|
WORLD
POLICY JOURNAL
| CODA:
Volume XIX, No1, Spring 2002 |
Print
|
 |
| |
Friendly
|
On Showing
"A Decent Respect"
[Go
to interactive
discussion forum]
Invade Iraq?
As we were closing these pages, the war drums were beating in Washington
for unilateral armed intervention to depose Saddam Hussein’s regime
in Iraq and replace it with America’s handpicked choices in Baghdad.
Writing in the March 11 New Yorker, the usually well-informed
Seymour Hersh reported that many senior Bush administration officials
believed it was not whether, but when, the action would take place,
the best bet being this fall. One rubs one’s eyes: an unfinished
war remains underway in Afghanistan, U.S. advisors are now deployed
across half the world, from the Philippines and Yemen to the contested
gorges of the Caucasus—yet with all this happening, the Bush team
seems to be bracing for a full-court invasion of Iraq, requiring
at a minimum 150,000 American troops.
Put aside the
symbolic matter of George W. Bush seemingly settling paternal accounts
with Saddam Hussein. Ignore the logistic problems of assaulting
Iraq without willing Arab allies, and pass over the parlous risks
of appearing as infidel outsiders bent on installing pliable clients
in a turbulent Islamic region to govern Iraq. Consider instead what
America’s founders called "a decent respect to the opinion
of mankind," a phrase embedded in the Republic’s birth certificate.
The Declaration of Independence went on to itemize the specific
affronts ascribed to George III and his ministers, the casus belli
justifying a resort to armed rebellion. The declaration’s phrases
grew wings, and were taken up gratefully by innumerable brave patriots
elsewhere.
How curious
that in this age of CNN and the Internet the Bush White House seems
so tongue-tied, so incapable of making a convincing case for its
use of force. The attitude seems to be that asserting, and reasserting,
America’s rectitude suffices. To be sure, Americans needed little
persuading that Osama bin Laden was the culprit responsible for
September 11. Yet a Gallup poll in nine Muslim nations this February
found that only 18 percent believed Muslims were responsible for
the attacks, and three out of four persons opposed America’s Afghan
campaign. Doubtless this partly reflects the media bias in the nine
countries, but it bodes ill for any U.S. invasion of Iraq. Washington,
after all, has yet to convince even its European allies that Baghdad
assisted bin Laden’s network, or that Saddam Hussein’s menace is
more than conjectural. A thought occurs: whatever happened to the
time-honored tradition of publishing blue books and white papers
to document an adversary’s misdeeds?
The lapse extends
to rhetoric. President Bush’s one memorable phrase in his State
of the Union address—"axis of evil"—provoked more confusion
than enthusiasm. As noticeable in the same address was the president’s
failure to mention by name the many allies that helped bring off
military and political successes in Afghanistan. When he finally
acknowledged their vital assistance in his March 11 speech, mentioning
no fewer than 13 countries, he tellingly said nothing about the
United Nations, an essential partner in the Afghan reconstruction
program. This churlish silence is consistent with ongoing American
penury (President Clinton is as guilty as Bush père et
fils toward the United Nations). The world organization’s slashed
budget is now half that of South Dakota and is $600 million less
than the Tokyo fire department’s.
Whose Rules
of War, Anyway?
American diplomacy’s other grievous verbal miscue concerned
the protracted internment of captives of war from the Afghan campaign.
Granted, people of goodwill can reasonably differ with the Bush
administration’s resolution of the difficult circumstances it confronted
in dealing with four different categories of detainees: (1) prisoners
of war captured in Afghanistan; (2) lawful and unlawful combatants
held in Afghanistan or elsewhere outside the United States; (3)
illegal aliens in the United States; and (4) legal aliens with permanent
resident status in America accused of complicity in terrorism. (These
categories were defined and analyzed by Aryeh Neier in the February
14 issue of the New York Review of Books.)
Among those
captured were dangerous killers, and a legal case for their incarceration
has been made by Yale’s Ruth Wedgwood, a member of this journal’s
advisory board—that unlawful combatants are not the same as prisoners
of war. Yet initially, the White House barely troubled to defend
mass detentions, and only did so after an outcry in Europe over
prisoners held in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, and the intervention of
Secretary of State Colin Powell. Washington’s basic rejoinder was
that the Third Geneva Convention, which the United States ratified
in 1955, does not extend its protections to unlawful combatants.
For sake of argument, even assuming this is true, in terms of public
advocacy the Bush team blew a golden opportunity to educate everybody,
including Americans on the history and need for those Geneva protections—which
were literally initiated by the United States.
Four considerations
justify the most scrupulous attention to the laws of war. First
and most obviously, the protections and benefits are reciprocal,
and abuse of POWs constitutes a war crime, and was so treated at
the Nuremberg trials. Second, no offense figures more frequently
in the State Department’s annual human rights report than indefinite
detention of suspects, many of them accused of terrorist acts or
beliefs. For the United States to do the same gives every foreign
offender a facile alibi. Third, decent treatment of POWs discourages
fight-to-the-death resistance. And finally, the very laws of war
that are in contention were first put into writing by an American,
Francis Lieber, an unjustly forgotten democratic hero from Prussia.
During the
Civil War, Lieber drew on customary usages stemming from the age
of chivalry to define the rights of POWs, including irregulars,
and specify protections for civilians. Until President Lincoln promulgated
General Order 100 on April 24, 1863, known since as the Lieber Code,
those rules had not been codified. So impressed were Europeans that
the code became the prototype for the Geneva Conventions whose prohibitions
are being tested afresh. Moreover, the code also dealt with an adversary’s
cultural property and sought to define licit and illicit spoils
of war—also for the first time.
Lieber distilled
the code from his own battlefield experiences. Born in Prussia in
1798, he fought against Napoleon as a teenage rifleman in a German
regiment at Waterloo in 1815, and was wounded in the neck at Namur.
This was the noontime of romantic nationalism, and Lieber’s early
life sprang from the pages of Goethe and Schiller—student years
at Berlin and Jena, quarrels with Prussian authorities, enlistment
(like Byron) in the Greek War of Independence, evenings with the
scientific explorer Alexander von Humboldt and the poet-musician
E. T. A. Hoffmann, study in Rome with the renowned diplomat-historian
Barthold Niebuhr, imprisonment in Prussia as a suspected democratic
troublemaker, which propelled his flight, by way of Britain, to
the United States in 1827.
A multilingual
polymath, Lieber brimmed with plans for ascent, the most audacious
being to publish in Boston what he felt the Republic obviously needed—a
good, cheap encyclopedia. Thus was launched the Encyclopedia
Americana, the first volume of which appeared in 1829, and a
whole set of which Lieber later presented to his friend and fellow
constitutional liberal, Alexis de Tocqueville. Thereafter, Leiber
made a name for himself as a prolific political philosopher, as
a "publicist" (a word he coined) who promoted prison reform,
and as a professor, first at South Carolina College and then from
1857 at Columbia College in New York. By then, he and his wife Matilda
had three grown sons and, like the country, the family divided as
the Civil War broke out. Fighting for the Union were Norman and
Hamilton (who lost an arm at Fort Donelson), and joining the Confederate
Army was his oldest son, Oscar (killed at the Battle of Williamsburg).
During the
1860 presidential campaign, Lieber spoke out for Lincoln and against
dis-union, and explained his decision to his son Oscar: "My
dearest Boy," his letter began, "and if I knew a more
endearing term, that I term I would use now to address you. I feel
your grief most bitterly..." It was thus an acutely personal
matter when Lieber was asked in 1862 by Gen. Henry W. Halleck to
advise on the vexing legal status of pro-Confederate guerrillas.
Were they protected by the customary laws of war?
Lieber offered
his views in a 16-page essay that Halleck immediately distributed
to his officers. He contended that irregular forces should not be
lumped together, that the lack of a uniform was not decisive. He
cited Froissart’s Chronicles and Wellington’s experiences
in the Peninsular War against the French to distinguish between
"the freebooter, the marauder, the brigand, the partisan, the
free-corps, the spy, the rebel, the conspirator, the robber and
especially the highway robber, and the rising en masse, or the ‘arming
of peasants.’" Robbers and their ilk were common criminals,
and were to be treated as such, while spies or any who concealed
their true belligerent role were liable to execution. But, Lieber
went on:
I believe it can be said that the most recent publicists
and writers on international law agree that the rising of the
people to repel invasion entitles them to the full benefits of
the law of war, and that the invader cannot well inquire into
the origin of the armed masses opposing him, that is to say, he
will be obliged to treat the captured citizens as prisoners of
war, so long as they oppose him in respectable numbers, and have
risen in the yet invaded or unconquered portions of the hostile
country. Their acting in separate bodies does not necessarily
give them a different character. Some entire wars have been carried
on by separate bands or capitaneries, such as in the recent war
of independence of Greece.
Lieber carefully
distinguishes between guerrillas and self-constituted, unpaid bands
of armed men who belong to no organized army, or who take up arms
and lay them down at intervals, or who carry on petty warfare by
means of raids, extortion, or massacre. As applied to Afghanistan,
Lieber’s words would argue for treating Taliban forces differently
than Al Qaeda fighters, since the former are defending their country—and
it makes no difference, following Lieber, whether Taliban soldiers
lack uniforms, or whether their government had little international
standing or recognition. Neither did the Greeks who fought for independence
against Ottoman Turks, and neither did Marion’s swamp fighters in
the Carolinas, recently glorified in a Hollywood epic, The Patriot,
starring Mel Gibson.
In truth, it
is the spirit as much as the letter that distinguishes the code
that Lieber was called upon to prepare in 1863 for the Union armies.
Animating all its articles is a plea for restraint and humanity
in dealing with prisoners and noncombatants. "Men who take
up arms against one another in public war," enjoins Article
15, "do not cease on this account to be moral beings, responsible
to one another, and to God." Other articles read:
All wanton violence committed against persons in the
invaded country, all destruction of property not commanded by
the authorized officer, all robbery, all pillage or sacking, even
after taking a place by main force, all rape, wounding, maiming,
or killing of such inhabitants, are prohibited under the penalty
of death... (Article 44).
As martial law is executed by military force, it is
incumbent on those who administer it to be strictly guided by
the principles of justice, honor and humanity— virtues adorning
a soldier even more than other men, for the very reason that he
possesses the power of his arms against the unarmed (Article 4).
Admittedly,
the spirit, if not the letter, of the code was flouted by Union
forces as in Sherman’s march to the sea, always on the claim, which
Lieber allowed, of military necessity. Yet he qualified that claim
with these words:
Military necessity does not admit of cruelty—that is,
the infliction of suffering for the sake of suffering or for revenge,
nor of maiming or wounding except in fight, nor of torture to
extort confessions. It does not admit of the use of poison in
any way, nor of the wanton devastation of a district. It admits
of deception, but disclaims acts of perfidy, and, in general,
does not include any act of hostility which makes the return to
peace unnecessarily difficult (Article 16).
Lieber died
in 1872, just long enough to see the beginning of an international
movement, bolstered by the parallel establishment of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, to restrain the dogs of war. It is a
rebuke to our age that the Lieber Code has been more honored in
the breach than the observance. Yet it shines today as a lodestar
for the United States, deserving of explicit recognition by the
White House and Pentagon, as the war against terrorism continues,
or widens. It was good that belatedly in March the Pentagon spelled
out more clearly procedures for its military tribunals, but as the
columnist William Safire and others have noted, there remains grim
vagueness about the right of appeal and length of detention of POWs.
— Karl E.
Meyer
Note
I have drawn
gratefully in this essay on the admirable biography by Frank Friedel,
Francis Lieber: Nineteenth-Century Liberal, published in
1947 by the Louisiana State University Press. The text of Lieber’s
paper for General Halleck is in Lieber’s Miscellaneous Writings,
published by Lippincott in 1880. The text of General Order 100
can be found at www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/lieber.htm.
Space is lacking here for a full discussion of his entry on "Assassination,"
which raises important questions about the use of this deadly instrument.
[Go
to interactive
discussion forum]
You will need the Adobe Acrobat Reader installed
on your computer to access full
text PDF article.
 back
|