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WORLD POLICY JOURNAL India and the United States: Forging a Security
Partnership? In March 2005, Condoleezza Rice visited India for the first time as secretary of state. Her visit, though not widely noticed in the American press, received a great deal of attention in India. Even the subsequent U.S. announcement of the sale of advanced F-16 aircraft to Pakistan, India's long-term adversary, failed to completely remove the luster of her visit. Indian criticisms of the proposed F-16 sale were almost anodyne in comparison to the intransigence they had generated some 15 years ago. The highly restrained Indian reaction to the announcement highlights the dramatic shift that has come about not only in India's foreign policy orientation but in Indo-U.S. security ties. Beginning in 2004, the two sides had embarked upon a new bilateral program, referred to as the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership (NSSP). Under the aegis of this program, the United States had agreed to work with India on a quartet of security issues: civilian nuclear technology, civilian space technology, high technology trade, and missile defense. Will India and the United States succeed in forging a viable strategic partnership? The question is of considerable significance. There is little question that India, despite a number of endemic domestic constraints, especially widespread rural poverty, is now a rising power in Asia. Its economic growth over the past decade has been robust, its political institutions have demonstrated remarkable resilience in the face of myriad domestic challenges, and its military prowess is steadily increasing. Finally, the country has, for all practical purposes, abandoned its hoary commitments to nonalignment. These factors in concert make conditions propitious for the emergence of a U.S.-India strategic partnership. It is in America's interests to work with India, a large, powerful, and democratic state, to ensure regional stability, to maintain the safety and security of sea lanes that lie athwart India's east and west, and to deal with the scourge of global terror. Unfortunately, despite this positive constellation of factors, other forces may yet undermine the forging of such a strategic bond. The problems lie in both New Delhi and Washington, and stem from a number of different sources: historical, institutional, and structural. During the Cold War years, apart from a fleeting moment of cooperation in the early 1960s, Indo-U.S. security cooperation was a slender construct. There was a brief period of cooperation after the disastrous Sino-Indian border war of 1962, when Indian forces suffered a humiliating defeat at the hands of the People's Liberation Army. India sought and received some U.S. military assistance, but a broader U.S.-India security relationship failed to materialize. India remained committed to nonalignment, and the United States proved unwilling to offend its Cold War ally, Pakistan. Over the next two decades, as the United States improved relations with the People's Republic of China in an attempt to contain Soviet power, India, despite its formal nonaligned status, came increasingly to rely on the Soviet Union for advanced weaponry and diplomatic support. These divergent foreign and security policy alignments were hardly conducive to the evolution of a security partnership. Ironically, during one of the peaks of Cold War tension, a breakthrough occurred in Indo-U.S. strategic cooperation. President Ronald Reagan met Prime Minister Indira Gandhi at a North-South summit in Cancun, Mexico, in October 1981, and the two leaders established a working rapport. Shortly thereafter, Washington and New Delhi signed a memorandum of understanding that permitted the sale of some critical high-tech aerospace components to India, including several GE-404 engines for India's Light Combat Aircraft project. Over much of the next decade, there was only fitful movement toward improved relations, and even with the end of the Cold War and the demise of the Soviet Union, no breakthroughs took place. The reasons were straightforward. The United States refused to ease up on its nonproliferation commitments in South Asia, and India was equally adamant about maintaining its nuclear option. The Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 stultified the incremental progress that had taken place. The Clinton administration imposed a raft of military and economic sanctions on India that effectively halted virtually all ongoing military cooperation. It was not until the waning days of Clinton's second term, and after 14 rounds of negotiation between Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh and Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, that any resumption of meaningful defense ties could again be discussed. Strategic cooperation, in effect, had to wait until the first George W. Bush administration. Barriers to Cooperation Other structural constraints also place important limits on Indo-U.S. security co-operation. India, despite its increasing military prowess, steady economic growth, and size, still remains at best a regional power, albeit one with grander aspirations. The United States, despite its current economic doldrums and its overextended military commitments, nevertheless remains the most powerful nation on the globe. It has repeatedly professed in the past several years that it intends to maintain its globally dominant position for the foreseeable future. Despite certain constraints, it is highly likely that the United States will be in a position to do so. The dramatic asymmetries in power and capabilities between the United States and India place certain limits on security cooperation. India is a regional status quo power. The United States, the messianic zeal of the Bush administration notwithstanding, has also been mostly a status quo power: it would like to maintain existing global regimes in a number of areas ranging from nonproliferation to global trade. However, at a global level, India is at odds with the United States with respect to a number of security regimes. The Bush administration, despite its intransigence toward most global regimes, has appeared unwilling to shred the nuclear nonproliferation regime. India, however, remains outside its ambit and will not accede to it. Admittedly, the administration has not attempted to coerce or even cajole India into acceding to the terms of the treaty. However, the formal provisions of the treaty constrain security cooperation with India in the nuclear arena. India may also run afoul of the United States on the Missile Technology Control Regime, which seeks to limit the spread of ballistic missiles with a range greater than 150 kilometers, as well as in the ongoing discussions on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, which would prohibit the further production and stockpiling of weapons-grade fissile material on a global basis. Apart from these regime-driven constraints, the two sides face other hindrances to collaboration. These stem from divergent conceptions of world order. India, as a regional power, wishes to avoid conflict in areas adjacent to its immediate neighborhood. Consequently, it was unwilling to support, let alone join, the "coalition of the willing" to topple Saddam Hussein. New Delhi harbored few illusions about the scabrous features of the Iraqi leader's regime; at the same time, Iraq under Saddam was a secular and stable state not overtly hostile toward India. Consequently, the Indian government was content to allow the United Nations sanctions to handcuff Saddam. The American invasion and occupation of Iraq has now created widespread instability and a recrudescence of Islamic fervor. New Delhi fears that these may spill over beyond the confines of Iraq and adversely affect India's vital interest in the region, namely access to oil at a reasonable cost. Thus far, despite regime changes in New Delhi, India has managed to avoid conflict with the United States on such vexed issues as the invasion and occupation of Iraq through what the Canadian political scientist K. J. Holsti calls a strategy of "hiding." (2) To this end, it has kept a very low profile on the Iraq question and has avoided the use of intemperate language in criticizing America before and after the war. The Bush administration, for its part, though disappointed with India's unwillingness to send troops to Iraq, has nevertheless not sought to pummel India over differences on the Iraq question. Though this vexing issue has been deftly set aside, it exemplifies the differences in Indian and American conceptions of world order. India, though no longer the standard bearer of Third World concerns, retains serious misgivings about the untrammeled use of American power. Other differences, however, have surfaced. During Condoleezza Rice's recent visit to India, the secretary of state publicly expressed her misgivings about India's interest in pursuing a gas pipeline linking Iran with India. Indian officials, however, remain adamant about maintaining robust relations with Iran and also proceeding with the pipeline. (3) India, which is acutely energy deficient, can ill afford to abandon its quest for reliable supplies of energy. Simultaneously, given its endemic difficulties with Pakistan, a robust relationship with Iran, regardless of the character of its regime, remains in India's long-term interests. New Delhi and Washington have managed to maintain cordial relations on other fronts despite this emerging breach over Iran. It is possible that U.S. policymakers may well adopt a more benign position on Indo-Iranian relations if some breakthrough occurs on the talks directed at forestalling Iran's pursuit of a nuclear weapons option. A Strategic Partnership While there seems to be significant overlap between the national interests and priorities of India and the United States, these are far from identical. Perhaps the most important major difference in perceptions and expectations concerns Pakistan. The United States has labeled Pakistan a "major non-NATO ally" and, particularly since 9/11, has cooperated closely with Islamabad on a variety of security issues. While Washington views Pakistan as a key frontline state in the war on terrorism, New Delhi continues to view Pakistan as, at best, an unstable and erratic neighbor and, at worst, as a radical revisionist power. There is a strong interest in both New Delhi and Washington in "dehyphenating" India and Pakistan. While desirable, this goal is diffcult to achieve in practice. For the United States, this means viewing India more as a country in its own right and not simply within the context of South Asian security issues. De-linking India from Pakistan is challenging because of Washington's ongoing concern over the danger of a conflict breaking out between New Delhi and Islamabad over disputed Kashmir and the fear that any such conflict could escalate to a nuclear war. For New Delhi, the desire to get beyond Pakistan is there—India increasingly thinks globally and aspires to a greater role in world affairs. On the other hand, New Delhi cannot help but constantly monitor how the United States treats Pakistan and compare it to how Washington manages its security relationship with India. While the U.S.-Indian strategic partnership is in the process of being built, it is important to note that the two countries are not starting from scratch. While the relationship has often been rocky, there is a history of security cooperation. (4) The origins of the current strategic relationship, which can be traced back to the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, began to develop, albeit on very modest basis, during the 1980s. The demise of the Soviet Union made a closer Indo-U.S. security relationship possible since Washington no longer had to worry about India's security ties to the USSR. While the Indian nuclear tests of May 1998 led to a chill between Washington and New Delhi, they also provided the impetus for a serious dialogue between high-level leaders on both sides. Of particular note was the extended series of meetings between then Deputy Secretary of State Talbott and Foreign Minister Singh noted earlier. (5) This rapprochement was further strengthened by President Bill Clinton's successful visit to India in 2000—the first by a sitting U.S. president in 22 years. The tragedy of September 11, and the subsequent decision by the Bush administration to launch a global war on terrorism, only served to raise the level of security cooperation and dialogue between Washington and New Delhi. What is the logic of their emerging strategic partnership? It is based on a foundation of shared democratic values and institutions, a belief in the importance of market forces as the engine for economic growth, and a convergence of national interests. Most importantly, the relationship rests on a belief in the value of democracy, both as an ideal and as a system. The United States, as the world's oldest democracy, and India, as the world's most populous democracy, both recognize the importance of protecting and promoting democratic values and institutions around the world. Second, since at least the 1990s, India has been moving away from socialist planning and embracing free-market economics. This development in turn has led New Delhi and Washington to explore areas of potential economic cooperation, and businesses in both countries have begun to act upon them. Third, India and the United States have witnessed a convergence of national interests. While shared values are important for nations to engage in strategic cooperation, there must also be significant commonality of national interests. These include maintaining stability in the Middle East and South and Central Asia, and combating the global scourge of terrorism. The Challenges Ahead There are a number of challenges confronting the relationship. These include developing a roadmap, managing expectations, providing leadership, and finding room for growth. How each of these challenges is handled will determine the future of the relationship. The closest thing to a roadmap is the Next Steps in the Strategic Partnership. However, the scope of the NSSP is limited to the four specific areas noted above. Looking further ahead and more broadly, there is no true roadmap, and it is probably unrealistic to expect one given the nature of democracies and the uneven history of security relations between India and the United States. Still, it is important to clarify and manage expectations and assumptions regarding the anticipated future trajectory of the relationship. What are the expectations each country has of the other? As noted above, neither Washington nor New Delhi seems to anticipate relations blossoming into a full alliance. In terms of defense cooperation, for India "the 'acid test' for U.S. commitment" is technology transfer. (7) The reason for this can be found in New Delhi's experience of defense ties with Moscow, which primarily consisted of arms purchases without joint military exercises or exchanges, and India's perception of the United States as an unreliable source of weaponry. The United States, by contrast, conceives of a bilateral security relationship as being multifaceted and comprehensive—much more than just arms transfers—encompassing military exchanges, exercises, and strategic dialogues. Beyond the confines of the bilateral relationship, what role does India see for itself and how does this compare with what the United States envisions for India in the twenty-first-century world? Certainly, India is seeking a more prominent and influential role in global affairs, one commensurate with its vast size, economic dynamism, and heritage as one of the world's great civilizations. An important part of India's vision is obtaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. New Delhi expects that Washington will support and assist it in this effort. Indeed, New Delhi will almost certainly take the degree of Washington's backing in its quest for a permanent seat as a kind of litmus test of the strength of America's commitment to the strategic partnership. For the United States, however, this is part of a much larger issue about major institutional reform of the United Nations. Moreover, Washington has to weigh the candidacies of a number of other countries that are seeking permanent membership on the Security Council. Third, for the partnership to continue to grow, it will need to be nurtured by leaders in both countries. Last September, President Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had a cordial first meeting in Washington, and Secretary of State Rice appeared to hit it off with her Indian counterpart, Foreign Minister Natwar Singh, during their recent meeting in New Delhi. While political leaders in high office are essential to guiding the relationship, so are military leaders, as well as various former officials and ex-soldiers who remain active even in retirement. Enduring ties between individuals matter, and the more personal relationships blossom and develop the stronger the relationship between the two nations will be. Since leaving the White House in January 2001, Bill Clinton has made several visits to India to promote trade and investment. And Strobe Talbott, in his capacity as president of a leading think tank in Washington, continues to devote considerable time and effort to strengthening ties between the two countries. Fourth, there is a need to deepen and broaden the relationship beyond political and military leaders. These need to be expanded to the business arena, legislatures, academic institutions, and think tanks. U.S.-Indian bilateral trade is now measured in tens of billions of dollars compared to hundreds of millions in the 1990s. In recent years, software entrepreneur Bill Gates has taken abiding business and philanthropic interests in India. The U.S.-India Business Council, founded in 1975, has long been working to promote economic links and now has more than 100 member companies. On Capitol Hill, there are India caucuses in both the House and Senate, and an active U.S.-India Political Action Committee (USINPAC). American universities and colleges have thriving programs in India and South Asian studies, and many offer programs for study abroad in India. Tens of thousands of Indian students are studying at American institutions of higher education. In all of these areas we can anticipate continued energy on the part of the approximately 2 million American citizens of Indian descent, who constitute one of the most prosperous and best educated ethnic communities in the United States. A Healthy Relationship Intelligence is another area for cooperation. The sharing of intelligence between the United States and India dates back more than two decades. Regular cooperation on intelligence began in the early 1980s and focused on terrorism committed by Sikh extremists. More recently, the sharing of counterterrorism intelligence was institutionalized with the establishment in January 2000 of the Joint U.S.-Indian Terrorism Working Group. As noted above, one area of the security relationship that India considers very important is U.S. arms sales. For decades, India has tended to purchase Soviet/Russian arms, and indeed India remains one of Russia's most important markets for weaponry. New Delhi, however, has for sometime been very interested in acquiring technologically sophisticated U.S. weaponry. Until recently, Washington has been reluctant to approve such sales. A watershed event was the signing in January 2002 of the General Security of Military Information Agreement, which prohibits both countries from transferring classified military information to third parties. The absence of such an agreement had been a road block to Washington's approval of export licenses for U.S. weapon systems desired by India. The prospects for a continued U.S.-Indian security partnership appear promising. High-level dialogue is slated to continue— notably President Bush looks likely to pay his first visit to India either later this year, or in early 2006. However, in addition to the challenges already mentioned, the future of the relationship is also dependent on a variety of external variables. A basic unknown is how long the U.S. focus on South Asia will last. Washington has a rather short attention span and global concerns that could quite easily shift its attention elsewhere. Key external variables that are likely to affect U.S.-Indian security cooperation include: how the global war on terrorism proceeds, how successful efforts at global counterproliferation are, and China's future trajectory. It is all but impossible to predict with any degree of reliability the likely course of these extraneous forces. Nevertheless, if the current foundations of the growing relationship can be strengthened, the possibly baneful effects of these factors can be minimized. Notes: 1. Jo Johnson, "Indians Greet US Declaration of Strategic Relationship with Cynicism," Financial Times, April 5, 2005. 2. K. J. Holsti, The State, War and the State of War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 3. On this point, see Sumit Ganguly, "America and India at a Turning Point," Current History, March 2005, pp. 12024. 4. See for example, Dinesh Kumar, "Defence in Indo-US Relations," Strategic Analysis, vol. 20 (August 1997); and Sumit Ganguly, "The Start of a Beautiful Friendship?" World Policy Journal, vol. 20 (spring 2003), pp. 2530. 5. For a U.S. eyewitness account, see Strobe Talbott, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 6. Ian Storey, "Indo-US Strategic Ties on the Upswing," Jane's Intelligence Review, March 2003, p. 43. 7. Juli MacDonald, Indo-US Military Relations: Expectations and Perceptions (Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, October 2002). *Sumit Ganguly is the Rabindranath Tagore Professor of Indian Cultures and Civilizations at Indiana University, Bloomington. Andrew Scobell is associate research professor in the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and adjunct professor of political science at Dickinson College, both located in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. This article reflects the views of the authors alone and does not represent the policies or positions of the U.S. Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. government. [Go to interactive discussion forum]
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