Illuminating the Arts-Policy Nexus 

By Jamila El-Gizuli

Suspense is building for the final act of the self-styled “King of Kings of Africa.” It has been more than a week since Libyan rebels entered Tripoli, and within days, they seized Muammar Gaddafi's compound. Now, rebel forces hunt the Colonel “house by house, alleyway by alleyway.” Meanwhile, the Transitional National Council (TNC) issued an interim constitutional charter to establish order in newly conquered towns. The TNC has also gained recognition as a legitimate representative of the Libyan people by most Arab and some African countries. Undoubtedly, foreign backers facilitated these advances on the ground, but a recently leaked United Nations document that details Libya’s transition raises questions about the transparency of the current U.N. and NATO mission. In Libya and the region as a whole, there are concerns that foreign meddling in a nascent Libyan government will backfire in these already uncertain times.

On the face of it, the U.N.’s plan has a lot going for it. The 10-page internal document obtained by Inner City Press, a nonprofit investigative journalism organization, upholds the rights of women and minority groups, calls for provisions to guarantee inclusive representation and the rule of law, and outlines a rather speedy timeline—six to nine months—to elect a Provisional National Congress, which will write Libya’s new constitution. Prepared by Ian Martin, the U.N. special adviser on Libya, it also acknowledges the importance of restoring order with the help of a small U.N. police force, initially deploying 78 persons and later increasing them to 190. The U.N. Mine Action Service, already functioning on the ground in collaboration with other NGOs, will coordinate mine clearing actions “in case of operational U.N. military or police mandate.”

That much is all fine and dandy. But some of the provisions for “Post-Conflict” Libya are far more disturbing. The content reveals a number of schemes already executed and others in the process of being implemented that are not coming from Libyans themselves Interestingly, the document does not expose the chain of U.N. command, leaving one to wonder who’s really in charge, nor does it make any reference to a Libyan or U.N. Security Council approval of these activities.

The U.N. document shows that its Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has plans to deploy 200 United Nations Military Observers (UNMOs)—with five officers identified—while additional observers from “Arabic-speaking countries have been requested to provide the remaining officers needed.” It also speculates about the need for an interim protection force to enable the deployment of these UNMOs. These foreign troops, the document states, will be “a multi-national force under a lead nation command.” Two member states have already been provided with the force requirements, and, according to the document, their feedback is “awaited.” Indeed, a small U.N. police force is commendable as the report foresees their role as restoring public security and training Libyan police. On the other hand, having UNMOs and their protection force monitor “withdrawals, positions, and movements” of weapons and other domestic military activities is intrusive. While the document says some elements of the plan are conditional on a TNC request, it fails to mention, let alone explore, alternative scenarios or proposals. And why would it do that when foreign observers, security forces, and carefully selected member states are already acting on the plan?

When it comes to NATO, Martin writes that if the transitional authorities face a “major challenge” to stabilize Tripoli following the collapse of Gaddafi’s government, the responsibility to “protect the civilians” mandated by the Security Council to NATO “does not end with the fall of the Gaddafi government and, therefore, NATO would continue to have some responsibilities.” No Security Council approval “would be needed for these kinds of tasks, other than the general mandate for the mission.” This thought has been repeated time and again by NATO officials including at the recent NATO and allied forces meeting in Doha in light of its mission’s approaching Sept. 27 deadline. This would be the second time NATO’s mission is extended. All that is required for the extension is approval by the Alliance’s 28 members.

What is concerning is the operational extension, not the temporal one. Protection of the civilians must continue until Gaddafi and his supporters stop their attacks, but it must not be used as an excuse to clandestinely influence domestic politics. Take, for instance, the report published in June by Le Figaro that French forces air-dropped light arms and ammunition to Libyan rebels in the Nafusa Mountains. Col. Thierry Burkhard, spokesman for the French general staff, confirmed the report, arguing it was necessary to protect the rebels from Gaddafi’s assaults. Then, the U.S. presented its own interpretation of Security Council Resolution 1973, highlighting paragraph four that authorizes “all necessary measures” to “protect civilian and civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.” So far, NATO has not ruled out the possibility of expanding their mission in Libya.

At this phase, the brutality of Gaddafi’s regime supersedes violations committed by or attributed to the rebels, so who to help is obvious. In the post-Gaddafi phase, however, it may not be as clear. Should any split occur within the rebels’ ranks, the consequence of NATO interfering or, worse, taking sides would be dire. At that stage, foreign military assistance to either side threatens turning disagreements that could be resolved within tribal conventions into a civil war. TNC has ruled out the possibility of foreign forces playing a major role. It needs to maintain that firm stance. Foreign involvement, even in good faith, to remove an old regime can make the new government indebted to outsiders. The new authority must be accountable to its people and not the foreign players that assisted them. Libyans, and only Libyans, must decide their electoral and governance systems in accordance to their diverse culture, history, and national interests.

Imposing plans envisioned by foreigners who cling to abstract notions of state-building while being disconnected from the reality on the ground is dangerous. From the arbitrary borders drawn by colonial powers in Sudan to the Iraqi constitution, drafted under U.S. auspices, the region’s history offers a wealth of evidence for this. Moreover, the U.N.’s plan drafted and implemented on Libya’s behalf gives the impression of a paternalistic hijacking of the revolution. Should it be carried out, it threatens to smother the unique characteristic of these Arab revolutions—the people’s voices. In the coming weeks, the world will watch the curtains fall on Gaddafi’s reign, but foreign powers need to leave the next Act to Libyans.

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Jamila El-Gizuli is a doctoral student of comparative politics at the Graduate Center of the City University of New York focusing on the political development of Persian Gulf states and the governance systems of ethnically diverse nations. She can be followed on Twitter @jamilaelgizuli.

[Photo courtesy of Flickr user ЯAFIK ♋ BERLIN]