Illuminating the Arts-Policy Nexus 

By Robert Valencia

There was a moment of glee in Colombia when the International Court of Justice began to announce their verdict over control of the San Andres Archipelago two months ago.  After decades of disagreement with Nicaragua, the ICJ ratified Colombia's sovereignty over the islands and islets.

Then, the ICJ President Peter Tomka read the verdict's final portion, and it was Nicaragua's turn to celebrate. The Hague-based Court granted Managua nearly 60 percent of the disputed seas, some 75,000 square meters of maritime territory, threatening the livelihoods of the archipelago's Colombian residents, who rely on fishing. In response, President Juan Manuel Santos vowed to ignore the ICJ and instead seek a diplomatic solution with Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega. This is not the first time a UN member country has disobeyed an ICJ verdict, putting the authority and efficacy of the body in question.  

A sense of loss pervades among Colombians, and this is not the first time Colombia has felt deprived. Between 1810 and 1952, Colombia lost vast territories to Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil, and Panama. It also unveiled Colombia's disastrous diplomatic management of the San Andrés case since it focused solely on the land’s sovereignty rather than including the maritime areas that keep the archipelago’s local economy afloat. Furthermore, former Colombian presidents Alvaro Uribe and Juan Manuel Santos continue to bicker for what seems like perpetuity. Santos blames Uribe for not having negotiated amicably with Daniel Ortega, whom Uribe called a “terrorist” for his ideological support of Colombia’s FARC rebels. The ICJ's decision led to the deployment of both Colombia and Nicaragua's navy fleets, in attempts to wield sovereignty over their respective maritime confines. In light of this, Santos withdrew Colombia from the Organization of American States’ Bogotá Pact in order to end ICJ’s jurisdiction over future territorial disputes.

In the wake of this case, it is the question of constitutionality that lingers. Should ICJ rules be the law of the land or are they an affront to the sovereignty of disputing nations? Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter contains provisions of the ICJ. The Charter’s Article 93 stipulates that all UN members are automatically members of the Court. Likewise, Article 94 states that all members must abide by the Court's decisions, and it bestows power upon the UN Security Council to enforce those decisions. But in reality, states don’t always comply with ICJ's rulings.

Even some Security Council members have disavowed various ICJ rulings. Take, for example, the case of France and New Zealand in 1973. The latter requested of the ICJ that France be barred from holding nuclear tests in the South Pacific, but France did not recognize ICJ’s competence and declined to participate in the Court’s hearings. In 1972, during the so-called “Cod Wars,” Iceland expanded its exclusive fishing zone from 12 to 50 miles, which sparked outrage in the United Kingdom and Germany. Iceland, for its part, did not attend any of the ICJ’s hearings, and the British sent fishing fleets to the area Iceland claimed as part of its economic zone. The ICJ ruled that Iceland’s new delimitations were invalid and granted the UK permission to fish beyond its 12-mile radius. Iceland, however, ignored the ICJ ruling, treating the sea far beyond its shores as its own, and threatened to close a major NATO base after the deployment of British naval ships within the disputed 200-mile-long seas.  The strife ended in 1976, when both Iceland and the United Kingdom agreed that British nationals could not fish in that zone.

A similar case occurred in Latin America, when in 1977 the ICJ ruled that the Beagle Channel’s islands of Picton, Lennox, and Nueva belonged to Chile, not Argentina. Argentina, under a military rule, rejected the ICJ’s verdict, which almost led to crossfire against Chile. In 1984, it was Pope Jean Paul II, and not the ICJ, that resolved the issue in an amicable way. Under the Treaty of Peace and Friendship, the islands were granted to Chile, with no retaliation coming from Argentina.

Perhaps both Nicaragua and Colombia should learn from the Chile-Argentina and the Iceland-UK incidents. Rather than dragging themselves to the brink of war, both countries must reach a peaceful agreement. By international law standards, the ruling is clear: Nicaragua has the right to 200 more nautical miles, and Colombia now has sovereignty over the archipelago. Nevertheless, the ICJ verdict put the inhabitants of the San Andrés’ islands at risk, preventing them fishing and feeding their families. This will ultimately serve as grounds to disobey yet another ICJ ruling. Countries should try and fix their territorial feuds amicably. ICJ all too often only aggravates already deep-seated tensions and should be turned to only as a last resort.

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Robert Valencia is a Research Fellow at the Council on Hemispheric Affairs and is a contributing writer for Global Voices. He also has a personal blog called My Humble Opinion.

[Photo Courtesy of Ecuador Presidency]