The pair of Iranian women, clad head-to-foot in black chadors are sitting on the floor in the ante-room waiting patiently, hopefully, desperately for the audience with their president that they hope might lift a tiny corner of the curtain of poverty that had enveloped them. Hours had passed and they are becoming increasingly frustrated. “I swear on the Koran, I can’t afford strawberries,” moans one. “I swear on the Koran, my child wanted strawberries. I had to save three weeks to buy them.” “You have to put on a strong face for your children,” says her friend. “Like a movie actress.” Then it all begins pouring out. The frustration, the panic, the desperation. Three weeks to wait for strawberries, and then $4 a kilo. I wait three weeks to go to the government subsidized store. It’s cheaper. Bananas are $2 a kilo. No milk, no yogurt, no meat. What should we eat? Yesterday, I was on the bus. Someone had bought some meat. And I wanted it. I asked her 'how much'? She bought it for $17. That little meat in her hand cost $17. We are retired with just $200 a month. So Mr. Ahmadinejad, what should we eat?” This dialogue was at the heart of an extraordinary documentary record assembled by the international filmmaker Petr Lom, whose “Letters to the President” will be shown on June 10 on HBO. That’s two days before voters will go to the polls in Iran to elect their new president, or re-elect the incumbent. The documentary revolves around one central component of the re-election strategy of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad—the letters that two million or more people have sent, e-mailed, or simply flung at him in his barnstorming trips around the nation. Nearly all the letters have one overwhelming theme: help me. I have no money, no job, my family is in desperate straits. Few receive any help or even real encouragement. Most will receive a reply. In a handful of cases, there is money attached. But for most, it is like the lottery. A few win. Most lose. But will hope spring eternal?

Welcome to the new era of democracy. Elections for the European Parliament, whose 736 elected members represent the 500 million citizens of the 27 member states of the European Union, take place at the end of the week.

Not since the time of the Roman Empire has there been such an agglomeration of the peoples of the world. This election will be the biggest transnational election in the history of humanity.

But a tower of Babel it is not. The Parliament is the under-reported Cinderella of the European Union. When the Treaty of Lisbon comes into effect, after what seems likely to be a successful Irish referendum in October, a re-ordering of the governance of the EU will give the Parliament more power, and will strengthen the authority of the Council of Ministers with a permanent president. (Finally, as Henry Kissinger wryly observed, he'll only have only one phone number to dial). To some it appears to be a contradictory development, but there is no reason why both should not be able to tolerate each others' new powers.

Stabilizing Afghanistan has emerged as one of the Obama administration’s top priorities. The president has expended significant effort to forge a new Afghan strategy, even firing the general in charge of the campaign in search of a fresh approach. Most discussions of the conflict focus on four actors: the insurgents, the Afghan government, the United States, and Pakistan. In fact, however, there is another important player in Afghanistan that receives much less attention: India. India has historic ties with Afghanistan and a long-standing relationship with its current leaders. Indian interests in Afghanistan largely converge with those of the United States and the international community. And India has invested considerable resources in helping to develop Afghanistan in the wake of civil war and Taliban rule. Thus India could potentially play an important future role in helping to stabilize the country. Such a role would not be without risk. Greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan could threaten Pakistan, thereby building support for the Taliban within the Pakistani military and security services. A greater role for Indian in Afghanistan might raise alarm in Islamabad, diverting Pakistani resources away from Afghanistan toward the border with India and increasing the likelihood of outright Indo-Pakistani conflict. Some basic diplomatic and military steps, however, would reduce these dangers and could help India to emerge as an important part of future efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Indo-Afghan Ties The Indo-Afghan relationship goes back centuries. Long before the advent of British colonial power, the region that is now present-day India had extensive cultural and trade links with Afghanistan. The British launched several expeditionary efforts into the country from India, usually with disastrous consequences. In 1893, a formal border between Afghanistan and India, known as the Durand line, was drawn. British colonial rule in South Asia lasted for another 60 years. When it came to a close in 1947, the nascent state of Pakistan came to abut Afghanistan in the east. In the aftermath of Britain’s departure from the subcontinent, the Afghans repudiated this border, causing considerable tension with now-neighboring Pakistan. New Delhi, for its part, established close ties with Afghanistan’s King Zahir Shah after independence, and maintained these links until the king’s overthrow in 1973. Even after Zahir Shah’s ouster and the emergence of a communist regime, India managed to keep close ties with subsequent Afghan governments. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan surprised and displeased New Delhi. But the Indians proved unable to cooperate with Pakistan on a solution to the problem. In addition, India was concerned by substantial United States military and economic assistance that began flowing to Pakistan—initially, $3.2 billion from 1981 to 1986. New Delhi also cared little for the Islamist mujahedeen groups that Pakistan was supporting to battle the Soviets. Finally, India did not wish to jeopardize its easy access to advanced Soviet weaponry. India therefore avoided any public censure of the U.S.S.R.’s occupation. Instead it chose to work with successive Soviet puppet regimes in Afghanistan. It also subsequently supported Ahmed Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance because of its hostility towards the Pakistan-supported mujahedeen groups. India’s ties to Afghanistan were sundered when the Taliban seized power in 1996. The Taliban victory, which owed much to Pakistani support, enabled Islamabad to achieve an important goal: the establishment of a pliant regime in Afghanistan, which would give Pakistan “strategic depth” against India. New Delhi abandoned its embassy and withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan. It did not, however, relinquish its ties to the Northern Alliance, and provided Massoud’s forces with a range of military and logistical backing. After September 11, 2001, India quietly supported the American-led effort to dismantle the Taliban regime. New Delhi was also pleased by U.S. efforts to promote the presidential bid of Hamid Karzai, who had lived and studied in India. After the Taliban’s fall, India moved quickly to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan. It re-opened its embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad, and established two new consulates in Herat and Mazhar-e-Sharif. It also became deeply involved in Afghan development, spending approximately $750 million, and pledging a total of $1.6 billion, to help rebuild the country—making India Afghanistan’s sixth-largest bilateral aid donor. Specific projects include efforts to rebuild the Afghan national airline, Ariana; construct telecommunications, power transmission, and road networks; improve sanitation; build a new Afghan parliament; and include Afghanistan in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A Possible Backlash? New Delhi believes that its extensive involvement in Afghanistan will help to stabilize the country, thereby reducing the likelihood of a Taliban resurgence, limiting Pakistan’s regional influence, and facilitating Indian ties with the energy-rich states of Central Asia. India’s wish for a stable, Taliban-free Afghanistan, and a demonstrated willingness to invest significant resources in developing the country, align closely with the interests of the United States and the international community. Indeed, a larger role for India could be an important component of the new strategy that the Obama administration is attempting to devise for Afghanistan. A larger Indian presence in Afghanistan poses a significant problem, however; it could threaten Pakistan.