Illuminating the Arts-Policy Nexus 

I believe this is the most neutral account of the recent situation in Bangladesh: http://shahbagprotest.wordpress.com/ An Unbiased Account Of The Shahbag Protest In Bangladesh, 2013 The Shahbag Protest of 2013 in Bangladesh is a gathering of thousands of protesters in the Shahbag area of the capital city of Dhaka, Bangladesh, that began on Tuesday, February 5th, 2013, with the demand of capital punishment for Abdul Quader Mollah and other accused war criminals of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh. There is a confusion regarding actual leadership of the protest. The Awami League government claims that the protest is a demonstration of public support for their party and also that they are not leading it in any way. Many in Bangladesh would disagree with both of these claims but it cannot be denied that many who have joined the protest don’t support Awami League. Many are ordinary citizens who are unaware of the complicated legal or constitutional implications that their demands might involve. Even though the protest was supposed to be a reaction against Awami League government failure to prosecute effectively, it actually took shape more in the form of anger and hatred towards the defendants, and since the trial of war time collaborators is specifically a government initiative, many don’t have the option of not going along with the government and many even don’t have the interest or capacity to do so . All protesters are being supplied with food and drinks regularly and although a full list of the sources of funding have not yet been published, some pro government companies and some that are in the government blacklist for tax evasions or other legal irregularities, such as the Bashundhara Group, have voluntarily revealed the amount of their contribution towards the protest and made it clear that it is actually them, and not the government, who are funding the protest. The amount revealed has been found by many observers to be justifying only a small proportion of the actual funding that must have been required by the protest. The protest has been described as peaceful in general but there are scattered reports of extortion of companies by allegedly Awami League supporting mobs, who, it is claimed, had blackmailed some of those companies with statements such as “if you don’t pay for the welfare of Shahbag, you will be reported as agent company to war criminals”. Recent news also reported of threats to politically neutral critics, professors and journalists and an attempt to label a popular freedom fighter of the 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh, Kader Siqqiqui, also known as Bongo Bir (the Hero of Bengal), as a Rajakar (war time traitor) by the protesters at Shahbag for denying to go along with the present government. There are also rumors that girls have been abducted (allegedly for fun?) from Shahbag by government supporting youth, although its authenticity is yet to be established. Opponents of the protest claim that majority of the local media are covering the situation in Bangladesh from a biased standpoint, so there might be more about the protest than what we actually know. The government has taken action against some media (local and online) that were spreading critical views on the government or the protest. Demands And Legal Implications The specific demands of the protesters and how to achieve them are not yet clear and is a popular topic in the media, the talk shows and the academia. It is not a protest about bringing the accused to trial but a demand for some specific punishment. It still remains to be clarified as to how it is that the protesters want the government to influence the verdict of a court, how it is that a court can be bound by some pre-decided non-judicial verdict or whether being accused itself is a sufficient criterion for guilt. A second trial would conflict with the basic principle of law that a person cannot be tried twice for the same offense. For some, a viable option that is left is for the prosecution to appeal to superior courts and wait for the judges there to take the sentiment of the protesters into account. The government has promised to amend the law with provisions for the prosecution to appeal against sentencing, but this gave rise to further concerns among the intellectual circles of Bangladesh as to why the initial trial was not conducted under such provisions. Nevertheless, even that would be a matter of time and many are finding it difficult to ascertain as to what could immediately be offered to the ongoing protests. As the protest progresses, it is is slowly turning its demands of hanging the culprits of 1971 to the banning of the whole of Jamaat-e-Islami and all organizations, banks, schools, hospitals and companies affiliated to it, and some have even cried out for the banning of all forms of religious politics, outraging a devout Muslim majority across the country. Meanwhile, armed supporters of the government have attacked many institutions around the country without warning, causing casualties, including death. Historical Context And Development Of The Protest Abdul Quader Mollah was charged with abetting the Pakistani army and actively participating in the 1971 atrocities in Bangladesh. In 1973, he, along with others, was pardoned as part of a general amnesty issued by the Awami League government at that time, under Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, due to legal difficulties surrounding the issue. After forty years, the present Awami League government, under Sheikh Hasina, resumed the trial of some of the accused by setting up a special tribunal and naming it the International Crimes Tribunal to win back the support of the public amidst massive dissatisfaction regarding Awami League rule since 2009. On February 5, 2013, the International Crimes Tribunal of Bangladesh sentenced Mollah to life in prison after he was proven guilty in five out of the six charges against him. Within hours of the verdict, an online community, the Blogger and Online Activists Network (BOAN), successfully managed to publicize its event to protest the verdict, to be held at Shahbag, primarily with the help of the social networking site Facebook. Initially members of the Chhatra League, the student wing of Awami League, initiated the protest, but soon were joined by many neutral people who wanted revenge for the 1971 war time activities of Jamaat-e-Islami and also by passive, curious observers and those who just wanted to be a part of an important event whatever its agenda might be, after the mainstream media covered the protest at Shahbag nationwide through TV channels with statements such as “the nation is getting united in the manner of Tahrir Sqaure”. The protest has continued ever since. The Murder of Rajib Haider After a tiring ten day period it was decided by the protesters that the protest would be continued only symbolically from Friday, 15th February, 2013, onwards. But on that same day, Rajib Haider, who was among the bloggers who initially called for the Shahbag protest, was brutally murdered by unidentified individuals after he returned from the protest that day. The government blamed it on Jamaat-e-Islami while Jamaat-e-Islami officially denied the allegation. Government activists requested the protesters that the protest be rekindled and carried on in the previous manner until revenge is extracted on Jamaat-e-Islami. Nationwide Reactions Opinions vary regarding the motives, the method and the outcome of the protest. In Bangladesh there are many who are supporting the protest strongly. Many among them are ordinary citizens but there is also a significant number of Awami League activists merged within the crowd. Those who do not want the government to hijack the protest for their own purposes have tried to prevent government officials to speak in the protest. But government supporters are also active and have physically injured a female protester who was trying to prevent a government official speak. The second group of people are the supporters of Jamaat-e-Islami, who are openly denouncing the protest as a plot instigated by the ruling Awami League to neutralize political opponents and to divert anti-government sentiments before the coming of the next general election. They are arguing for their democratic right to participate in politics, which, many protesters believe, they do not have. They claim that the initial tribunal set up by Awami League was not fair enough, proven by reports from several international entities complaining of procedural restrictions on the defense and the admissibility of hearsay evidence in favor of the prosecution, the abduction of defense witnesses by law enforcers and the sensitive information regarding the trial process that were leaked when a Skype conference of the chairman of the tribunal went public revealing government pressure on the tribunal. They claim that their few central leaders have been accused retrospectively for crimes committed by many localized individuals during the 1971 wars. They also claim that the passing of the life sentence in the initial trial was intentional and influenced by the government, as a protest supporting government cause was what the government wanted most to achieve from it, which would eventually enable them to achieve not only the elimination of political opposition but also show public support for it and at the same time neutralize massive anti-government sentiments that arose during their rule since 2009. They claim that the breadth and scope of the Shahbag protest are being highly exaggerated and publicized by elements of the government while Jamaat-e-Islami supporters are being killed nationwide during strikes and demonstrations without being covered significantly by the media. There is a rumor that they have already threatened the government with civil war. Many religious minded people and groups are sympathizing with Jamaat-e-Islami. A third group of people (probably a majority of the people) have appreciated the spirit of the protest but believe that singling out only the capital punishment of the criminals of 1971 among hundreds of other issues bothering the country today would be an immature policy to adopt and would only benefit the cause of an increasingly fascism embracing Awami League, when, in reality, the major cause of crisis in Bangladesh today are in fact the activities of the ruling political parties, Awami League and BNP. They believe that all issues haunting the country today should now be put together and the energy channeled towards a real change in national politics in the spirit of the Language Movement of 1952 or the Liberation War of 1971, and that the Shahbag protest is achieving just only the opposite: creating support for a corrupt government by promoting selective issues. They believe that misusing the sentiments of 1971 Liberation War of Bangladesh in politics is just as appalling as misusing religion in politics and that its time to usher in an era where politics would be about people’s welfare. They believe that the government is taking advantage of a nation’s nature of “going with the crowd” to realize their ambitions of staying in power and exploit the country for another five years. This third group of people would not like to see the mainstream political parties such as Awami League, BNP or Jamaat-e-Islami in power, at least not without major internal reforms, any longer. International Reactions Since 2009, under Awami League, Bangladesh has suffered some downturns in international relations (with the exception of India, whom Awami League traditionally considers to be a source of political and diplomatic strength) and it is yet to be seen how the international community reacts to the protest at Shahbag. Till date, international media has tried to cover the situation in Bangladesh as objectively as possible but some coverages, particularly those by journalists who are themselves Bangladeshi expatriates, echo the same pro-government/anti-government bias that, to this day, has prevented, and will continue to prevent, the thoughtful progress of their own country into anything desirable. The text of this page is available for modification and reuse under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-Sharealike 3.0 Unported License and the GNU Free Documentation License (unversioned, with no invariant sections, front-cover texts, or back-cover texts).