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WORLD
POLICY JOURNAL
ARTICLE:
Volume XV, No 1, SPRING 1998
A New Era
of Overstretch? American Policy in Europe and Asia
David P. Calleo
American foreign and defense policy has been frequently criticized
in recent years for lacking a coherent strategy adequate to the
challenges and opportunities of the post-Cold War era. These complaints
were raised occasionally in the Bush administration, despite its
rather spectacular historic successes, but have become particularly
insistent during the Clinton administration. Part of the problem
stems from the election of 1992 that brought Clinton to power. His
campaign focused on the shortcomings of the domestic economy ("It's
the economy, stupid!") and depicted George Bush as uninterested
in domestic matters and bemused by geopolitical visions. His tactic
was to display his own preoccupation with domestic issues, but to
avoid spelling out its corollary in foreign policy so as not to
identify himself as an "isolationist."
Ignoring foreign policy was good politics for a Democrat, whose
party, given half a chance, was always ready to split into its old
pro-and anti-Vietnam wings. Attacking Bush's foreign policy directly
was thus left to Ross Perot, who, in many respects, dominated the
election intellectually. Perot not only relentlessly criticized
Bush and Reagan for mismanaging domestic affairs but combined the
themes of economic degeneration, fiscal deficits, and falling working
class incomes with geopolitical overextension-a package put together
by the so-called "declinist" scholars at the end of the
1980s. Perot made 1992 the declinist election and, by taking nearly
20 percent of the votes, made Clinton president, albeit with less
than a majority of the popular vote. Between votes for Clinton and
votes for Perot, however, the electorate seemed to have registered
an overwhelming preference for a vigorous pursuit of domestic regeneration.
Al-though Clinton's campaign strategy had worked, it gave him scant
mandate for a different sort of foreign policy. Had the Cold War
continued, with its heavy demand on American resources, the tension
between Clinton's domestic goals and the customary Cold War military
expenses would probably have led to serious problems.
The tension never developed because the Cold War soon ended. Few
initiatives needed to be taken in American foreign policy, since
the initiatives that changed the world for the better and relieved
the United States of its Cold War burdens had already been taken
by others-by the Soviets, who had retreated and then collapsed,
and by the Germans, who had reunited. The United States, having
skillfully eased and consolidated the Soviet retreat and successfully
ejected Iraq from Kuwait, found itself in a position to settle back
and enjoy the fiscal fruits of a well-deserved peace dividend. The
administration and Congress together proceeded to cut the defense
budget severely. From FY 1989, when Bush came into office, through
FY 1998 (January estimate), defense spending fell by over 30 percent
in real terms, some $109 billion in FY 1992 dollars. By contrast,
nondefense spending rose by roughly 28 percent over the same period-by
some $264 billion in constant 1992 dollars.1
Ironically, Clinton's domestic accomplishments in his first term
were not the reforms that he emphasized in his campaign, notably
the health care that he failed egregiously to implement, but the
remarkable improvements in the country's fiscal balance. When Clinton
took office in 1993, the fiscal deficit (on budget) stood at 4.6
percent of GDP. By January of FY 1998, it was estimated to be 1.3
percent of GDP.2 The fall in defense spending played a major role
in the improvement. During Clinton's first term (from FY 1993 through
FY 1996), when the level of the annual fiscal deficit fell by $151.5
billion, the level of annual defense spending dropped by $46.3 billion,
both figures in constant 1992 dollars. The contribution of defense
for the period 1989-98 is still more telling. As the level of the
annual deficit dropped by $162.7 billion, the level of national
defense spending dropped by $109 billion-all in constant FY 1992
dollars.3
Clinton's fiscal record denied the Republicans their favorite campaign
issue and led to his easy reelection in 1996. The other factor that
helped him greatly was the exceptionally long boom, dating from
1992 and adroitly nursed along by the generous monetary policy of
the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan. The low interest rates
that fueled the boom also helped to control the deficit. Thanks
to Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin's adept management, the
only other favorable fiscal change to rival cuts in defense spending
was the much lower relative cost of financing the federal debt.
Between FY 1992 and FY 1998, the costs of net interest (on budget)
rose by only $66 billion in current dollars-from $223 billion to
$289 billion4-despite an increase in the gross federal debt in the
same period of $1.541 trillion-from $4.002 trillion to $5.543 trillion.5
The low interest rates managed to work their benefits without bringing
on inflation, presumably because America's relative openness to
trade from Asia made it difficult to raise the prices of goods,
while globalization in production and advances in labor-saving technology
helped to keep wages down, despite record low unemployment. Even
today, the only real sign of gathering inflation in the American
economy seems to be the extremely high stock market. Optimists-official
and private-judge even that not as asset inflation but as a reflection
of faith in American economic vitality. This bubble, which some
analysts believe is overripe for bursting, lends a certain nagging
precariousness to what otherwise seems a remarkable achievement.
As a result of the fiscal gains of Clinton's first term, his 1999
budget was able to estimate a balanced total budget by the year
1999.6 Considering that the deficit total stood at 4.7 percent of
GDP in 1992, the improvement seems highly impressive. It should
be noted that actual defense outlays in the official projections
continue to fall-by another $4 billion between FY 1998 and FY 2003
in 1992 dollars.7
No Defense Strategy
Along with his admirable economic record, Clinton has confronted
growing disaffection in the defense community. While the large military
cuts were providing the foundation for his fiscal achievement, critics
felt these cuts had not been linked to any coherent changes in strategic
and geopolitical doctrine. Clinton's first secretary of defense,
Les Aspin, went through the motions of a serious defense review-the
"bottom-up" review of 1993. But its conclusions, which
merely reaffirmed a basic strategy of preparing for two wars simultaneously,
were almost universally a source of disappointment. Given the big
defense cuts that actually had been occurring, not to mention the
changes in the world, continuing with old definitions of old commitments
seemed excessively inadequate. More recent efforts have not mollified
the critics.
Foreign policy in Clinton's first term was, however, more or less
in harmony with his budget. Quietly, Clinton seemed to be adopting
a sort of devolutionist foreign policy, at least in Europe, that
was a symmetrical accompaniment to declining American military spending.
European efforts to organize collectively for their own defense
were seemingly encouraged, along with efforts to "reform"
NATO into a more European-directed organization. The admini-stration
gave the impression that Americans would stick around but not get
in the way.
Clinton spoke little of this at home but did spell it out clearly
enough in a speech before the French National Assembly in June 1994,
where he welcomed European efforts to develop common defense policies
and forces, and appeared to be open to a significant Europeanization
of NATO. Meanwhile, American ambitions for NATO's role in any new
European construction seemed notably restrained. The "Partnership
for Peace" sought to reach out to Russia as well as its neighbors,
but without changing the basic membership of NATO itself.
A certain strategic vision could be inferred from this reticent
European policy-a multipolar world in which the United States would
play the role of general balancing power but would not aspire to
the high-profile hegemonic role implied in the Bush era's notion
of a unipolar world, with the United States as its only superpower.
Clinton's Ambitions
In Asia, the Clinton administration appeared ready to take a somewhat
more commanding role, not from any great enthusi-asm for it, but
from the apparent lack of any alternative. This was brought home
to the administration by the gathering crisis over North Korea's
nuclear ambitions. The United States, meanwhile, continued its familiar
trade dispute with Japan and uneasy engagement with China.
In the State Department, grand ration-alizations of foreign policy
were out of fashion. Secretary of State Warren Christopher prided
himself on a problem-solving approach to the world's difficulties.
There was considerable American involvement in the world's trouble
spots but obvious reluctance to commit forces or even money to foreign
policy goals. The unhappy experience in Somalia had encouraged America's
military leaders of the time to perfect the argument that the armed
forces should never be engaged unless they could use force without
inhibition and had a clear chance of winning quickly without extensive
casualties. Under no circumstances were they to be committed in
ambiguous situations that could not be resolved by military means.
In practice, this amounted to unwillingness to commit military forces
almost anywhere. Arguably, the combination of ad hoc diplomacy and
diffident military doctrine was ideal for Clinton's domestic priorities-to
bring the deficit under control and renew the domestic economy.
A more ambitious and hegemonic-sounding note did emerge occasionally
out of the National Security Council-a sort of low-grade, low-wattage
Wilsonian rhetoric concerned with prodding the world toward universal
democracy. But given the cautious pragmatism of the State Department
and the chronic diffidence of the military, the rhetoric was not
taken very seriously. And in practice, it was applied with obvious
reluctance, as, for example, in Haiti.
These characteristics of early Clinton foreign policy were probably
manifested at their worst in the Yugoslav crisis. Starting with
the Bush administration, the United States was happy not to get
involved mili-tarily in what Europeans regarded as their own problem.
On the other hand, the United States interfered diplomatically all
the time, primarily to discourage the Moslems from accepting any
offer of a negotiated settlement. This policy went on for several
years and undoubtedly did very little to help the Europeans resolve
the situation themselves.
As the 1996 election campaign approached, Clinton possibly felt
vulnerable to the widespread criticism of his "lack of leadership"
in foreign affairs. Events in Yugoslavia were not proceeding at
all well under the "hands off" approach, and French president
Jacques Chirac, elected in 1995, was demanding that the U.S. military
get involved. The successful NATO intervention, coupled with Assistant
Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke's bravura diplomacy, dissolved
the administration's old image of weakness in foreign policy. Clinton
suddenly became a resolute world leader, as the United States demonstrated
its indis-pensability as the manager of the Western alliance.
Since Bosnia, the administration's Wilsonian rhetoric has had what
is described in electrical terms as a "heavy up." Not
only has the president been lecturing the rest of the world about
the virtues of the American economy, but American hegemony has also
been forcefully reasserted in NATO and the limits of American interest
in developing a European-run alliance once more made clear. More
significant still, membership in NATO is to be extended to East
European countries, despite implacable if ineffective Russian opposition.
Meanwhile, there has been no diminishing of the traditional American
role in Asia. If anything, the recent show of force in the Taiwan
Strait has elevated America's Asian military role to a level not
seen in several years. There is certainly a great deal of semi-official
talk about the increasing danger to American interests of a rapidly
growing China, which has more and more money to spend on arms.8
At the same time, no real improvement has been made in America's
troubled economic relations with Japan, itself going through a prolonged
political and financial crisis. In other words, the United States
seems to be taking a strong position-not particularly conciliatory
to either China or Japan. In Asia as well as in Europe, the new
United States comes across as aggressively assertive.
Arguably, this new American assertiveness is merely the restoration
of normal American foreign policy, unavoidable given the world's
real conditions. From a certain perspective, it never was realistic
to imagine that the United States could retreat to the position
of primus inter pares in a multipolar world. Like it or not, the
United States must continue to play the leading hege-monic role
in Europe and Asia both. Thus, the administration has belatedly
discovered what it should have known from the beginning, or perhaps
it did know it from the start but cleverly took advantage of a lull
in its responsibilities to restore the country's domestic strength.
Having done so, the United States now stands ready to resume its
traditional hegemonic role-and to redefine it for the new world
order.
Sour Notes
There is, however, an insistent sour note in this fashionable litany
of American self-congratulation, and it derives from the tensions
implicit in Clinton's electoral success of 1992: how can the administration
harmonize its ongoing fiscal policy with its new, more ambitious,
foreign policy? There has apparently been a significant change in
the ambitions of the administration's foreign policy without, so
far, much corresponding change in its defense budget. The administration's
fiscal projections continue to count on a low, indeed, a falling
military budget, which remains an essential element in achieving
its promised fiscal balance early in the new century.
This disconnect naturally raises the question of whether the administration
really has a coherent overall strategy to link its fiscal and geopolitical
policies. Beyond is the further issue of whether the administration
has a coherent foreign policy, and in particular whether its Asian
and European parts are complementary or contradictory. Some of President
Clinton's foreign colleagues and domestic critics claim, for example,
that the shifts in NATO policy were adventitious responses to particular
opportunities and electoral pressures.9 The administration would
no doubt hotly dispute the charge.
A sensible way to explore these questions further is to look at
the commitments and fiscal consequences implicit in America's European
and Asian policies-to see first whether together they reveal a coherent,
overarching geopolitical strategy, and second, whether that geopolitical
strategy, coherent or not, is in harmony with domestic fiscal strategy
and expectations.
Implications of NATO Enlargement
As essential background, it is worth noting just how very expensive
the Cold War in Europe was for the United States, and why it was
so. The principal reason was the need to maintain a large American
conventional army, a requirement that emerged from the character
of the nuclear balance as it evolved between the United States and
the Soviet Union. The NATO commitment was assumed at a time when
the United States could hit Soviet targets but was itself invulnerable
to a Soviet nuclear attack. The Soviet Union began to achieve strategic
parity with the United States at the end of the 1950s, and did so
by the early 1970s, when it developed MIRV technology.
As the reality of the situation bore in on American strategic planners,
they became more and more terrified of a commitment to Europe that
left an American president with few options between surrendering
to a Soviet conventional attack in Europe or launching a nuclear
war that could be expected to encompass America's home territory.
The situation was further complicated because both the French and
the British developed their own nuclear deterrents, together with
a strategic doctrine to make them triggers to intercontinental escalation
if any war did begin in Europe. For the Europeans, making this strategy
explicit seemed the best way to ensure that no European war would
actually break out. Their particular nightmare was a war between
the superpowers that was confined to Europe. But the American nightmare
was a war that began in Europe and spread to the United States.
The American remedy was to insist upon a large conventional capability
for NATO. The problem was that the Europeans were uninterested in
providing the conventional forces required-partly, at least, because
they feared such forces would detract from nuclear deterrence and
make a war more likely. Moreover, the United States insisted upon
being in charge of all the conventional forces, through SACEUR,
so as to control any escalation that might occur. Ultimately, the
French simply pulled out of the military arrangements, and the alliance
thereupon adopted the American "flexible response" doctrine.
The resulting solution, if efficacious militarily, was also extremely
expensive for the United States. In the 1980s, the Pentagon began
claiming that roughly $150 billion annually was devoted to forces
honor-ing the NATO commitment, fully half of its huge budget. This
situation fed an interminable and often acrimonious quarrel between
Americans and Europeans over bur-den sharing. Throughout most of
the Cold War, even the major European countries spent a much lower
percentage of GDP on defense than the United States.10 America's
high defense spending could, of course, be used to explain its difficulty
in maintaining a fiscal balance.
American taxpayers refused to pay anything like the level of taxes
paid by Europeans, arguably because of the relatively low proportion
of civilian benefits that they received in return. That low proportion
of civilian return could be attributed to the high level of military
spending, which, on occasion, accounted for roughly half of all
federal spending and never fell below a quarter throughout the Cold
War. Given the relatively undisciplined American constitutional
structure and the privileged role of the dollar, it was easier to
run fiscal deficits, financed alternately by inflation or foreign
borrowing, than it was to cut either military spending or the already
comparatively low level of civilian benefits.11 Thus, once the Cold
War ended, the United States received enormous fiscal benefits.
A weak and friendly Russia meant that large forces could be withdrawn
from Eu-rope. Indeed, American forces in Western Europe (European
Command) have been cut from well over 300,000 in 1989 to somewhere
around 122,000 at the moment.12 A series of brilliant arms control
agreements continuing from the Bush administration have consolidated
the reductions while further enhancing security with various limits
on the deployment of conventional forces.
Clinton's relatively passive approach to European diplomacy followed
naturally from these accomplishments. A hostile superpower confronting
the West in the middle of Germany was a situation that obviously
called for a strong American presence and leadership. That confrontation
was now over. The new problems were those of ethnic quarrels, border
disputes, criminality and general disorder-most of which went hand
in hand with the resurrection and transformation of the states of
Eastern Europe.
The United States wished to retain a significant military presence
but hoped that the Europeans could manage the messysecurity problems
arising from the Soviet withdrawal, particularly in the Balkans.
It was hoped that the European Union (EU) would quickly embrace
the newly liberated countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and
the United States seemed not to object to a parallel development
of the Western European Union as the EU's military arm. At the same
time, the United States remained diffident about formal extensions
of NATO, although Washington offered all sorts of cooperative arrangements
to East European countries, and most particularly to the Russians.
Managing Europe
The switch began with President Clinton's July 1994 visit to Poland,
where he spoke of extending NATO membership. After the intervention
in Bosnia, and particularly during the presidential campaign of
1996, Clinton enthusiastically endorsed NATO's enlargement. The
limits to U.S. interest in the Europeanization of the alliance also
grew increasingly apparent, prompting the French, who seemed ready
to reenter NATO's military structures, once more to stand aloof
from them. It is difficult to see how any of this can logically
be regarded in America's national interest unless the United States
is now determined to assume a very direct hegemonic role in managing
European se-curity problems. That disposition seems confirmed not
only by U.S. proposals for NATO enlargement but by the expansive
character of those proposals, which appear to be intentionally maximalist
rather than limited in scope.
Limited enlargement could mean merely an extension of NATO membership
to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, with perhaps Slovenia,
Slovakia, and even Croatia eventually to follow. Such an enlargement
could be presented as a once-for-all adjustment of those East-West
borders that had been artificially altered by the Cold War. In effect,
it would mean returning a much Westernized Poland and the old crown
lands of Austria to the West. The Russians could be soothed by being
told that such measures were simply rectifying Stalin's historic
wrongs against obviously Western countries. Arguably, Romania and
Bulgaria might be construed into membership under a similar rationale,
namely that they need stabilizing and are of little interest to
the Russians.
Part of such a policy, however, would have to be the explicit renouncing
of NATO expansion to countries that are clearly seen by the Russians
as vital to themselves, in particular to former territories of the
So-viet Union, notably the Baltic States and Ukraine. But no such
renunciation has been forthcoming. On the contrary, whatever its
real intentions, the administration seems to be taking a deliberately
maximalist tone. The president himself toured Eastern Eu-rope to
promise further openings, and NATO now claims already to be readying
a second slate of candidates. Clinton has continued to signal his
intention to see the Baltic States' eventual inclusion.13 Meanwhile,
the United States has been cultivating close relations with Ukraine
and showing a strong interest in Central Asian states as well. In
other words, the United States seems firmly embarked on a policy
of advancing not only its political and economic but also its military
influence eastward.
The appeal of such policies is easily understood. Western countries
feel benevolent toward the East Europeans and perhaps more than
a little guilty about their harsh fate throughout most of the twentieth
century. The governments of these East European states, supported
by varying degrees of popular enthusiasm, are pressing very hard
to be included. The Germans, hoping to roll eastward NATO's "carpet
of stability," have also been pressing the United States for
expansion. The French, whatever their real thoughts, cannot afford
to seem less enthusiastic. Many European countries, beginning to
calculate the costs and other difficulties of EU expansion, perhaps
see NATO as a heaven-sent stopgap.
The Defeat of Russia
The problem remains that NATO expansion seems bound to outrage the
historic sensibilities of Russians and make them afraid for the
future. It may be wondered whether any great power would be willing
to put up with this kind of intrusion into its adjacent areas. For
centuries, Russians have regarded these regions as part of their
own sphere. Russians, moreover, seem bound to see these Western
moves as a direct violation of promises made at the time of German
reunification. Belatedly, the United States and Ger-many are acting
as victors. The result is that Russians will see themselves as defeated.
TheWest is thus denying the Russians their useful fiction, not altogether
false, that Russia itself created the new Europe by freeing its
empire at the same time as it threw off its own totalitarian shackles.
What NATO enlargement is saying is that Russia was defeated and
that the West is now collecting its gains.
Russia seems in no position to confront the West head on. Russian
leaders probably believe it would be counterproductive to make any
show of force, even if they were capable of it. It would merely
rejuvenate the Cold War's old anti-Russian alliance. Russia needs
time and Western investment to transform its domestic economy and
refashion its society. But the grievances are nevertheless likely
to rankle and to alienate Russia from the West over the long run.
Even in the short term, there are formidable opportunity costs to
the West from driving Russia back into hostile isolation. Russia
could refuse, now or later, to ratify or honor the numerous recent
arms control treaties that are rightly thought to be highly advantageous
to the West-far more so, some experts think, than any putative advantages
of adding new members to NATO and modernizing their armies.
Even in its present weakened state, Russia could cause NATO acute
difficulties by stirring up the incipient disorder in neighboring
states. Over time, the West can only lose by antagonizing Russia.
It is an immensely rich and populous country, with impressive military
traditions and highly advanced technology. Even now it remains a
nuclear superpower and seems unlikely to remain militarily weak
indefinitely. Once Russia is restored, it may be wondered how significant
American guarantees would be for NATO's new members, were the Russians
to grow seriously hostile. Would the United States be prepared to
launch a nuclear war for the defense of a disputed Polish border,
a civil war in Ukraine, or a swift takeover of Estonia?
Making such American commitments responsibly implies a willingness
to create a military structure that would make the commitments effective,
without at the same time creating unbearable risks of nuclear war.
If the past is any guide, such a military structure will be extremely
expensive. Indeed, by comparison with the relatively short and precisely
defined NATO boundaries that existed in Central Europe during the
Cold War period, organizing a conventional defense for the proposed
new NATO is inherently a far more formidable task. The cost of modernizing
the armies of the putative new NATO members is, in itself, likely
to be considerable, even by conservative estimates.14 New member
countries in the throes of economic transformation clearly have
better uses for their scarce resources.
The Clinton administration, sporting its hard-won credentials for
fiscal responsibility, blithely assumes that the military im-plications
of enlargement will be slightand that the West Europeans will, in
any event, bear a large part of the costs. Nei-ther assumption seems
very secure. A new transatlantic burden-sharing row of major proportions
may well be in the making. In short, America's new European policy
has major military, fiscal, and diplomatic implications.
China's Ambitions
NATO enlargement not only raises important issues of cost and risk
in Europe but seems also to carry significant implications for American
policy in Asia, which is, of course, America's other great area
of strategic concern. After 1950, the United States undertook to
contain the Soviet Union and Communist China in Asia, just as it
undertook to contain the Soviets in Europe. In Asia, however, the
United States actually fought two wars to do so. As in Europe, America's
Asian role was partly explained by the need to prevent the malignant
revival of an indigenous great power whose ambitions had devastated
the region-Germany in Europe, Japan in Asia. Japan was persuaded
to adhere to a nuclear nonproliferation treaty, as was Germany,
on the grounds that the United States would provide adequate extended
nuclear deterrence.
As in Europe, it was initially relatively easy to pledge that extended
deterrence, since both potential major antagonists-China and the
Soviet Union-were incapable of attacking the American homeland.
After the Soviet Union achieved strategic parity, overall U.S.-Soviet
strategic relations nevertheless remained reasonably stable, not
least because the Soviets fell out with their erstwhile Chinese
allies. That falling out rendered China a more tractable antagonist
in Asia. Without its Soviet ally, with whom it was now on very bad
terms, with only rudimentary nuclear forces of its own, and in the
midst of all the upheavals of the Mao era, China was in no position
to challenge the United States militarily.
The Soviet collapse has not really improved this American position
in Asia, where the problem is not Russian ambition but Chinese.
China after Mao has been growing very rapidly economically, according
to its own singular model of authoritarianism tempered by anarchy.
Its economy seems destined to become the world's largest within
a decade or so. The rate of social change is so frenetic as to raise
questions about China's continuing social and political stability.
Meanwhile, many analysts are worried about China's growing military
spending and capacity. In short, China is a giant on the move-full
of conflicting forces and tendencies.
The question for American policymakers is whether this China is
programmed to be aggressive-inevitably driven to dominate its region
and, in the process, to challenge the United States. Arguments can
be marshaled on all sides of the issue. There seems no reason to
assume, a priori, an implacable Chinese hostility to the West, let
alone a mindless and self-destructive expansionism. But the potential
threat is sufficient to require reasonable precautions. China seems
more likely to develop in a way that is benign for its neighbors,
for the world in general, and indeed for itself if it is surrounded
by a balanced regional security structure. Arguably, it is America's
historic role to create such a structure.
Analysts naturally speculate on what the nature of that future Asian
security structure might be. Three obvious models come to mind:
China the regional hegemon, America the region's hegemonic balancer,
and a multipolar regional balance made up of China, India, Japan,
Russia, and the United States. The noted American analyst, Samuel
Huntington, author of The Clash of Civilizations and the Making
of World Order, expects the first model, Chinese hegemony, to prevail
over the long run, in part because he sees it as the traditional
historic pattern. Asian states will know how to adapt to it, he
suspects. They will understand how to defer without sacrificing
too much indepen-dence, just as the Chinese will probably be wise
enough not to exaggerate their hegemony. Huntington, of course,
is currently emphasizing the "civilizational" aspects
of geo-political affinities. It seems natural to him that "Sinic"
Asian states will ultimately stick together under their traditional
leader. He includes the Japanese in this Sinic grouping and expects
them to kowtow to Beijing, as they have through much of their history.
Huntington makes a strong case. Not the least of China's attractions
to Japan and other highly developed neighbors is, of course, its
huge and rapidly growing economy. Provided that Chinese hegemony
is reasonably benign and not excessively burdensome, such a system
could have great advantages and strengths. The feasibility of such
optimistic expectations naturally depends on a wide variety of unknown
factors-the real strength and adaptability of traditional Asian
or "Sinic" values; the pull on Asian societies of such
Western values as democracy, human rights, or free market competition;
the capacity of China to serve as a manager of interstate political
and economic relations; the sustainability of economic progress
in China and elsewhere in Asia; and the stability of China's own
po-litical and social system. All such elements are sufficiently
uncertain to guarantee widespread resistance to accepting Chinese
hegemony, so long as a reasonably attractive alternative is available.
That alternative, presumably, is some sort of containment system.
A Viable Asian Balance of Power
Building such a system, a viable Asian balance of power, would not
have to be seen as an anti-Chinese policy, nor one that denied China
a certain preeminence in the region, only natural as it grows more
and more important economically and politically. But it would be
a policy that, even while prompting cooperative arrangements across
the region, also sought to sustain a basic military balance to encourage
all parties, China included, to remain reasonable in their claims
on each other.
American hegemonic balancing seems the obvious way to organize such
a system. Indeed, it is a continuation of a status quo that has
long had numerous advantages for Asia. Not only has it successfully
contained China, North Korea, and Japan, but it has provided rich
capital inflows to Asia and access for its exports in the huge American
domestic market. Hence, the trade imbalance with the United States
that is so very favorable to Asian producers.
The problem is whether America can be expected to sustain this status
quo over the long run, and in particular whether the terms for it
can continue to be as generous for Asia as in the past. As China
inevitably grows into a more and more formidable nuclear power,
the cost and danger to the United States of sustaining its balancing
role is bound to increase. If the European case is any guide, the
Americans will react by upgrading conventional forces and seeking
allies to share the "burdens." As in Europe, the increases
implied for U.S. defense budgets do not square with Clinton's fiscal
targets on the home front.
The third option-a multipolar balance-is perhaps the most attractive
in principle but also the most elusive to define in practice. Some
analysts speak of a pentagonal balance-with India, Japan, and Russia
as participants, along with China and the United States. In some
versions, this model seems merely an extension of American hegemonic
balancing-a device to rally regional support behind the American
hegemon. In this view, what is needed is a sort of Asian NATO to
help the United States contain China by enlisting several other
Asian allies-Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, or the Philippines, for
example. Arguably, some of the European great powers might be brought
in as well. The problem with this idea is that few Asian or European
states would be willing to risk such a for-mal alienation from China
on behalf of the United States, at least not unless China's behavior
grows a great deal more threatening.
The notion of a pentagonal balance of independent great powers,
in the classic realist sense, seems rather unreal in the Asian situation.
Japan cannot be an independent great power capable of playing a
balancing military role against China so long as it depends on the
U.S. nuclear deterrent. Of course, Japan, were it more aggressively
armed with conventional weapons, could be an excellent subordinate
military ally for America, like Germany during the Cold War. But
it is not clear that the Japanese would relish such a role, or that
it would be welcomed by others in the region. Including India in
the group of five balancers also seems artificial, given the vast
distances and the world's most formidable mountain chain between
itself and the others. In reality, only three powers seem capable
of playing an independent balancing role-China, Russia, and the
United States.
A Tripolar Balance
What are the dynamics of this triad? Logically, Russia ought to
be an ally of the United States in attempting to balance China.
In many respects, it seems the only useful independent major ally
for the United States in Asia. Militarily, Russia has a nuclear
capacity that matches America's and, over the long term, can be
expected to have independent conventional military forces of high
quality. Politically, there are many reasons why Russia's relations
with China will be conflictual. In the nineteenth century, while
China was debilitated by Western incursions of one sort or another,
Russia was able to consolidate its hold on the immense land mass
of northern Asia, including some territories regarded as part of
the Chinese sphere. Today, with Russia's acquisitions populated
by a great many people of Sinic or Turkish origin, with only a thin
veneer of indigenous Russians, the huge Russian gains of the last
century appear highly vulnerable. This seems likely to be true unless
Russia is very strong, as it was during the Soviet period, or unless
China is otherwise balanced or engaged.
Since the mid-1980s, relations between China and Russia have been
improving, in contrast to the open hostility of the 1970s. In recent
years, relations have taken a con-siderable step forward as Russia
has growndisillusioned with the West over NATO enlargement, which
China also opposes. Ties between the two countries have grown tighter.
Trade has risen from a low of $370 million in 1974 to an estimated
$7 billion in 1996, one-third of which was cross-border trade. The
Russian Far East conducts about 80 percent of its trade with China's
Northeast. Joint ventures are proliferating. There were said to
be over 800 such ventures already in 1992 and 1993.
Militarily, both sides have taken a much less aggressive posture
than formerly. Russia has cut 150,000 troops from the Far East since
1985, and 50 percent of its Pacific fleet. Other confidence-building
measures include a pullback of forces to between 100 and 200 kilometers
from the border and a general round of multilateral force reductions,
joint military exercises, and agreements on no first use of nuclear
weapons. The Chinese are heavy buyers of Russian military equipment,
which the russians are desperately eager to sell in order to keep
their large and impoverished armaments industry going. Border issues
have been almost entirely ironed out, but the enormous incursion
of Chinese into Siberia, supposedly as temporary workers-is a development
that the russians watch with appre-hension. Russia's friendliness
toward china stems in good part from its weakness and diplomatic
isolation, which offer little room for quarreling with china. Thus,
surface relations are good, even if the long-term prognosis includes
a high probability ofconflict.
Having Russia as an ally in Asia would presumably greatly simplify
the task of containing China for the United States. This is particularly
true since Russia also has a long history of close relations with
India. That Russia has recently been successfully cultivating good
relations with China may provide a further advantage. The aim of
con-tainment, after all, is not to threaten China but to encourage
it along a path of peaceful engagement with its neighbors, as opposed
to a path of aggrandizement at its neighbors' expense. Arguably,
it is in China's interest to be reliably "contained."
within a military triad with russia and the united states, China
ought to be able to find enough room for maneuver to protect its
own interests.
An entente between Russia and the United States in Asia depends
on the absence of serious conflict between them elsewhere. NATO
enlargement is just such a case. But if it is a priority for the
United States to balance China in Asia, then it should also be a
priority not to antagonize Russia unnecessarily in Europe. If the
Russians were ready to overrun Western Europe, the United States
would have little choice in the matter of NATO enlargement. But
Russia poses a very small real military threat to its European neighbors.
On the whole, Russia behaved very well during the Yugoslav crisis.
And indeed, since they themselves ended the Cold War, the Russians
have been eager to be brought into an overarching European security
system, so long as the terms are not humiliating.
So what is the rationale for the current American policy? One such
rationale might be the assumption that Russia is in irrevocable
decline, so weak that it is an immense vacuum that needs to be filled
and might as well be filled by the West. The other rationale might
be that Russia remains fundamentally and constitutionally hostile
to the West, whatever its current policies, or even the intentions
of its current leaders. Under the circumstances, the West might
as well pocket what gains it can while Russia is weak.
Neither argument seems to me to support a "maximalist"
NATO enlargement in Europe. If Russia has become a vacuum, there
is no threat to European security and no enlargement is needed.
If Russia remains potentially powerful and constitutionally hostile,
enlargement makes NATO militarily indefensible at any reasonable
price. Likewise, neither the vacuum argument nor the hostility argument
seems very comforting to Western interests in Asia. A Russia that
really is permanently weak would be a highly destabilizing element
in the Far East. Russia's enormous territory-rich and underpopulated-presents
so huge and appetizing a prize that no great power could be expected
not to covet it.
If Russia remains enfeebled over the long run, neither the United
States nor a Japan not thoroughly remilitarized would be in a position
to stop the Chinese from encroaching on Siberia. The thesis of an
implacably and permanently hostile Russia is scarcely more encouraging.
A hostile Russia, allied with China, could easily create enormous
security problems for a United States trying to play the role of
hegemonic balancer, not just in Europe but in Asia as well.
If this analysis has much validity, the rationale for current American
foreign policy is unclear. Potentially, the military commit-ments
being prepared in Europe and Asia are substantially greater than
anything undertaken during the Cold War. On the European side, commitments
to defend the bor-ders of Poland or the Baltic states, for example,
pose a much more difficult military problem than defending the West
German border against the Soviets. Unless the United States is prepared
to rely on purely nuclear defense, a highly improbable scenario,
the requirements of an effective conventional defense for an enlarged
NATO against a rejuvenated and hostile Russia will be enormous.
Similarly, the American commitment to Asia can only grow in scope,
as China becomes more and more powerful.
Given the priority that American domestic politics places on budget
balancing, a foreign policy that appears vigorously deter-mined
to create expensive new military commitments seems anomalous. It
is difficult to see the rationale for an American policy that deliberately
picks an unnecessary quarrel in Europe and, at one stroke, also
antagonizes its most useful future ally in Asia. If the United States
truly embarks on such a geopolitical course, a quick return to the
unbalanced American fiscal conditions typical of the late Cold War
seems very probable. Alternatively, should the civilian priorities
of the American political system prevent such an ambitious geopolitical
course from be-ing financed effectively, America's foreign commitments
will be taken less and less seriously, the classic recipe for war
by miscalculation.
Foreign Policy by Special Interests
How can current American policy be explained? Two explanations come
quickly to mind. Each, however, seems to raise more questions than
it answers. One is that Amer-ican foreign policy has simply been
hijacked by special interests-by, for example, the NATO bureaucracy,
the arms industry, and Polish, Czech, and other East European ÈmigrÈ
communities in the United States. If so, this seems a rather dangerous
situation, not least for the safety of Central and East European
countries themselves. They are enticing the United States into a
policy that will antagonize their relations with Russia without
gaining a reliable long-term defense for themselves. Such a course
seems as little in their interest as in the interest of the United
States. America, after all, can always leave Europe. The Central
and East European countries cannot. Their long-term interest is
to engage Russia in some peaceful pan-European structure rather
than to add a postscript to the Cold War that leaves the West occupying
an overextended and indefensible position. Arguably, it was Stalin's
unwise overextension westward into Germany that triggered the Cold
War and ultimately exhausted and destroyed the Soviet Union. Should
the West now insist upon imitating Stalin?
Another possible explanation is that the administration agrees with
many of the ÈmigrÈ lobbies-that so fundamental and implacable a
division exists between the "West" and Russia that geographical
Europe must continue to be split between two armed camps. Recently,
Samuel Huntington has also been arguing that there exists a major
civilizational divide between Western Christendom and Orthodox Christendom,
such that they may be considered two distinct civilizations, along
with the Moslem, Sinic, and several other civilizations. To the
best of my knowledge, Huntington never relates this civilizational
divide to the question of NATO enlargement, nor does he suggest
that it precludes some sort of cooperative pan-European structure.15
But he does argue forcefully that Russia embodies a Byzantine or
Orthodox civilization distinct from the West's and is unlikely to
merge with it.
Many people might take issue with Huntington's civilizational analysis
in its European dimension. Obviously, there are important differences
between the Orthodox and Western Christian cultures. But it is not
so clear that these are greater than those between Catholics and
Protestants, or between the French, Germans, and Americans. Elites,
moreover, are generally more cosmopolitan than their countrymen,
who they tend to drag along behind them. A large part of the Russian
elite clearly wants to be in the West. Huntington tends to discount
the influence of such elites in the present era. At the very least,
his argument is a healthy corrective to prevailing fatuous assumptions
of the coming universality of Western or American values.
But if civilizational differences mean that Russia will be alienated
from the West, the consequences seem unfortunate for any American
policy that tries to maintain se-curity in both Europe and Asia
without bankrupting the national economy in the process. If Huntington
is right about both Asia and Europe, the sensible American strategy
would be a gradual retreat from Asia and a NATO enlargement limited
to truly "Western" nations in Europe. Presumably, the
alternative to an American retreat from Asia would be a search for
major non-Sinic allies, which means Russia, a course blocked by
the expanded civilizational NATO in Europe. If, however, civilizational
antagonism does not preclude close cooperative relations between
the West and Russia, then it is difficult not to agree with George
Kennan that NATO enlargement is a profound historical mistake for
American policy. In any event, it is difficult to find a coherent
strategy that can reconcile the current American foreign policies
toward Europe and Asia with each other, or with the Clinton administration's
fiscal goals and expectations at home.
By any reasonable standard, the first term of the Clinton administration
was a very respectable performance. True, Clinton's campaign goals
were not achieved. But in the American system, unlike many in Europe,
the president is far from being an elected dictator. Perhaps even
more than most other Western leaders, he has to seize and exploit
whatever opportunities the situation offers. Arguably, Clinton used
the end of the Cold War and the Republican enthusiasm for budget
balancing to bring about a major improvement in the country's macro-economic
climate, without sacrificing too much of the educational and technological
agenda that he believes essential for long-term economic viability.
Doubtless, his fiscal accomplishment is more precarious than it
looks and, given the demographic trends, should have gone further.
Still, politics remains the art of the possible and he has done
very well by the country.
Clinton's second term, however, seems to be off to a troubling start.
The lack of coherence between foreign and domestic policy looks
as if it may start to catch up with him. Worse, there is a prevailing
smell of hubris. A rather militant and assertive self-satisfaction,
which alienates useful allies, seems to go hand in hand with geopolitical
overconfidence and carelessness-tendencies that point to a new era
of geopolitical "overstretch" and a new lease on life
for the "declinists." If there is a historical parallel,
it is with the 1960s and the Kennedy administration. If the parallel
holds, we are probably now entering the Lyndon Johnson phase-a thought
that should give pauseto any president, most especially to one who
is a liberal Democrat of the Vietnam generation.
Notes
This article was developed from a paper given at the Fourteenth
Sino-European Conference in Geneva, September 1997, jointly sponsored
by the Modern Asia Research Center at the Graduate Institute of
International Studies at Geneva and the Institute of International
Relations at Chengchi University, Taiwan.
1. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999, Historical
Tables (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998),
pp. 108-09. Roughly 50 percent of the $109 billion in defense cuts
occurred from FY 1989 through FY 1993. All FY 1998 figures used
in this essay are official estimates from the FY 1999 budget (presented
in January 1998).
2. Ibid., p. 22.
3. Ibid., pp. 23-24, 108-09. FY 1998 figures are official estimates
from the FY 1999 budget.
4. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
5. Ibid., pp. 110-11.
6. Ibid., p. 24. Note that the predicted surplus is for the "unified"
budget only. In other words, it includes the "surplus"
from Social Security as current income. According to the most recent
administration projections, in the year 2003 that Social Security
surplus will be $148 billion. Without it there would be a projected
fiscal deficit of $94 billion (pp. 1-2). Whether the $148 billion
should be counted as current income is disputable, since it is supposedly
invested in a "trust fund" to cover future demands for
Social Security payouts. When those demands come, there will be
nothing in the fund except government obligations. The government
will have to meet those obligations either by selling still more
bonds out of its then current income-exactly the same situation
as if there were Social Security obligations but no trust fund.
In effect, the Social Security payroll tax is treated as another
form of regular government income. Critics object that it is highly
regressive compared to income tax. The issue is made still more
opaque because the federal government pays interest on its phantom
trust fund, which it then counts as income to itself! These practices
explain why federal debt is estimated to rise by $133 billion in
2003, a year when the budget is supposed to be in surplus (p. 111).
For a recent angry reaction to these practices, see Ernest F. Hollings,
"What Surplus?" Washington Post, February 5, 1998. Senator
Hollings declares the various trust funds to be heavily in deficit
at the moment and destined to grow worse. His figures for FY 1999:
Social Security $845 billion, Military Retirement $140 billion,
Civilian Retirement $490 billion, Unemployment Compensation $81
billion, Highways $35 billion, Airports $15 billion, Railroad Retirement
$21 billion, All Others $58 billion. He traces the onset of these
practices to the Nixon administration. By 2002, he reckons the federal
government will "owe Social Security $1.236 trillion...."
7. Ibid., p. 109.
8. China's defense budget for 1997 was 80.6 billion yuan ($9.7 billion),
an increase of 12.73 percent on 1996. (Defense budget shows official
figures at market rates.) Actual military expenditure in 1996 was
reckoned at $38 billion, a 15 percent increase on 1995 (Institute
for International and Strategic Studies [IISS], The Military Balance
1997-8 [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997], p. 176). See also
Richard Bernstein, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America,"
Foreign Affairs 76 (March/April 1997), p. 17, and his book with
Ross H. Munro, The Coming Conflict with China (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1997).
9. At the Madrid Summit of NATO leaders in July 1997, Canadian prime
minister Jean ChrÈtien, apparently not realizing he was speaking
into a microphone, observed to Belgium prime minister Jean-Luc Dehaene
that Clinton's endorsement of enlarge-ment was "done for short-term
political reasons needed to win elections" (Fred Langan, "Smile:
Two Allies Caught Knocking the U.S.," Christian Science Monitor,
July 11, 1997). See also William Pfaff, "America's NATO Claims
Are about Vote Buying," Chicago Tribune, July 29, 1997.
10. In 1965, the United States spent 7.57 percent of GNP on defense;
France spent 5.17 percent; Germany, 4.33 percent; Italy, 3.29 percent;
and the UK, 5.86 percent. Comparative figures for 1975 were: the
United States, 5.9 percent; France, 3.8 percent; Germany, 3.6 percent;
Italy, 2.5 percent, and the UK, 5.0 percent. For 1985: the United
States, 6.6 percent; France, 4.0 percent; Germany, 3.2 percent;
Italy, 2.3 percent; and the UK, 5.2 percent. For 1995: the United
States, 3.8 percent; France, 3.1 percent; Germany, 2.0 percent;
Italy, 1.8 percent; and the UK, 3.1 percent. The figures for 1965,
1975, and 1985 are from World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, corresponding
years); the figures for 1995 are from IISS, Military Balance 1996-1997.
For a detailed discussion of these issues, see David P. Calleo,
Beyond American Hegemony (New York: Basic Books, 1987), esp. ch.
7.
11. See David P. Calleo, The Bankrupting of America (New York: William
Morrow, 1992), esp. ch. 5.
12. IISS, The Military Balance 1997-8, p. 25.
13. "Clinton Promises to Seek NATO Membership for Baltics,"
Washington Post, January 17, 1998.
14. Varying estimates of the costs of NATO expansion, as well as
allied reactions, are surveyed in Michael Dobbs and John F. Harris,
"France Balks at Paying Share of NATO Costs," Washington
Post, July 9, 1997. According to Dobbs and Harris, President Clinton
said that NATO expansion would cost U.S. taxpayers $200 million
per year over the next decade. According to the Congressional Budget
Office (CBO), the total costs will be more than twice that, potentially
$4.8 billion. The administration's case was ably presented by Undersecretary
of Defense Walter Slocombe in his testimony before the House National
Security Committee on July 17, 1997; he estimated that NATO enlargement
would cost $27-35 billion through 2009, with the U.S. share about
$150-200 million annually. In "The Cost of Expanding the NATO
Alliance," the CBO outlines five potential scenarios, with
the costs from 1996 to 2010 ranging from $60.6 billion, with the
United States paying $4.8 billion, to a total of $124.7 billion,
with the United States paying $18.9 billion, the current NATO allies
paying $54 billion, and the new members paying $51.8 billion. For
their part, the allies show little sign of rising to the occasion.
The varying size of the estimates depends heavily on whether any
serious Russian threat is contemplated. The RAND Corporation's analysis
by Ronald Asmus, Richard Kruger, and Stephen Larabee, "What
Will NATO Enlargement Cost?" Survival 38 (autumn 1996), pp.
5-26, stresses that the costs will vary greatly according to the
scenario contemplated but strongly discounts any durable or effective
Russian hostile reaction. For the latest survey of NATO costs, see
William Drozdiak, "NATO: US Erred on Cost of Expansion; Figure
Is $2 Billion, Not $30 Billion, It Says," Washington Post,
November 14, 1998.
15. Obviously, Huntington's civilizational analysis could be applied
to NATO enlargement, although it would seem to exclude several countries
that are eagerly awaiting an invitation, as well as one or two already
in. A "civilizational" NATO would presumably include the
Baltic states, Poland, the Czechs and Slovaks, the Slovenes, Croats,
and Hungarians, and perhaps the Western Ukrainians. Romania, with
its Latin language would be a borderline case, but Bulgaria, Bosnia,
Macedonia, and Serbia would not be candidates. Logically, Greece
and Turkey would be restricted to the Partnership for Peace, along
with Russia and other exemplars of Byzantine and Muslim civilizations.
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