



Castro and Latin America: A Second Wind?

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Is Cuba's influence in Latin America on the rise? Washington seems to think so, and the Bush administration, which sees this as a threat to regional stability, has been sounding the alarm.

During most of the 1990s, Cuba's status as the lone dictatorship in the Western Hemisphere—and one of the few remaining communist countries anywhere—left it isolated and increasingly irrelevant. Under the iron-fisted leadership of Fidel Castro, Cuba struggled to ward off economic collapse as other Latin American countries focused on consolidating democratic rule, expanding trade, and pursuing closer ties with the United States. Most regional governments disapproved of the U.S. embargo of Cuba, which they saw as counterproductive, but few saw any advantage in strengthening their bilateral ties with Havana. In 1999, Mexican president Ernesto Zedillo excoriated Castro for the lack of political freedoms on the island at the Ibero-American Summit in Havana.¹ Excluded from such regional initiatives as the Summit of the Americas and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) and denied participation in the Organization of American States (OAS), Cuba appeared to have been permanently relegated to the hemispheric sidelines.

In the five years since Zedillo's speech little appears outwardly to have changed. Cuba remains outside the inter-American system, embargoed by the U.S. government, and criticized for its repressive policies at home. If anything, Castro's rule in Cuba cuts even more deeply against prevailing norms. In a rebuke to democratic opening,

the Cuban government cracked down on internal dissent in the spring of 2003, sentencing 75 democracy activists and independent journalists to prison terms averaging more than 20 years. Eschewing diplomatic niceties for Cold War-style confrontation, Castro continues to relish a fight. Recent targets of the Cuban leader's ire have included Mexican president Vicente Fox, Peru's Alejandro Toledo, Uruguay's Jorge Batlle, and even Cuba's crucial economic partner, the European Union. With FTAA negotiations ranking as a top hemispheric priority, and Chile, Colombia, and the Central American nations pursuing separate bilateral trade agreements with the United States, the Cuban government remains unceasingly critical of free trade and regional integration. While most of Latin America favors better relations with the United States, Castro appears to revel in the unrelenting antagonism of the Bush administration.

Yet Fidel Castro's relations with Latin America appear to be on the mend. Last year, the Cuban leader was publicly feted when he attended presidential inaugurals in Argentina, Brazil, Ecuador, and Paraguay. He has developed a close personal and political relationship with Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, the controversial populist who has presided over the leading oil-producing country in the hemisphere since 1999. While Latin American countries continue to support U.N. resolutions condemning the human rights situation in Cuba, an OAS resolution to that effect fell apart in the spring of 2003, spurned by a dozen Caribbean nations and several of the

hemisphere's major countries. Cuba's sweeping program of medical diplomacy has earned Havana substantial goodwill in the region, even in Central American countries with conservative governments where official ties remain cool. In 2002, when Honduras normalized relations with Cuba after 41 years, the head of Cuba's medical brigade became the first ambassador to that country. Today, only Costa Rica, El Salvador, and Uruguay lack full relations with Cuba (and if a leftist candidate wins Uruguay's presidential election this year, that list may be down to two). Meanwhile, Cuba has established closer ties with the new presidents of Brazil and Argentina, and even Mexico appears to be looking for a way to get out of Castro's doghouse following a period of rocky relations. The more U.S. officials have voiced their displeasure at what they see as Castro's guiding hand—for example, in Chávez's political resurrection following a 2002 coup attempt or in the collapse of the conservative government of Bolivian president Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in the fall of 2003—the longer Castro's shadow appears to be.

But can it seriously be argued that the democratic countries of Latin America are embracing the hemisphere's lone dictatorship? In 2003, some U.S. analysts worried that Cuba, Venezuela, and the new left-wing governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador would form an alliance in opposition to U.S. interests and sow regional instability. Apart from Havana's deepening ties with Caracas, that does not appear to have occurred. Efforts by Argentina and Brazil to strengthen ties with Cuba have been notable mainly for their caution, not their ambition. Ecuador's Lucio Gutiérrez has kept Cuba at arm's length. And although the majority of Latin American governments favor maintaining normal diplomatic and trade ties with Cuba, the island simply does not rank as a top foreign policy priority.

Yet Castro's ability to maintain or even improve regional ties is striking because it

coincides with a wave of harsh repressive measures against dissidents in Cuba that has led to ruptured relations with the European Union and heightened the island's tense stand-off with the Bush administration. Ironically, Castro has principally Washington to thank for Cuba's rejuvenated ties with Latin America. Since 9/11, the focus on the "war on terror" has led Washington to neglect hemispheric relations. At the same time, the U.S. invasion of Iraq was highly unpopular in the region. Castro, highly attuned to shifts in the political wind, has seized on the widespread disapproval of Washington's approach to the "war on terror" to attempt to renew political and economic partnerships in the region.

Post-9/11 Blues

A week before the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, President Bush hosted a state visit by Mexican president Vicente Fox. There was to be a new focus on hemispheric relations, President Bush promised, and the United States, he said, had no more important bilateral relationship than with Mexico. After September 11, Latin America appeared to slip off Washington's radar screen. The Bush administration continued to pursue Latin American trade initiatives and to offer substantial assistance to Colombia in an effort to control the flow of illegal drugs into the United States, but for the most part its attention was elsewhere. At the same time, the U.S. economy slumped and tourism dropped precipitously, with negative effects on much of the Caribbean, Central America, and Mexico. The worldwide global slowdown that followed was accompanied by specific country crises where the U.S. response was either clumsy or inadequate. Washington's slow response to the collapse of Argentina's economy, its inattention toward the festering political crisis in Haiti, and its ham-handed reaction to the mounting unrest and attempted coup in Venezuela

contributed to the perception that Latin America hardly mattered.

Initially, Cuba's relations in the Western Hemisphere also suffered in the aftermath of 9/11. Coincidentally, on that very day, Latin American countries ratified the Inter-American Democratic Charter, which codified protection of democracy in the region and further marginalized Cuba within the inter-American system. Most Latin American governments rallied to the United States, expressing their condolences over the attacks and, in the case of Brazil, invoking the Rio Treaty, under which the attack on the United States was deemed an attack on all the treaty's signatories. Although Cuba had voted for the 12 U.N. treaties against terrorism, Cubans were deeply opposed to the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan; Cuba had been designated a "state-sponsor of terror" by the U.S. State Department, and Cubans worried that Washington might extend its doctrine of preemption to them. This opposition was not widely shared in Latin America, and a public opinion poll conducted in eight countries in November 2001 confirmed that Castro no longer commanded much respect in the region. Castro's negative ratings ranged between 63 and 82 percent. Only in collapsing Argentina did a bare majority—53 percent—express a positive view of the Cuban leader.²

At the same time, differences over questions of democracy and human rights were generating new tensions in Cuba's relationship with Mexico, one of the island nation's oldest allies; Mexico is the only country in Latin America to have maintained steady ties with Cuba since Fidel Castro came to power in 1959, and the Cuban Revolution remains a powerful symbol for the Mexican left. Vicente Fox had been elected president of Mexico in 2000, ending 71 years of rule by the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI). Although it was the PRI that had traditionally sustained relations with Cuba, Castro's relations with outgoing president Ernesto Zedillo were chilly; Fox's arrival

represented an opportunity to turn over a new leaf. Under the Fox administration, Mexico began to seek a more prominent role on the world stage, and its traditional stance of nonintervention in its neighbors' political affairs began to conflict with the desire to promote democratic norms. Foreign Minister Jorge Castañeda, once sympathetic to Cuba, became more openly critical of political repression under Castro. Mexico's position was further complicated by the initially close personal relationship between Fox and George W. Bush, who advocated an uncompromising stance against the Castro regime. This mix of factors soon led Mexico into an unwanted and explosive confrontation with Castro.

In February 2002, as Fox's long-planned visit to Cuba approached, tensions arose between Washington, Mexico City, and Havana. The purpose of the trip was ostensibly to promote cooperation with Cuba, yet the overriding question soon became whether Fox would meet with Cuban dissidents. As U.S. officials pressed for such a meeting, the Mexican government downgraded the trip from a state visit to a "working" visit. Attempting to navigate the diplomatic shoals, Fox met with Castro at length but ended his two-day visit by meeting with dissidents.³ Instead of smoothing Mexico-Cuba relations, the Fox visit reopened old wounds. Later that same month, Cuban asylum seekers invaded the Mexican embassy in Havana, apparently in response to comments about Cuba made by Castañeda on Radio Martí, the Miami-based anti-Castro radio station. In March, the Fox government awkwardly engineered Castro's exit from a U.N. summit on financing for development in Monterrey in order to ensure that the Cuban leader would not cross paths with President Bush.

The final straw came in April, when Mexico supported a U.N. resolution condemning the human rights situation in Cuba. As a member of few mainstream international organizations, Cuba greatly values its

seat in the United Nations, particularly for making its annual case against the U.S. embargo in a resolution overwhelmingly backed by the General Assembly each November. However, in recent years, Cuba has faced the humiliation of a U.N. Human Rights Commission resolution condemning Havana's repression of political and civil liberties. In 2000 and 2001, the Czech Republic proposed the measure, with a split vote among Western Hemisphere countries. But 2002 witnessed the "Latin Americanization" of that effort. Uruguay introduced the measure, which passed with the support of seven Latin American countries, including Mexico, which for the first time departed from its policy of withholding criticism of Cuba in U.N. fora.

Castro, incensed, responded by calling an international press conference to release audio tapes of a private phone conversation with Fox about the Monterrey summit intended to reveal that the Mexican president had ousted Castro as a result of U.S. pressure, and subsequently blasted Mexico's foreign minister, calling him "diabolical" and "sinister." Castro also labeled the Uruguayan president an "abject Judas." Uruguay broke off diplomatic ties to Cuba, and Mexico-Cuba relations sank to a historic low. Fox came away from this contretemps looking like a political neophyte who had been outsmarted by Latin America's sagest politician. The accusations that Fox had ejected Castro from the Monterrey summit at the behest of Washington created a political firestorm in Mexico, with Fox's political opposition having a field day and the media giving the story wide exposure.⁴

But if Cuba's relations with Latin America in 2002 were troubled, Washington's were not much better. The hemispheric trade agenda was beginning to show signs of strain, and anti-Americanism was beginning to seep back into the political discourse. The region broadly accepted the U.S.-led war in Afghanistan, but the subsequent transfer of hundreds of captured Taliban to

the U.S. Naval Base at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, struck many leaders as an effort to flout established international law. And the Bush administration's increasingly hostile posture toward Iraq deeply unsettled the Latin American public. In this atmosphere, Washington could only view with consternation Castro's warm embrace of Venezuela's Hugo Chávez.

The Castro-Chávez Axis

Hugo Chávez, a former army paratrooper and fiery populist, won the presidency of Venezuela in 1998 with the overwhelming support of Venezuela's poor. Chávez first struck up a friendship with Castro in 1995, when he was given a hero's welcome in Havana following his release from prison for a 1992 coup attempt. In campaigning for the presidency, Chávez's promise of a "Bolivarian revolution" was couched in leftist terminology. The newly elected Chávez traveled to Havana in early 1999, in a public embrace of Castro that soon emerged as a political flash point among Venezuela's increasingly polarized electorate.

In October 2000, Castro and Chávez signed the so-called *Convenio Integral de Cooperación* that has formed the backbone of an "oil for services" arrangement that is economically crucial to Cuba and politically inflammatory in Venezuela. Under this agreement, Cuba receives 53,000 barrels of oil a day at a favorable rate of financing, in exchange for providing technical support and advice on education, health care, sports, and scientific research. The oil shipments represent about a third of Cuba's energy needs, with an estimated value of \$400 million—or one-sixth of total imports—making Venezuela Cuba's largest trading partner. Yet for the state-owned oil company, *Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA)*, Cuba's oil imports are barely significant, representing less than 2 percent of annual production. After the coup against Chávez in April 2002, top PDVSA managers immediately suspended the oil shipments to Cuba, acting on

the orders of the interim government. But when the new administration, led by businessman Pedro Carmona, made a series of unconstitutional pronouncements, it lost the backing of the Venezuelan generals. Chávez was then quickly swept back into power by the military rank and file amid an outpouring of popular support. Temporarily chastened by his brief removal from office and economic troubles marked by an \$8 billion budget deficit, Chávez allowed the suspension to persist until August 2002, when the oil agreement was renewed.

At the time of renewal, Venezuelan officials pointed out that Cuba had held up its end of the bargain, continuing to provide social and technical assistance during the suspension. Nevertheless, as PDVSA struggled to recover from a damaging anti-Chávez strike in 2003, Cuba's missed payments and favorable treatment remained a contentious issue in Venezuelan politics. In early 2004, the *Wall Street Journal* reported that Cuba's debt to Venezuela's state-owned oil company had risen to \$752 million—80 percent of the company's debt—and that Caracas had made little effort to collect.⁵

Chávez's open and unapologetic embrace of Fidel Castro has infuriated the right in a deeply polarized country and conjured up the specter of the "Cubanization" of Venezuela. Cuba's deployment of thousands of teachers, doctors, and sports trainers in Venezuela has sparked controversy in both countries. Some Cubans worry that the departure of valued professionals for oil-rich Venezuela will lead to a further fraying of the island's social safety net. Venezuelan educational and medical professionals have expressed skepticism about the need to import foreigners. The political opposition in Venezuela accuses Castro of meddling in the country's internal affairs. The opposition worries that by providing needed services in Venezuela's poorest barrios, the Cubans may in fact be bolstering political support for Chávez among the disenfranchised who have otherwise seen few benefits from his "Boli-

varian revolution." The controversy is likely to intensify given recent discussions between Chávez and Castro regarding a medical aid project that would entail sending 10,000 Cuban doctors to treat Venezuela's poor.⁶

U.S. officials have expressed concern that the two countries have entered into a strategic alliance to thwart Washington's objectives in the region. "We certainly see a Venezuela-Cuba axis which is broadening and deepening and which is not conducive to the promotion of democracy and human rights," says Otto Reich, the U.S. special envoy to the Western Hemisphere.⁷ Indeed, many U.S. officials have expressed deep concerns that a mix of Castro's smarts and Venezuela's cash could create a hotbed of anti-American sentiment, lead to the rise of new leftist movements, and even pose a security threat to the United States and its allies in the region.

The collapse of the Bolivian government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada last October and the political strength of the Bolivian indigenous leader Evo Morales has only fanned Washington's worries. According to Assistant Secretary of State Roger Noriega, Fidel Castro is "nostalgic for destabilizing elected governments" and has become "increasingly provocative."⁸ It is true that many indigenous leaders express admiration for Castro and Chávez at such left-wing gatherings as the Bolivarian Congress of the People, convened in Caracas in November 2003. But it is also true that Bolivia's deep poverty, social tensions, and history of racial exclusion are at the root of country's recent instability.⁹ Castro and Chávez are more likely to be ringside cheerleaders than prime instigators of leftist movements in the hemisphere.

The relationship between Cuba and Venezuela merits continued scrutiny. If the two nations were to move toward closer military ties or show signs of actively intervening in neighboring countries, this would lend credence to Washington's fears. Yet what is most striking about this alliance to

date is not how much of an impact it has had on regional affairs, but how little. There is no question that Venezuela's oil is crucial to Cuba, and that Chávez derives some political benefit from Castro's support. Yet Chávez owes his rise to domestic political factors that are entirely independent of Cuba, and the loss of Venezuelan oil shipments would be a significant but manageable setback for Castro. Cuba's nearly \$2 billion in annual tourist revenues and \$1.2 billion in remittances from Cubans living in the United States are both more important economically, and the island has made significant strides in cultivating domestic energy sources and reducing dependency on oil imports. While most hemispheric leaders maintain relations with both countries, they have so far steered clear of allying themselves with the two men and instead focused mainly on regional integration and managing relations with the United States. Castro and Chávez have a penchant for grand rhetoric. But in conjuring a hemisphere united against American hegemony, they remain a distinctly two-man club.

Alliances of (In)convenience

There is little doubt, however, that Castro's star began to rise again in 2003. This was due in no small part to his decades of resistance to Washington in a period of rising anti-American sentiment. It was also due to the emergence of center-left governments in several key countries in the hemisphere, particularly Argentina and Brazil. In Washington, this shift was especially disconcerting because it coincided with a worsening human rights situation in Cuba.

Unease abroad over the Bush administration's steady march toward war with Iraq in the early months of last year was especially prevalent in Latin America. Chile and Mexico, both traditional U.S. allies with seats on the U.N. Security Council, resisted entreaties by Washington to support a second resolution approving military action. On March 19, the day the first U.S. bombs

fell on Baghdad, the Cuban government instigated a roundup of dissidents—and subsequently arrested and executed three ferry hijackers trying to flee the island. No doubt the timing of arrests represented an attempt by Castro to crack down on rising domestic dissent when the world's attention was otherwise engaged. But it was the rising tide of anti-American sentiment over the Iraq War that allowed the Cuban government to escape serious negative consequences in Latin America for its mistreatment of dissidents. The war against Iraq was so unpopular in fact that a Zogby International poll of Latin American opinion leaders conducted last November showed that George W. Bush, with an unfavorable rating of 87 percent, had surpassed Castro as the most disliked leader in the hemisphere.¹⁰

The arrival of new leaders on the Latin American scene in 2003 also gave Castro a number of opportunities to burnish his public image. On January 1, he attended the inauguration of newly elected Brazilian president Luiz Inácio "Lula" da Silva. Later that month in Ecuador, he was given a warm reception at the presidential inauguration of former coup leader Lucio Gutiérrez. This shrewd public diplomacy continued through the spring, when Castro received a hero's welcome at the inauguration of Néstor Kirchner in Argentina, including a standing ovation in the congress and a mobbed speech at the law school at the University of Buenos Aires.¹¹ Even in Paraguay, a country where Castro had long been considered *persona non grata* during decades of right-wing military rule, the Cuban leader was smoothly received in August by newly elected president Nicanor Duarte Frutos.¹² Castro drew enormous crowds everywhere he went. Perhaps most markedly, on each occasion the outsized Castro outshone the U.S. representative, who was typically an obscure cabinet official.¹³

If the anti-U.S. sentiment generated by Iraq provided the context for Castro's warm reception in Latin America, it was Brazil's

Lula who mapped a path of limited engagement with Havana. As the head of the Workers Party in Brazil and a veteran figure of the Latin American left, Lula had lost three previous presidential elections before his victory in 2002. Castro and Lula have been friends for decades, since the days when Lula was fighting Brazil's right-wing dictatorships. Yet Lula has not pursued a deeper relationship with Cuba to the extent many anticipated, a fact that is consistent with the pragmatism that appears to guide Brazil's new government. It is true that Brazil continues to abstain from criticizing Cuba at the United Nations, and in September, the Brazilian president traveled to Havana to sign trade and investment deals worth \$200 million.¹⁴ Anxious to avoid a confrontation with Castro, Lula dodged the issue of political rights and did not meet with dissidents on the island. However, the Brazilian leader kept the trip short, in an effort to assuage U.S. sensibilities.

The newly inaugurated Argentine president Néstor Kirchner traced Lula's footsteps. In 2001, Argentina had recalled its ambassador when Castro accused then president Fernando de la Rúa of "licking Yankee boots" by supporting the U.N. resolution condemning Cuba. Buenos Aires had previously sought to lower tensions with Havana under interim president Eduardo Duhalde by abstaining from the U.N. vote over human rights in Cuba in 2003, and Kirchner had vowed to follow along the same lines. In October 2003, Argentine foreign minister Rafael Bielsa visited Cuba and normalized relations with the Castro government. During the visit, Cuba and Argentina arranged a debt-for-services swap whereby Cuba will provide medical supplies, treatment, and biotech training to Argentina in exchange for cancellation of its \$1.9 billion debt to the Argentine government—a move that did little to please Argentina's many creditors.¹⁵

Lula has largely escaped U.S. criticism for his approach to Cuba, primarily because

Washington sees trade as the most important item on the bilateral agenda, and Brazil's outreach to Cuba has been much less substantial than originally feared. The Kirchner administration did not get off so lightly: Assistant Secretary of State Noriega noted the Bush administration's "disappointment" with the "leftward drift" of the Argentine government.¹⁶ Buenos Aires has publicly ridiculed such admonitions, but shows signs of backing away from Cuba. This past January, when President Kirchner met with President Bush at the Summit of the Americas in Monterrey, Mexico, the two leaders avoided the topic of Cuba, but the Argentine president indefinitely postponed a trip to Cuba that had been planned for the following month. The Argentine government also announced that Foreign Minister Bielsa would include the subject of Cuban dissidents on his next trip to Havana. The reality is that Argentina does not consider Cuba to be a foreign policy priority, and the country is preoccupied with successfully renegotiating its debt with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and dealing with foreign creditors. Nevertheless, much of Kirchner's exceptional popularity in Argentina stems from his assertive attitude toward Washington and the IMF, following the country's economic implosion in late 2001. And Castro remains a figure of respect among the Argentine public. Cordial relations between Buenos Aires and Havana are likely to persist so long as Argentina refrains from criticizing Cuba at the United Nations. Argentina is also pressuring Uruguay to drop its opposition to Cuban membership in MERCOSUR, the Southern Common Market.

Ecuador is the only other Latin American country to abstain consistently from condemning Cuba at the United Nations, but bilateral ties have not strengthened perceptibly since Col. Lucio Gutiérrez, a populist with leftist sympathies, was elected to the presidency in November 2002. Ecuadoran vice president Alfredo Palacio did make a

routine visit to Cuba in 2003 and signed several agreements related to medical and sports cooperation, but no presidential visit has been planned.

Colombia's Álvaro Uribe is the latest in a succession of Colombian presidents who say that Cuba has played a constructive role in facilitating the peace process between the government and guerrilla groups, particularly the National Liberation Army (ELN). However, Castro is reported to have tense relations with Manuel Marulanda, the ailing guerrilla leader of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). Castro remains a respected figure among Central America's left-wing parties, like Nicaragua's Sandinista Party and El Salvador's Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), but these parties have failed to win elections, and the conservative governments of Central America remain consistently antagonistic toward Cuba. Perhaps the island's strongest support comes from the small nations of the Caribbean, which have maintained diplomatic relations with Cuba for decades and often side with it in international fora.

Mexico, for its part, has been working to improve its ties to Cuba since the falling out between Castro and Fox. The foreign ministers of the two countries met last September—the first high-level meeting in nearly 18 months. Although both countries have expressed interest in better relations, Havana has indicated that Mexico must abstain from the upcoming U.N. resolution condemning Cuba's human rights record to achieve this. Thus, Mexico, like most of Latin America, will continue to walk a tightrope between support for democratic ideals and the desire for a working relationship with the Cuban government.

Don't Call It a Comeback

Despite the renewed appeal of Cuba as a symbol of independence from the United States in a region wary of the Colossus of the North, few countries are anxious to submit themselves to the inevitable diplomatic

dustups with Washington that will be provoked by their seeking warmer relations with Castro. So long as Cuba remains the thorn in Washington's side, the path of least resistance will remain by far the most popular course for most Latin American governments. This path consists of siding with the United States on the question of human rights (the common approach in Central America and in South American countries like Chile, Peru, and Uruguay) or maintaining steady, relatively low-profile diplomatic contact with Havana (pursued by Colombia and the Caribbean nations). For those leaders who have tried publicly to straddle the divide between the United States and Cuba, the costs have often outweighed the benefits. Mexico stumbled badly in this regard, and Argentina appears to be backing away from its earlier rapprochement. Brazil's Lula has managed simultaneously to strengthen relationships with both Cuba and the United States, but his lead has proved hard to follow.

The reality is that Cuba's political and economic model holds little appeal for the democratic governments of Latin America, and relations with Havana tend to rank toward the bottom of their foreign policy agendas. Cuba remains the only country in Latin America and the Caribbean that has not attained full membership in any of the main regional commercial associations, a situation that is unlikely to change in the near future. Worries about the emergence of an alliance of left-wing leaders throughout the hemisphere have proven to be off the mark. The center-left leaders of Argentina, Brazil, and Ecuador have largely pursued moderate policies, guided by pragmatism as much as by ideology. A visit with Castro is useful in establishing left-wing bona fides and asserting independence from the United States, but relations with Cuba's government rarely extend beyond symbolic cooperation agreements and limited trade. Only Venezuela has embarked on a path of deeper engagement. The relationship bears watching, but

Hugo Chávez's self-proclaimed revolution, though polarizing and damaging, has fallen far short of its promises. For more than 45 years, Fidel Castro has promoted socialist revolution as the answer to U.S. power in the hemisphere. In the twilight of this performance, Latin America will provide Castro with a respectful audience, but few heirs. ●

Notes

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