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XXIII, No 1, Spring 2006 |
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WORLD
POLICY JOURNAL
Bloggers vs. Mullahs: How the Internet Roils
Iran
Bill Berkeley*
We Are Iran: The Persian Blogs
Nasrin Alavi
New York: Soft Skull Press, 2005
When I first traveled to Iran in 2003, the
trip happened to coincide with my birthday.
Far from home and family, in a land that for
an American might have seemed far from
friendly, I assumed the date would pass
without song or fanfare. In the event, my
last three nights in Tehran were taken up
with three huge birthday parties, replete
with mountainous spreads of rice and
kabobs, tasty cakes, and one memorably
erotic dance performance in my honor by a
teenage Iranian girl in spiky hair and
skintight pants. At the last of these occasions,
I found myself surrounded by about
two-dozen Iranians singing me a spirited
"Happy Birthday." But there was an embarrassed
pause when they reached the line
"Happy Birthday dear..." No one could remember
my name.
For alas, it was not my personal charisma
that attracted so many newfound
friends, but the fact that I was American.
Like many others before me, I was discovering
that for all the harsh "Death to the
Great Satan" rhetoric of Iran's political leaders
and the image the Islamic Republic
projects as a beacon of radical Islam, Americans
are actually well liked in Iran. So much
so, in fact, that in my chance encounters
with ordinary Iranians, from hotel bellhops
to taxi drivers to merchants, I developed the
habit of saying I was Canadian, not to avoid
trouble but to avoid being drawn into prolonged
conversation if I didn't have plenty
of time.
In three subsequent visits, I learned that
Iranian attitudes toward America are more
complicated than their personal hospitality
might suggest, and they are evolving. With
America at war in neighboring Iraq and
Afghanistan, and with the drumbeat of
Washington's own harsh rhetoric about
"regime change" and the "axis of evil," Iranians
high and low, left and right, still cultivate
long-held suspicions about American
foreign policy. But the deeper lesson of my
warm personal encounters remains: Iran up
close is not what it seems from afar.
These thoughts came to mind as I read We Are Iran: The Persian
Blogs, a fascinating new book by a young Iranian journalist,
Nasrin Alavi, which chronicles the rapid growth of the Iranian blogosphere.
As in China, where the Internet is having a profound impact on political
discourse, the Internet in Iran is challenging the Islamist regime's
ability to control news and shape public opinion, particularly among
Iran's well-educated younger generation. Alavi's book, which combines
extensive excerpts from Iranian blogs with an informative background
narrative of the last century of Iranian history, opens a unique
window on the political passions roiling Iran.
At a time of increasing bellicosity on
all sides over Iran's nuclear program, when
Iran's new hard-line president, Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, seems to be harkening back
to the harsh anti-Western militancy of the
late Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,Iran is a timely reminder that behind the
menacing facade is another Iran, teeming
with sympathetic voices. The "We" of the
defiant title is a huge and dynamic young
population that mostly despises its leaders,
craves contact with the outside world, and
yearns for nothing more culturally clashing
than accountable government and the rule
of law.
A Safe Space
In September 2001, a young Iranian journalist
named Hossein Derakhshan, who
had recently moved to Canada, established
one of the very first weblogs in his native
Persian. In short order, Derakhshan created
a simple "how-to-blog" guide in Persian.
Less than five years later, there are now
more than 75,000 Persian blogs. In neighboring
Iraq, by comparison, there are fewer
that 50 known bloggers. Persian is believed
to be the third most frequently used language
in the blogosphere, behind only
English and Chinese. These are astonishing
developments.
"Blogging in Iran has grown so fast because
it meets the needs no longer met by
the print media," Alavi writes. "It provides
a safe space in which people may write
freely on a wide variety of topics, from the
most serious and urgent to the most frivolous."
She quotes one blogger writing in
November 2004, "I keep a weblog so that I
can breath in this suffocating air.... In a society
where one is taken to history's abattoir
for the mere crime of thinking, I write so as
not to be lost in my despair, so that I feel
that I am somewhere where my calls for justice
can be uttered.... I write a weblog so
that I can shout, cry and laugh, and do the
things that they have taken away from me
in Iran today."
The Persian Internet has its roots in the
short-lived flowering of an independent
press in Iran that followed the election of
the reformist President Mohammed Khatami
in 1997. Scores of vibrant newspapers
began publishing critical commentary and brave, if sometimes reckless and partisan,
investigative journalism. But the ruling
mullahs who hold real power in Iran, led
by the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, soon fought back, shutting down
more than 100 newspapers and jailing many
reporters and editors. Now some of these
prominent Iranian journalists use blogs to
bypass strict state censorship and to publish
their work online. Exiled Iranians worldwide
also blog to communicate with those
back home.
In April 2003, Iran's regime became the
first in the world to imprison a blogger.
Dozens have since been jailed, many claiming
torture. In 2004, Ayatollah Mahmoud
Hashemi-Shahroudi, the head of Iran's judiciary,
one of the key coercive arms of the
Iranian regime, denounced the Internet as a
"Trojan horse carrying enemy soldiers in its
belly." He announced new laws covering
"cyber crimes": anyone "propagating against
the regime, acting against national security,
disturbing the public mind and insulting
religious sanctities through computer systems
or telecommunications will be punished,"
he vowed. The announcement was
accompanied by articles in state-controlled
newspapers like Tehran's Keyhan daily,
which "exposed" the Iranian blogosphere as
a "network led by the CIA conspiring to
overthrow the regime."
Unsurprisingly, many Iranians blog
anonymously, yet some prominent bloggers
still write under their own names. One is
Bijan Safsari, former editor and publisher
of several pro-democracy newspapers that
were shut down over the last several years.
In a typical pattern, each time one of his
newspapers was shut down, it resurfaced
under a new name. Safsari was eventually
jailed. "At a time when our society is deprived
of its rightful free means of communication,"
he blogged in February 2004,
"and our newspapers are being closed
down one by onewith writers and journalists
crowding the corners of our jails...the
only realm that can safeguard and shoulder the responsibility of free speech is the
blogosphere."
Estimates of the number of online users
in Iran range from 4 million to 7 million,
with thousands of Iranians buying computers
every month and going online. That's
still a small percentage in a country of 70
million. But Alavi says the number of Iranians
online is likely to more than double
again in the next five years, in a country
where two-thirds of the population is under
30, and many are technologically savvy. Interestingly,
she reports, because of the education
policies of the Iranian regime, those
with access to higher education cut across a
wide spectrum of Iranian society. Literacy
rates for young men and women are more
than 90 percent, even in rural areas. Young
Iranians from very different social and regional
backgrounds are gaining access to
computers and the Internet.
Any foreigner who visits Iran is struck
by the gap between the image projected by
the regime to the outside world and the reality
of Iranian society. The blogs quoted
here vividly convey the bitter disillusionment
many Iranians feel not just toward the
hard-line mullahs, but toward the failed reformist
project and its erstwhile leader, Mohammad
Khatami.
The Damaged Generation
Iran's hard-liners wield real power through
nonelective institutions like the judiciary,
the so-called Guardian Council, which can
veto legislation and disqualify candidates for
elective office, and the army, the Revolutionary
Guard, and allied militias like the
Basij and Hezbollah. Since around 2000, the
hard-line "conservatives," as they have come
to be called, have successfully crushed the
reformists, not just by shutting down the
reformist press but by vetoing reformist legislation
and disqualifying thousands of electoral
candidates, and jailing, torturing and,
in a number of notorious incidents, assassinating
reformists and student activists. In
his eight years as president, Khatami proved powerless to stop this onslaught, and was
seemingly disinclined to try.
A young student blogger wrote in January
2004: "You have heard the story of my
generation many times. A generation that
grew up with bombs, rockets, war and revolutionary
slogans.... The girls of my generation
will never forget their head teachers
tugging hard at tiny strands of hair that
somehow fell out of their veils to teach
them a lesson. The boys of my generation
will never forget being slapped five times in
the face for wearing shirts with Western labels
on them...all of us have hundreds of
similar memories. My generation is the
damaged generation. We were constantly
chastised that we were duty-bound to safeguard
and uphold the sacred blood that was
shed for us during a revolution and war.
Any kind of happiness was forbidden for
us...."
Yet the student's harshest words were
reserved for Khatami, who time and again
failed to stand up for student demonstrators
who were jailed and beaten on his watch:
"It's unfair to say that he [Khatami] did
nothing. We got concerts, poetry readings,
care-free chats in coffee shops and tight
manteaus [the mandatory overcoats for
women]. But is this all that my generation
wanted? It was also during this time that
the students of my generation were labeled
hooligans and Western lackeys...and again
Khatami was silent."
Iranian bloggers give eloquent voice to a
painful history that many Americans are unaware
of: Iranians have been struggling to
build a constitutional democracy for much
of the last century. Americans have figured
prominently in this struggle, for both good
and ill. That helps explain the ambivalence
many young Iranians feel toward the United
States, at once a kinship and a profound suspicion.
It also explains why most Iranian
democracy activists will be wary of accepting
the recent proffer of financial support
from the Bush administration, for fear of being
seen as tools of American meddling.
In March 2003, one blogger marked
the anniversary of the infamous 1953 CIA-
backed coup that drove the elected populist
Mohammad Mossadeq from power and ushered
in three decades of the Shah's tyranny:
"The most influential democratic leader in
Iranian modern history died on this day. At
a time when America is telling the world its
aims are to bring democracy to the whole
planet, the Mossadeq era proves all of America's
protestations to be a long lie."
The 1953 coup came as a shock to many Iraniansnot least
Mossadeq, who regarded Americans as allies and had many American
friends and supporters, including President Truman, who stood up
to the British when they wanted to force Mossadeq from office. But
the mood in Washington had changed when Dwight Eisenhower took office
in 1953. To this day, Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamanei,
justifies the regime's harsh rule by saying, "We are not liberals
like [Salvador] Allende [of Chile] and Mossadeq, whom the CIA can
throw out." Yet Alavi reminds us that before the coup America was
revered in Iran. She recalls that two unlikely heroes of Iran's
earlier experiment with democracy at the turn of the twentieth century
were Americans. One was Howard Baskerville, an idealistic young
Princeton graduate who came to Iran to teach in a mission school
and wound up championing the Iranian people's struggle for self-rule
against the imperial powers, Russia and Britain, that ruled Iran
through a puppet monarchy. Baskerville was killed in Tabriz at age
24 while leading 150 soldiers in battle against the monarchist forces.
To this day, thousands of Iranians make pilgrimages to Baskerville's
grave in Tabriz. Then there was Morgan Shuster, a Washington lawyer
who was invited to Iran in 1906 by the newly installed constitutional
government to reorganize Iran's national finances. A supporter of
Iran's fledgling liberal democracy, Shuster's reforms strengthened
Iran but threatened Russian and British interests. When parliament
was dis solved after a Russian invasion, Shuster was dismissed and
reluctantly left the country. But he produced a memoir, The Strangling
of Persia (1912), that poignantly recounted how Russia and Britain
crushed the democratic aspirations of Iranians. From then until
the 1953 coup, Americans were regarded as heroes of the democracy
movement in Iran. In August 2003, a blogger calling himself "Godfather"
wrote: "We have been fighting against fascists for at least the
last 100 years. Our great-grandfathers during the Constitutional
Revolution (1906) tried to bring democracy to this land. But the
British with their Anglo-Iranian Oil Company were against it and
soon killed them off. Do they know about the democratically elected
government of our beloved Dr. Mossadeq? Do they know that the CIA
toppled him nearly 50 years ago and replaced him with (to paraphrase
a remark attributed to Franklin Roosevelt) a 'son-of-a-bitch, but
our son-of-a-bitch.' And the sick joke is now they want to give
us democracy!" The 1953 coup, and the decades of American support
for the Shah, are not the only sources of abiding suspicion. Iranians
are mindful that America provided covert assistance to Saddam Hussein's
Iraq in its devastating eight-year war with Iran, sharing vital
intelligence that enabled Saddam to use chemical weapons against
Iranian troops. The Reagan administration wanted to contain Iran,
fearing that it would overrun or inflame other oil-producing states
and export its Islamic revolution. Moreover, America's Cold War
allies, France and Germany, fortified Saddam's grip on power with
weaponry and dual-use technology that underpinned Iraq's chemical
and biological warfare programs. These are facts that Americans
may scarcely recall. Iranians know them all too well, and they are
not shy about reminding American visitors, as I learned more than
once. Yet paradoxically, Alavi writes, "Iraq's war against Iran
was crucial in strengthening
the power base of the radical clerics, because even those Iranians
who opposed the Islamic Republic moved to Khomeini's camp in defense
against foreign aggression." A blogger wrote in September 2003:
"What an era we are born in.... Remember all those piggy banks shaped
like tanks and all the windows taped up? The rush to get to a shelter,
the terrorizing sound of sirens and then total darkness...?" The
blogger went on: "The best of our kind were disabled, maimed or
died in the war and the worst of our kind rule us now. May God protect
us and bring an end to this madness." Mad Dogs and Satanic Yanks
Yet Iranians' abiding personal affinity for Americans persists.
An American blogger living in Tehran with her Iranian boyfriend
wrote in August 2003: "I like being an American here. Everyone is
so nice to me. Everyone seems to think Americans are wonderful....
People shake my hand. They talk to me. Sometimes they tell me they
don't like Bush, but they always tell me how much they like Americans.
This is so refreshing after a couple of years of living in Europe,
where all I heard was how evil Americans were." The American went
on: "I like the way Iranians are dissatisfied with their society
and their government. I like the way they are working to change
it (slowly). One thing I always complained about in the Netherlands
is that Dutch people are too satisfied. Everything seems finished
there.... In Iran (like America, I think) there is a sense that
society is an ongoing project. Things are most definitely unfinished
and moving forward." Since September 11, 2001, the official line
from Iran's Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has been that the attacks
on New York and Washington were coordinated by Israel and the United
States as a "stratagem for world domination." The subsequent wars
on Iran's immediate neighbors east and west, Afghanistan and Iraq, are cited as
proof. In the realm of the blogosphere, by contrast, where anonymous
individuals are free to voice contrary views, one gets a very different
take on those events. Soon after the attacks, one Iranian blogged,
"So many dead.... Although the world only became aware of Islamic
fascists on 9/11, as a society we have been forced to coexist with
them for nearly a quarter of a century." This blogger went on, "In
the past they have served their purpose.... These mad dogs were
well fed and used at the ‘last stand' against Communism in Afghanistan....
Another rabid bunch, Hamas, were a valuable tool against a brainless
but secular Arafat...and in 1953 in Iran, the CIA used some of them
to topple the democratic government of Dr. Mossadeq. All societies
have their mad dogs, but while theirs are marginalized, scorned
and subdued with antipsychotic medication...tragically ours have
at times been very well fed by outsiders and nurtured by our own
ignorance and desperation." The Persian blogs capture well what
some commentators have called the increasingly "post-Islamist" nature
of Iranian society, the election last year of President Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad notwithstanding. After years of theocratic rule and
Islamist propaganda, many Iranians roll their eyes at the Islamist
fervor now sweeping much of the rest of the Muslim world. A blogger
wrote in 2005: "Europe struggled for five centuries to banish religion
and superstition from political and social life, making a lot of
sacrifices along the way. Our country will be the first country
in the Middle East to go on this journey in a relatively short time
frame. We must make this hard and hazardous journey by ourselves.
There are no chains harder and stronger than the chains of religion
and tradition." He continued, "Our people have not been very politically
aware throughout their history. Today they know what they want and
what they don't want. They have felt a religious regime and its
decomposed cultural traditions with their flesh and skin. There
are not many families in Iran that have not paid a sacrifice on
this journey...women, workers, teachers, student protesters, writers
and journalists, on the Internet and in blogs and in the daily lives
of ordinary people. They all call to account those thieves of the
Revolution responsible for this brutal tyranny. Have you not heard
their voices?" Alavi writes: "Iran, uniquely, has been controlled
and ruled by radical clerics, and people have lived through and
suffered the consequences of the 25-year-forced march towards utopia
promised by the godfather of Islamic militancy Ayatollah Khomeini.
Iranians have no illusions to shatter. They are all too aware of
the difference between the Paradise they were promised and the harsh
reality of living under the rule of the Islamic fundamentalists."
In August 2003, the blogger called Godfather asked: "What is there
to be done with our own Islamic fascists? Our electoral system does
not give us the opportunity to vote against them. Have we put up
a fight? Yes, for 25 years our prisons have been packed to the rafters,
we have seen the best of our kind sent to the gallows and buried
in mass graves. Are the fascists in the minority? Yes.... But they
are armed and willing to kill for their beliefs and we are only
willing to die for ours." The Godfather concluded: "They only hear
the psychopaths among us. Don't they know that many like me believe
in the maxims of Hussein [the grandson of Mohammad and patron saint
of the Shiites], who said, 'If you are a non-believer, at least
be a libertarian.' He did not practice our faith like these tyrants."
Another skeptic wrote in May 2003: "Twenty-five years of religious
rule has had one long-term benefit.... For generations to come no
Iranian will ever want to mix matters of state with religion. And
if only those Muslim idiots in our neighboring countries knew about
our failed experiment with an Islamic government they would come
to their senses too.... It's a joke they want to do now what we
miserably failed at 25 years ago." In a variation of this oft-heard
theme, another blogger wrote in March 2004: "According to many of
our social commentators, religion has ceased to be a unifying force
among our people...the conduct of our rulers has pushed religion
out of its sacred dimensions and has turned religion into something
antisocial. No one can deny that after all these years if anyone
admits to being religious or having faith...in the view of most
people they are lined up alongside liars, hypocrites and even tyrants....
It was this religion that took away the people's right to vote...has
taken away from them the right to be modern and resourceful, and
denies them the basic pleasures of life... equality and freedom.
I believe that if the older generation today still hold strong religious
values, it is because they did not grow up under a meddlesome religious
regime.... The older generation can never comprehend the level of
humiliation, slander and insult that this totalitarian regime has
poured down our throats under the guise of religious values." "Death
to Everybody!" The election last summer of the hard-liner Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad as president was difficult to square with this sort
of widespread sentiment. The little-known mayor of Tehran had presented
himself, ironically enough, as an antiestablishment candidate, campaigning
against corruption and poverty. He owed part of his electoral success
to a boycott of the elections by many reformist voters. Ahmadinejad
won with the support of less than 40 per cent of eligible voters,
even after suspected vote rigging and stuffed ballots, and the mobilization
of his core support among the Revolutionary Guard Corps and the
Basij militias. Of the votes he won, many were given to him because
he was not a mullah, and in particular he was not Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani,
perhaps the most hated mullah in Iran and a symbol of financial
chicanery, who was his opponent in the run-off. Ahmadinejad clearly
has support, especially among the poor, whose voices are not well
represented in this book. Nor do we learn much of the economic concerns
that proved to be a decisive factor in his election. Alavi, like
most political analysts I have spoken to, says the regime has diehard
supporters who amount to perhaps 15 percent of the electorate. The
regime's hard-line militiamen and their families are financially
well looked after. Perhaps because their opinions are well represented
in the state- run media, blogs kept by staunch supporters of the
regime are rare. But Alavi says some bloggers do articulate the
concerns of many hard-liners that Islamic principles are being eroded,
and that a great injustice is taking place within Iranian society,
where the righteous and pious are being marginalized and mocked
by an elite that has been corrupted by the West. More typical was
acute despair and foreboding at Ahmadinijad's surprise win, though
even in the blogosphere, some disheartened reformists cautioned
against undue alarm. "Do not worry or become alarmed," one blogger
wrote. "Nothing much has happened, except that we can see what has
up to now been hidden. A fresh force outside the power structure
has not been empowered...the force that during the last eight years
held the real power is now come to the forefront and has only made
itself visible." President Ahmadinejad's bellicose declarations
about wiping Israel off the map have drawn much criticism in the
West (though little in the Muslim world), but they reflect long-standing
ideology dating back to the revolution. For a quarter century, Iran's
official position on Israelin the words of the Supreme Leader,
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been: "The cancerous tumor of Israel
has to be removed from the landscape." By most accounts, supported
by my own conversations in Iran, this ugly demagoguery has little support among
most Iranians, least of all in the blogosphere. A blogger wrote
in May 2004: "Death to Everybody! Death to America! Israel! Britain!
Imperialism!... Death to your mother, aunt and sister too!... Death!
Death! Death! They have been chanting ‘Death to America and Israel!'
for 25 years.... Israel is still the bully of the neighborhood and
the Palestinians are swamped in misery.... But I can't get over
how we Iranians are considered the most fanatical people in the
worldall because of a bunch of nit-ridden Mullahs.... When
I was growing up, Hajji Yousef, the mullah who used to teach us
the Koran...would say that Moses taught us wisdom, Jesus love and
Mohammad life...so where did all these death chants come from?"
A year later, another blogger wrote:
"I've been paying attention to the graffiti in
the office toilet recently: Death to the Mullahs'
ass lickers, Death to the Mullah pimps,
Death to fake Muslim wolves dressed in
Sheep's clothing."
One of the most prominent Iranian
bloggers is Masoud Behmoud, a leading author,
journalist, and social commentator in
Iran for four decades, including stints in
prison and more recently in exile. Behmoud
has likened the growing use of the Internet
to the famous audio cassette campaign
mounted by Khomeini in the late 1970s to
overthrow the Shah.
"Each day as I open and look at the
websites and blogs by young Iranians, I am
filled with a new spirit," he wrote in his
blog in April 2004. "I say to myself how
gratifying it is that our youth now possesses
an outlet for their beliefs.... They value freedom
and do not sell out to fanaticism. Their
blogs are reflections of the unveiled and candid
views of our youth and future generations
of Iran.... In our day, everyone was
looking for an opportunity to shout, and the
louder their voices the more attention they
would get. But today's generation is not like
that. If they want freedom it is so that they can coexist in this society and build a better
world for the whole of humanity."
The Iranian blogosphere may yet develop
the kind of subversive impact that
Khomeini's famous cassette tapes had in
1978 and 1979. Alavi calls the changing
consciousness of Iran's younger generation
"nothing less than a revolution within the
revolution." Revolution may be too strong
a word, even for those who most fervently
wish for change. Many Iranians, mindful of their turbulent recent history, recoil
from the idea of another revolution. The
point is perhaps best expressed by Emadeddin
Baghi, a leading journalist and human
rights advocate who spent three years in
prison: "Society itself, not the government,
creates change," Baghi has written. "And
there are deep transformations occurring
in Iran. Out of sight of much of the
world, Iran is inching its way towards
democracy."
*Bill Berkeley teaches writing at Columbia University's School
of International and Public Affairs. He is the author of The Graves
Are Not Yet Full: Race, Tribe and Power in the Heart of Africa,
and is currently at work on a book about the Iranian hostage-takers.
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