



Spain After Franco

Lessons in Democratization

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Viewed through the lens of contemporary Spanish history, the twenty-fifth anniversary of the return of democracy to Spain may justly be deemed an event of momentous significance.¹ Indeed, the survival of democracy in Spain since 1977 (not to speak of its success) is nothing short of extraordinary. The country's previous and only significant attempt at living under a democratic system (the brief and chaotic Second Republic, 1931–36) descended into civil war and cemented Spain's reputation as a society in which conflict and the potential for violence were ever-present.² In turn, the Spanish Civil War (1936–39), the bloodiest of the many civil conflicts that erupted in interwar Europe, gave birth to one of the longest and most entrenched dictatorships of the last century, the Franco regime (1939–77). Franco's authoritarian rule endured because the Spanish people had been socialized to believe that Spain was "different," that it was an inherently anarchic country in need of a strong hand.

No less significant than the triumph of democracy in a historically improbable environment is the importance of the Spanish experience to our understanding of the conditions that make democracy possible. Post-Franco Spain has reached the pinnacle of success in what scholars and policymakers have termed the "Third Wave" of democratization.³ Beginning in the mid-1970s in Western Europe's southern frontier, with the disintegration of dictatorships in Portugal, Greece, and Spain, this democratic revolution swept away military rule in South America during the 1980s and crested with

the stunning collapse of communism in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. No other new democracy born of this upheaval comes close to matching Spain's record of political, economic, and social achievement. "Spain is a miracle," observes Adam Przeworski, a doyen of democratization studies. "The banner of the new elites and the peoples of Eastern Europe is democracy, the market and Europe, and the optimistic scenario is to retrace the path of Spain."⁴

What was Spain's path to democratic success and what does it teach other nations struggling with the burdens of democratic consolidation as well as the policy community engaged in promoting democracy abroad? Curiously, despite the obvious success of democracy in Spain and the prominent role it occupies in the literature on democratic transitions, the policy implications of the Spanish experience remain largely unexamined and underdetermined.⁵ Spain's experience is seldom invoked in debates about democratization in Eastern Europe or Russia. Policymakers in Washington and in international aid organizations are more inclined to look to the emerging democracies of Latin America (especially the more successful ones like Chile, or large and complex ones such as Brazil) when counseling Russia and other postcommunist states about democratic reform.

Yet post-Franco Spain is a more apt historical and contemporary point of comparison. Spain, like Russia, was by-passed by the great intellectual and social currents said to have shaped the foundations of liberal

democracy: the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution. Not unlike post-communist Russia, moreover, Spain began to democratize in the wake of a prolonged experience with dictatorship, and without any significant experience with democratic governance.

By contrast, since gaining independence in the 1830s, the nations of Latin America have swung between dictatorship and democracy. The exceptions to this rule, such as Chile, long a paragon of democracy prior to the tragic end of the Allende regime in 1973, could find sustenance in a significant democratic legacy to reconstruct a democratic public life.

Arguably more important in asserting the relevance of Spain for the postcommunist world is that grappling with ethnic-based, subnationalist violence has been the crux of democratization in both contexts. Like Russia, Spain is a multinational state with important regional and cultural cleavages, as well as a history of state repression of regional identities. This explains why, in both countries, the drama of democratization has unfolded against a crisis of “state-ness,” feeding on demands for regional home rule and in some instances outright independence. Accommodating these demands, and by extension reinventing the notion of the central state, has been central to democratic sustainability in Spain, and this appears to be the case in Russia and other new democracies challenged by peripheral nationalism.

A focus on Spain is made more compelling by the fact that its experience challenges prevailing assumptions about how best to combine democracy and free markets in postauthoritarian societies. At present, U.S. democratic assistance favors rapid and dramatic change, as well as reliance on vibrant civil societies, especially nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). However, the Spanish experience underscores the need for consensus and moderation in the speed and scope of reform, as well as for effective lead-

ership and credible political institutions. These were the factors that allowed Spain to undertake profound and often painful economic and political change without resorting to autocratic measures, or to shock treatment, while sustaining popular support for democratic values. Despite the lack of significant democratic roots, democratic rule has flourished in Spain in the post-Franco era. The transition from authoritarianism triggered by the death of Gen. Francisco Franco in November 1975 was characterized above all by its restraint and became a blueprint for other nations seeking similar transformations.⁶ In autumn 1976, the Francoist parliament essentially voted itself out of business by passing a package of political reforms that legalized political parties, trade unions, and other private associations, and that scheduled elections for the following year. In June 1977, Adolfo Suárez and his Center-Right party (UCD) emerged victorious from Spain’s first free vote in four decades and began the arduous task of liquidating the institutions of Franco’s authoritarian regime. In December 1978, the Spanish people ratified a new constitution, completing the transition to democratic rule.

More impressive were the steps to democratic consolidation. Only a few years after formally shedding its authoritarian institutions, Spain had secured virtually all of the requirements associated with a mature democracy.⁷ First, and most obvious, was the capacity to conduct free and competitive elections leading to meaningful change in government. That Spain met this critical requirement became evident with the October 1982 general elections, marking the first peaceful transfer of political power from the Right to the Left—the historical fault lines of the civil war.

The 1982 victory of the Socialist Party, self-described since its creation in the late nineteenth century as a classic Marxist organization, had the added significance of representing the first return to power of the Left since the tumultuous years of the Sec-

ond Republic. Notwithstanding the party's moderation during the transition, the Socialist triumph was a source of intense anxiety and discomfort for many on the right, who feared a reprise of the extremism that had characterized Spanish politics during the 1930s. In their minds, the Left was intrinsically linked to the divisive and maximalist policies of the Second Republic, exemplified by the enactment of an atheist constitution, to which they attributed the breakdown of democracy in 1936 and the ensuing civil war. These fears proved unfounded and unwarranted. The long reign of the Socialists in the post-transition period under the leadership of Felipe González (1982–96) is credited with consolidating democracy and, ironically, with modernizing Spanish capitalism and strengthening the market economy.

Other compelling evidence of democratic consolidation in Spain has been civilian control of the military, no small feat considering the military origins of the Franco regime.⁸ Paradoxically, control of the military by civilians was underscored by an attempted military coup in February 1981. Backed by widespread public support for democracy, civilian leaders quelled the coup and punished its perpetrators. Thus emboldened, civilians undertook a comprehensive restructuring of the military, effectively removing any future threat from the barracks.

Another important benchmark of democratic consolidation has been observance of the rule of law. The best documentation is provided by Freedom House, whose annual report on civil and political freedoms has become the standard for evaluating the quality of democracy. With the death of Franco in 1975, Spain moved from the rank of "Not Free" to "Partly Free." After the democratic elections of 1977, the country was deemed "Free," an appellation it has retained ever since. More suggestive, perhaps, is that the group's latest rankings of Spain with respect to political and civil rights are virtually undistinguishable from those of

such older and presumably more mature democracies as Italy, France, and Britain.⁹

A final sign of consolidation has been the widespread support for democratic values. By 1978, polls showed that 77 percent of Spaniards deemed democracy the best political system for their country; only 15 percent expressed a preference for an authoritarian regime.¹⁰ This level of support has remained steady despite the economic and political convulsions triggered by the waves of terrorism by Basque separatists and Western Europe's highest unemployment rate.

Explaining Success

It is tempting to attribute democracy's success in Spain to modernization and its core assumption that social and economic development breeds democracy.¹¹ Although Spain's transition occurred in the midst of the oil crisis of the mid-1970s, which caused energy bills to soar and sent inflation spiraling, the country was favored with a true economic miracle just prior to Franco's death. In the years from 1960 to 1973, only Japan boasted faster and more sustained economic growth, a development that propelled Spain's economy to the ranks of the world's top ten by the mid-1970s.¹²

The economic boom of the late Franco period facilitated democracy by rendering authoritarian institutions anachronistic. It also afforded Spaniards the opportunity to travel abroad and experience firsthand the freedoms enjoyed by people elsewhere. The boom also undermined the traditional influence of the Catholic Church, which itself ceased to support the Franco regime by the late 1960s, and lessened the tendencies toward political extremism. As documented by the historian Edward Malefakis, the economic miracle of the late Franco period occasioned "a kind of embourgeoisement of the masses" that in turn led to the moderation of a previously radicalized working class.¹³

Also worth noting in explaining Spain's democratic transformation are external

factors, such as the country's geographic location. Spain's proximity to the core of Western Europe undoubtedly facilitated its incorporation in the 1980s into NATO and the European Union, thereby bolstering democratic institutions and attitudes. NATO membership helped modernize military institutions and enhance civilian control. Spain's admission into the European Union resulted in economic assistance from Brussels and, more important, reinforced the nation's status as a European country entitled to democratic government.

Still, none of the conditions outlined above could have guaranteed the success of the transition to democracy in Spain. Indeed, we can be misled into believing that a successful democracy was a predestined outcome, ignoring the real obstacles to successful democratization Spain faced in the mid-to-late 1970s. What in retrospect appears to be an elegant, orderly, and even rational process of regime change was in reality a delicate operation fraught with uncertainty and peril, a point underscored by the mostly bleak scenarios circulating at the time of Franco's death. A typical assessment of Spain's political future following Franco's death was that offered by the Spanish scholar José Amodia: "It is naïve to expect Franco's death to work a miracle. In the political future of Spain I see a great deal of darkness and hardly any light; my forecast must be pessimistic."¹⁴

Leadership and Political Crafting

Critical to the survival of democracy in Spain was effective and innovative political leadership, a reality suggesting that the viability of democracy in a postauthoritarian situation depends more on skillful political crafting than on structural conditions such as economic development.¹⁵ As noted by regime transition theorist Philippe Schmitter, "Democracy has to be chosen by real live political actors who have plenty of room for making the wrong and right decisions."¹⁶ Notable among political actors who made

the choices that favored democracy was King Juan Carlos, Franco's handpicked chief of state. His widely praised role in the transition to democracy set the example for the rest of the political class and rightly earned him the title of *El Pilota del Cambio* (the pilot of change).¹⁷

Following Franco's death, the king shelved the plan for *continuismo*, or "Francoism without Franco," by announcing his intention to set the nation on a democratic course. In the years preceding the democratic transition, Franco had personally groomed the monarch to assume political power, and Juan Carlos had given him every assurance that he would uphold the principles of the authoritarian regime. In boldly disobeying Franco's wishes, the king opened the way for democracy. Simultaneously, he legitimized the monarchy in the eyes of the general public and secured a role for the crown in the emerging democratic system.

Just as important was the behavior of Spanish politicians, whose capacity for compromise remains exemplary among neo-democracies. The king's choice for orchestrating the transition was the future prime minister Adolfo Suárez, at the time a relatively obscure bureaucrat. Suárez's first test was to convince the Francoist parliament to disband and peacefully relinquish its power. Second, and equally challenging, was the need to convince the historic opposition to the Franco regime, headed by the Communist Party, the strongest political organization during the transition, to abandon its dream of restoring Republican government through revolution.

In reconciling seemingly irreconcilable political agendas, Suárez relied on his considerable skills as a negotiator. As noted by Juan J. Linz, that most seasoned observer of Spanish politics, during the transition Suárez exhibited "a great capacity for personal dialogue and engaging those with whom he had to negotiate, listening to them, and creating a certain sense of trust without necessarily making promises he was

uncertain about being able to satisfy.”¹⁸ Suárez’s job was also aided by an emerging political culture that placed a high premium on consensus, a value rooted in the lessons the nation had learned from the excesses of the Second Republic and the bloodshed of the civil war.¹⁹

All this materialized in the epoch-making Moncloa Pact, an intra-party agreement brokered by Suárez following the 1977 elections to inaugurate democratic rule. The pact committed actors across the political spectrum—from conservatives to communists and from centralists to regionalists—to the dismantlement of Franco’s institutional legacy and the creation of a new political regime in as nonconfrontational a manner as possible.

Decentralizing the State

Accommodating the demands for self-government from ethnically distinct communities emerged as the most explosive issue in the consolidation of democracy. Previous attempts at decentralization in the 1930s helped wreck the Second Republic. In the mid-1970s, regional demands for self-government again came to the fore, facilitated by the breakdown of the authoritarian regime. The perils of democratization were arguably graver than in the 1930s, given the vehement demands for regional home rule and the potential for political violence.

This confrontation over democratization was ensured by Franco’s obsessive attempt to create a homogenous nation, especially in the Basque Country. In the post-transition period, this affluent region of northern Spain, which is home to some 2 million people, has become the focus of the struggle for regional self-rule. In the years preceding the transition, Franco’s efforts to annihilate the unique cultural heritage of the Basque people gave rise to the separatist organization Euskadia Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty, better known as ETA).

Through the 1960s, ETA violence was restricted to acts of vandalism, such as blow-

ing up monuments, but the advent of a more open political climate afforded ETA the opportunity to impose a veritable reign of terror. It began with the assassination of Franco’s prime minister, Luis Carrero Blanco, in 1973. To this day, ETA is responsible for over 800 deaths and multiple kidnappings and bombings aimed at destabilizing the nation’s democratic system.

Madrid’s strategy for addressing subnationalist groups was to assure their leaders, especially moderates such as Josep Tarradellas, the exiled leader of the Catalan regional movement, that their demands for home rule would be honored. This commitment reflected Prime Minister Suárez’s belief that the survival of both democracy and Spain’s geographic integrity were contingent upon successful decentralization. But Suárez made it clear that only a democratic, constitutional framework could provide the legitimacy needed to reform a centralized state structure. This meant that devolution of power to the regions would be preceded by the reorganization of the national political system, including the staging of national elections in 1977 and the approval of a new constitution in 1981.

Among the virtues of Suárez’s strategy was that it averted a Yugoslavia-type scenario in which regional agendas, elections, and institutions were permitted to submerge and undermine the development of national democratic institutions.²⁰ In Spain, in contrast, by the time regional identities and institutions began to assert themselves politically and challenge the central government, the nation possessed a resilient and coherent set of national political institutions. They were capable of withstanding not only the ETA’s terror tactics but also the military rebellion of 1981, which came on the eve of the granting of limited self-rule to Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country.

Spain’s constitution embodies an exquisitely ambiguous compromise that acknowledges the country’s unitary (nonfederal)

makeup, as well as its multiple “nationalities” and the right of the regions and their peoples to seek home rule. This compromise is unavoidably fraught with tension, since it aims to satisfy both centralists and regionalists. But it has facilitated Europe’s largest process of decentralization in the postwar period. By the mid-1980s, Spain had evolved into a collection of 18 autonomous communities (*autonomías*), effectively making the nation a federal state in practice if not officially in name. Education, social and cultural policy, law enforcement, and taxation are among areas of administration over which Spanish regional governments now have significant control.

Managing the Economy

In Spain, as in other new and fragile democratic orders, accommodating economic reform has occasioned a great deal of pain. The most evident cost is high unemployment, a consequence, in part, of the reindustrialization required by the country’s entry into the European Union. The unemployment crisis in Spain peaked in the mid-1990s, when the jobless rolls reached 24 percent, or 3.7 million of the active population, a record for Western Europe.²¹

High unemployment came as a shock to a nation that, not unlike the societies of Eastern Europe under communism, had grown accustomed to near full employment under Franco. Between 1965 and 1974, the unemployment rate in Spain averaged 1.5 percent, one of the lowest in Europe. Surprisingly, though, the dramatic reversal of fortune in the employment picture in the post-transition era did not erode popular confidence in democracy, as has been the case in other newly democratized nations. Not only did support for democracy remain solid throughout the most painful phases of economic reform, but the party most directly responsible for its implementation, the Socialists, was reelected repeatedly with impressive majorities, without any evidence of voter backlash. Why was this so?

The answer very likely hinges on the pace and scope of economic reform, especially its moderation and the willingness of the government to engage and compensate those most adversely affected. These approaches contrasted starkly with the so-called Washington Consensus on economic stabilization, as pursued by multilateral organizations, such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. This approach, which in recent years has come under increasing criticism, relies on “shock therapy,” or the speedy implementation of privatization and other policies aimed at creating and/or fortifying the market economy. Underpinning this strategy is the belief that reform is most effective when embraced with determination, and that transitions create opportune openings for bold and dramatic economic change. The Washington Consensus also assumes the exclusion of societal actors, such as trade unions, from the bargaining table for fear they would compromise the coherence of the reform effort or, worse yet, delay its implementation.

Little of what is prescribed in the Washington Consensus is reflected in the Spanish experience. For starters, the stabilization plan designed by state technocrats in 1977 to tackle rising inflation in Spain was aimed at averting political conflict and facilitating conditions for democratic consolidation. Rather than relying on shock and exclusion, it was anchored in direct negotiation and pacts with societal actors, including the national unions. Between 1977 and 1986, representatives of government, labor, and employers’ groups negotiated wage policy with the purpose of gradually moderating wages to tame inflation. Consequently, Spain’s new democracy was spared the draconian plans of economic stabilization implemented in South America during the 1980s, and in Eastern Europe during the 1990s.

More important, Spain succeeded in avoiding hyperinflation, the phenomenon most directly responsible for the loss of government credibility, and by extension demo-

cratic legitimacy, in dozens of new democracies. In Argentina and Brazil, for instance, numerous stabilization plans succeeded in dramatically curbing inflation but proved unsustainable because they were implemented by insulated technocrats, acting in secret and lacking credibility, thus ensuring their short life and eventual failure. And with each failed plan, the economy fell into a deeper and more entrenched crisis, while the belief in the capacity of the government to handle the economic affairs of the nation continued to erode, along with faith in democracy.

Gradualism and consensus also marked the revamping of Franco's vast and mostly outmoded state-owned enterprises, grouped around the National Institute for Industry (INI).²² In Spain, not a single public enterprise was sold or dismantled until every politically sensitive task relating to the construction of a new democratic system was accomplished. These tasks included not only enacting a new constitution and decentralizing the state but also creating a new framework for industrial and labor relations and a workers' bill of rights to replace Franco's fascist-inspired labor code. By privileging democratic change over industrial restructuring, Spain, unlike so many other new democracies, avoided the convergence of democratic consolidation and the implementation of economic reforms.

The gradual, negotiated approach to economic stabilization and reform adopted by Spain was undoubtedly conditioned by the culture of national reconciliation that permeated the transition. Less obvious is the fact that Spanish economic technocrats were slow to embrace neo-liberalism as a guide to economic policy. Between 1977 and 1984, democratic governments in Spain adhered to classic Keynesian economic prescriptions to deal with the economic downturn occasioned by the domestic repercussions of the international energy crisis. This included increased public spending on the unemployed, expansion of the welfare state, and job cre-

ation in the public sector even at the risk of increasing the public deficit.

After 1984, privatization and industrial downsizing, hallmarks of neo-liberal economic reform, arrived in full force in Spain when the government in a single stroke sold or dissolved dozens of state-owned enterprises, including banks, car companies, and steel mills. But in Spain these policies were introduced and implemented by a Socialist government with strong links to the working class, a fact that helps explain the distinct social democratic flavor of Spanish economic reform. As with economic stabilization, negotiations and pacts with organized labor were key to the government's program for industrial reconversion. Additionally, painful reforms were cushioned by an expanding welfare net. Government financing of pensions, unemployment benefits, health care, and education went up 39.7 percent in real terms between 1975 and 1982, and 57.6 percent between 1982 and 1989.²³ As a proportion of GDP, social spending in Spain increased from 9.9 percent in 1975 to 17.8 percent by the end of the 1980s. These public expenses aimed to compensate the working class, the group hardest hit by economic reform, for its sacrifices.

The Primacy of Political Institutions

The competence and capacity displayed by Spanish political leaders in negotiating the perils of democratization cannot be understood in a vacuum. We have to take stock of political institutions at the time of the transition, especially the modernization of the state apparatus that preceded the transition and the links to society embedded in the emerging multi-party system. During the last decades of Franco's rule, the state's administrative apparatus was largely demilitarized and many hard-line groups that played the leading roles in shaping the Franco regime during the 1940s and 1950s (such as the fascist-leaning Falange and the *Movimiento Nacional*) began to lose influence and recede into the shadows of history.

Replacing them at the apex of political power was a civilian, reform-minded elite responsible for bringing the Franco regime to its peaceful end.

This new technocratic elite, with its expertise in law and economics, rose to prominence during the economic crisis of 1959, which brought the Franco regime to the brink of collapse. Its members were obsessed with modernizing the state and ending the international isolation imposed upon the nation after the Second World War, the result being the emergence of state competence and a vibrant liberal economy. In working toward more open state-society relations, the elite began to prepare the country for democracy, albeit unintentionally, decades before the formal disintegration of the authoritarian regime.

The technocrats' first step was to abandon the disastrous policies of economic autarky embraced by Franco after the civil war. They adopted economic liberalization policies and opened the economy to the outside, key factors behind the economic boom of the late Franco period. They also introduced collective bargaining in factories across the nation and expanded the foundations of the welfare state. More important, by the time of Franco's death, many technocrats who had risen to power during the late Franco period had begun to regard the authoritarian regime as an impediment to modernization and joined with those acting outside the state bureaucracy in demanding the country's return to democracy.

The leading opposition forces to the Franco regime were the Communist and Socialist parties (the PCE and PSOE, respectively). These national political organizations, which survived Franco's ban on political parties by taking refuge abroad or operating illegally, proved critical in pushing for democratic reforms, given their ability to generate huge rallies at the time of Franco's death. The left parties were also critical actors in institutionalizing the new democracy. Above all, they offered useful organiza-

tional channels for securing mass support for a model of regime change anchored in negotiation and consensus.

The primacy of political institutions in Spain in making democracy possible challenges the prominent role currently being granted to civil society organizations in the creation and maintenance of democracy.²⁴ Focusing on a motley amalgam of organizations, ranging from trade unions to churches to recreational groups, civil society has been elevated to an unprecedented position of importance in the study of democratization. A thriving civil society, as argued by Harvard's Robert Putnam, is central to democracy in furnishing the social capital that lubricates trust and solidarity, and that allows society to check the state's authoritarian tendencies.²⁵ These assumptions about civil society and democracy currently animate the pro-democracy work of the U.S. government, international financial institutions, and philanthropic foundations in numerous democratizing societies.²⁶

However alluring and compelling, the notion of civil society as the engine of democratic consolidation is refuted by the Spanish experience. Not only have political institutions in Spain played the leading role in facilitating democratization, but the country's civil society evidences little of the vibrancy and robustness thought to be essential to democratic consolidation. A recent study of cultural patterns in Spain during the consolidation of democracy brands Spanish civil society as "anemic," based on the low levels of engagement by the citizenry in the kinds of organizations believed to form the core of civil society.²⁷ It reports that only about 22 percent of Spaniards belong to one or more voluntary associations, as opposed to 71 percent in the United States. This finding is hardly surprising to those aware of the notoriously low disposition of Spaniards to join groups, civil, political, or otherwise.

Twenty-five years of Spanish experience suggests where we may have erred in under-

standing democratization and how policies designed to advance the process might be corrected. Perhaps the most important lesson is that democratic consolidation is not the outcome of some meta-historical process, such as economic modernization, as academic theories lead us to believe, or the product of a vibrant civil society, as many in the policymaking community believe. Instead, it hinges upon the presence of effective and legitimate political leadership supported by competent and well-organized political institutions with deep roots in society. Unfortunately, these are the conditions most sorely missing from the world's democratizing landscape.

Ironically, in many newly democratic settings the political system is less legitimate and possibly even less consolidated today than when democracy was first inaugurated. Poorly served by backward-looking political leaders and underdeveloped political institutions, democracy is under serious stress around the globe. These conditions are directly responsible for the proliferation in recent years of regimes notable for the substantial gap between the rhetoric of democracy and its actual practice. Such "pseudo-democracies" possess the institutional trappings of a democratic system, most notably free elections, but lack any meaningful association with such democratic values as adherence to the rule of law and respect for civil and political rights.

This suggests that developing effective and legitimate political institutions is the principal task of democratization. That may be more arduous and less appealing than nurturing the development of civil society. But lacking stable political-institutional authority, democracy is not viable; and civil society, however vibrant and robust, can transform itself into an antidemocratic and even violent social force.²⁸ In other words, only well-functioning political institutions can guarantee the existence of both civil society and stable democracy. ●

Notes

1. The national elections of June 1977, the country's first since 1936, marked the formal return of democracy to Spain.
2. For a concise overview of political developments in Spain during the interwar period, see Juan J. Linz, "From Great Hopes to Civil War: The Breakdown of Democracy in Spain," in *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes* ed. Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979).
3. See Samuel Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
4. Adam Przeworski, *Democracy and the Market* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 8.
5. The prominent role of Spain in the comparative literature on democratic transitions is best appreciated in Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996).
6. For a more detailed overview of the events surrounding Franco's death and the subsequent transition to democracy, see: José María Maravall, *The Transition to Democracy in Spain* (New York: St. Martin's, 1982).
7. On the concept of democratic consolidation, see Omar G. Encarnación, "Beyond Transitions: The Politics of Democratic Consolidation," *Comparative Politics*, vol. 32 (July 2000).
8. On military politics in Spain during the democratic transition, see Felipe Aguero, *Soldiers, Civilians and Democracy: Post-Franco Spain in Comparative Perspective* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995).
9. To be sure, Spain's record with respect to civil and political rights is not spotless. During the years of Socialist administration, the government was accused of carrying out a dirty war against ETA that may have resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians. More recently, human rights violations against migrant workers in the south have captured international attention.
10. Linz and Stepan, *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation*, p. 108.
11. The classic statement on the links between modernization and democracy is Seymour Martin

Lipset, *Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics* (New York: Doubleday, 1960).

12. For a brief overview of the Spanish economy, see Joseph Harrison, *The Spanish Economy: From the Civil War to the European Community* (London: Macmillan, 1993).

13. Edward Malefakis, "Southern Europe in the 19th and 20th Centuries: An Historical Overview," working paper (Madrid: Instituto Juan March, 1992).

14. José Amodia, *Franco's Political Legacies* (London: Penguin, 1976), p. 204.

15. See Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, *Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

16. Philippe Schmitter, "Interest Systems and the Consolidation of Democracies," in *Re-examining Democracy*, ed. Gary Marks and Larry Diamond (Newbury Park, Cal.: Sage, 1992), pp. 158–59.

17. See Charles T. Powell, *El piloto del cambio: El rey, la monarquía y la transición a la democracia* (Barcelona: Editorial Planeta, 1991).

18. Juan J. Linz, "Innovative Leadership in the Transition to Democracy," unpublished manuscript, 1992, p. 4.

19. See Paloma Aguilar, *Memoria y olvido de la guerra civil española* (Madrid: Alianza, 1996).

20. For a broader discussion of this point, see Juan J. Linz and Alfred Stepan, "Political Identities and Electoral Sequences: Spain, the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia," *Daedalus*, vol. 121 (spring 1992).

21. On unemployment in post-Franco Spain, see Nancy Bermeo, ed., *Unemployment in Southern Europe: Coping with the Consequences* (London: Frank Cass, 2000).

22. For a broader view of Spain's politics of economic reform and its various strategies, see Nancy Bermeo, "Sacrifice, Sequence and Strength in Successful Dual Transitions: Lessons from Spain," *Journal of Politics*, vol. 56 (August 1994).

23. Data from Adam Przeworski and Luiz Bresser Pereira, *Economic Reforms in New Democracy: A Socio-democratic Approach* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

24. For a broader discussion of this point see Omar G. Encarnación, "Civil Society and the Consolidation of Democracy in Spain," *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 116 (spring 2001).

25. Robert Putnam, *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993).

26. See Omar G. Encarnación, "Tocqueville's Missionaries: Civil Society Advocacy and the Promotion of Democracy," *World Policy Journal*, vol. 16 (spring 2000).

27. Peter McDonough, Samuel H. Barnes, and Antonio López Pina, *The Cultural Dynamics of Democratization in Spain* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).

28. The classic statement on these points is Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).