THE BUSH EFFECT: U.S. Military Involvement in Latin America Rises Development and Humanitarian Aid Fall
An
Arms Trade
Resource Center
Fact Sheet
by
Frida Berrigan and Jonathan Wingo, World
Policy Institute
November 4, 2005
(PDF)
While
President George W. Bush is in Latin America
to push his controversial free trade agenda, there is another
type of trade to be concerned about. U.S.
military aid, training and arms sales to the region have all increased
sharply since the beginning of the war on terrorism and threaten
to exacerbate conflict, empty national coffers and sidetrack development
programs.
Through
the Foreign Military Financing program, military aid has drastically
increased during the Bush administration. In 2000, U.S.
military aid to Latin America was $3.4
million, a tiny share of worldwide FMF spending of $4.7 billion.
By 2006, overall spending on Foreign Military Financing actually
decreased to $4.5 billion, after peaking at $6 billion in 2003.
But military aid to Latin America increased
to over 34 times its year
2000 levels, to $122 million.
After
the Summit of the
Americas
in Argentina,
President Bush will visit Brazil
and Panama.
Argentina
is the third largest recipient of military aid in Latin
America, with a total of $6.3 million between 2000
and 2006. Panama,
where the United States long controlled the canal area, is also
a major recipient of military aid, with a total of $5 million
for the same period. Argentina’s
population is ten times that of Panama,
making the near parity in their military aid levels striking.
But,
when looking at military aid to the region, it is most noteworthy
that El Salvador
tops the list of recipients, with almost $23 million in FMF since
2002. This relatively large amount of military aid can be explained
at least in part by looking at Salvadoran support for the war
on terrorism. El Salvador
is one of the Bush administration’s few remaining allies with
troops in Iraq,
and six Salvadoran Special Forces soldiers have been awarded the
Bronze Star.
The
administration has also sought to draw a parallel between El
Salvador’s transition to democracy
and Iraq’s
rocky progress toward that goal. While in San Salvador last year,
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld praised the country’s progress,
saying “when one looks at this country and recognizes the fierce
struggle that existed here 20 years ago and the success they’ve
had despite the fact that there was a war raging during the elections,
it just proves that the sweep of human history is for freedom.”
He added, “We’ve seen it in [El
Salvador], we’ve seen it in Afghanistan
and I believe we’ll see it in Iraq.”
[1]
El
Salvador, which emerged from
a U.S.-backed civil war in 1992, is also the second largest recipient
on military training though IMET, and it is 11th on the list of
arms sales recipients, purchasing a total of $46.8 million in
weaponry between 2000 and 2003. During the civil war, in which
75,000 people were killed over 12 years, Washington
contributed $1.5 million a day in military and economic aid to
support the dictatorship’s fight against guerillas.
[2]
MILITARY TRAINING
In
fiscal year 2000, the United States
distributed almost $50 million in military training funding through
International Military Education and Training (IMET), with $9.8
million or 18% allocated to the Western Hemisphere.
This funding trained 2,684 soldiers from Latin American countries.
Fast
forward six years and into the midst of the war on terrorism;
overall IMET funding worldwide has increased 75% to $86.7 million.
Funding for military training in Latin America
has increased at a proportional rate, to $13.6 million for 2006.
This will fund training for 3,221 Latin American soldiers in everything
from counterintelligence to helicopter repair.
Colombia
tops the list for IMET, with $9.3 million in military training
aid since 2000, an increase of almost 90% over six years. But
other countries have received larger percentage increases over
the same period. IMET funding to El
Salvador and Nicaragua
increased more than 200%, and their neighbor Panama
received a 400% increase between 2000 and 2006.
At
the same time that military aid and training are on the rise,
U.S.
economic aid to the region is dropping-- the 2006 foreign aid
request foresees a sharp drop especially in development assistance,
child survival and health programs. In 2002, in the United
States budgeted $225 million
for U.S. Agency for International Development programs in Latin
America, including funds for child survival and health
programs, disaster and agricultural assistance. The request for
2006 totals $125 million for the region- a decrease of more than
40%.
WEAPONS SALES TO LATIN AMERICA: Hundreds of Millions and Counting
In
addition to aid programs such as FMF and IMET, the United
States sells military hardware
through arms sales programs such as Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS). The top 15 recipients of arms
sales in Latin America took delivery of
more than $3.5 billion in military hardware and weaponry between
2000 and 2003 (the last year for which full data is available).
Brazil
topped the list with almost $720 million in arms from the United
States.
The top five U.S.
arms sales recipients Brazil
plus Colombia,
Mexico,
Venezuela
and Argentina-accounted for two thirds of all U.S.
weapons sold in the region.
As a large and relatively
wealthy country, Brazil
can sustain a regular expenditure of over $100 million a year.
Other countries maintain a more cyclical approach to armament.
Instead of a steady increase or decrease in sales, countries go
through phases to expand their military, thus boosting sales,
and then spend a few years maintaining and servicing the existing
equipment, causing a drop in sales. A clear example of this is
Guyana,
which in 2003 remarkably increased their arms expenditure over
5,000% from the previous three years, and Argentina,
which spent 800% more in 2001 than in the two years that followed.
Foreign Military Sales
are conducted between the requesting government and the Pentagon.
This process is usually reserved for larger orders and “package
deals” that include delivery, training, spare parts, maintenance
and even a warrantee on equipment, in addition to the military
hardware. Most of the weaponry sold through FMS either comes from
the Pentagon’s stockpile, or from supplies of military hardware
restricted from market sale. Direct Commercial Sales, however,
are conducted between the requesting government and the weapons
manufacturing firms. As a rule, these transactions take less time
because they are not subject to the same level of Congressional
intervention or Pentagon red tape. But, sales are drawn from a
more limited inventory because of the above-mentioned market sale
restriction. FMS and DCS
are both subject to review from the State Department.
MILITARY AID AND THE WAR ON DRUGS
In addition to military
aid through Foreign Military Financing and International Military
Education and Training, Latin American police and security forces
are receiving billions in “counter-narcotics” aid.
In 2000, countries in Latin America
received $1.19 billion in International Narcotics Control funding,
with most of that-- $894 million -- going to Colombia
under the beginning of President Clinton’s Plan Colombia.
INC funding for Latin America (not including
additional supplementals to Colombia)
totaled $169 million between 2001 and 2005, and the State Department
has requested $51 million for 2006.
The Andean Counter Drug Initiative is a separate program
that includes considerable military and police aid. It is the
umbrella under which “Plan Colombia”
is supported and its stated goals are countering drug proliferation
and stimulating economic development in the Andean region. Bolivia,
Brazil,
Ecuador,
Panama,
Peru
and Venezuela
all receive some funding, but the lion’s share continues to go
to Colombia.
U.S. counternarcotics funds go
mainly to drug interdiction; programs to train and support national
police and military forces; provision of communications and intelligence
systems; support for the maintenance and operations aerial eradication
aircraft; and improvement of infrastructure related to counternarcotics
activities. Beginning in 2001 with $154 million in aid, the program
has so far totaled more than $2.9 billion.
SOUTHERN COMMAND
U.S.
Southern Command is the hub of the military’s presence in Latin
America. Now based in Miami
and headed by General Brantz Craddock,
SOUTHCOM operates on a budget of $800 million a year and considers
19 countries in Central and South America
and 13 in the Caribbean as its area of
concern.
The
Command’s size and budget, especially given the current military
preoccupation with the Middle East, speaks
to the United States’
enduring influence in the Western Hemisphere-- Washington’s backyard.
The Southern Command is staffed by 1,470 people-- more than are
tasked with the region by the Departments of State, Commerce,
Treasury and Agriculture and the Joint Chiefs office and the Office
of the Secretary of Defense combined.
UNGOVERNED SPACES: Al Qaeda in Latin America?
According to its public documents, Southern Command
is interested in improving “effective sovereignty” in Latin America’s
“ungoverned spaces” like the “Triborder
Area” between Paraguay, Argentina and Brazil, where national governments
have little power, smuggling is rampant, and U.S. military experts
allege that fundraising for Islamic terrorist groups like Hamas
and Hezbollah is taking place. Former SOUTHCOM head James Hill
states that “branches of Middle East terrorist
organizations conduct support activities in the Southern Command
area of responsibility.”
[3]
According
to San Diego Union Tribune contributor Andres Oppenheimer, other
“ungoverned spaces” include the “Tabatinga-Leticia
corridor on the Brazil-Colombia border, the Lago
Agrio area on Ecuador’s border with Colombia and the Darien
jungle in Panama” where “Colombian drug traffickers, narco-terrorists
and arms dealers roam about freely, and often control large territories.”
[4]
But,
many Latin America and security experts
say that the terrorist threat there is overstated. Adam Isaacson,
an analyst with the well-regarded Center on International Policy,
says that with the exception of Colombia, “terrorists are rather
scarce in Latin America, and terrorists who threaten U.S. citizens
on U.S. soil are scarcer still…To portray terrorism as a region-wide
threat, from the Rio Grande to Tierra del Fuego,
seems like a tough sell.” The
lack of a significant threat has done little to cool the rhetoric.
Isaacson notes that “the word ‘terrorism’ appears as a justification
for military aid in 16 of the Western Hemisphere
country narratives in the State Department’s 2005 Congressional
Presentation document for foreign aid programs.”
[5]
RADICAL POPULISM: Latin America Tilting Left?
While
fanning concerns about the growing role of Islamic fundamentalists
in Latin America and keeping a wary eye
on “ungoverned spaces,” what seems to concern Washington
most is the leftward tilt of many Latin American countries.
In
its 2004 Posture Statement, SOUTHCOM noted that “radical populism”
is a major threat to stability in the region. At a briefing before
the House Armed Services Committee in April 2004, then- SOUTHCOM
Commander James Hill said that “terrorists throughout Latin
America bomb, murder, kidnap, traffic drugs, transfer
arms, launder money, smuggle humans.”
[6]
He elaborated that
there are both “traditional terrorists,” like the criminal gangs
in Central America and paramilitary and
guerilla groups in Colombia;
and “emerging terrorists” like the “radical populists” who tap
into “deep seated frustrations of the failure of democratic reforms
to deliver expected results.” Radical populists apparently include
Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez and Evo
Morales, a former leader in the Bolivian coca growers’ union who
now heads that country’s main opposition party.
[7]
In
March, CIA Director Porter Goss testified before the House Armed
Services Committee that the U.S.
should paying greater attention to threats “in our own back yard.”
He noted that presidential elections will be held in eight South
American and Central American countries in 2006 and warned that
“destabilization or a backslide away from democratic principles...would
not be helpful to our interests and would be probably threatening
to our security in the long run.”
[8]
As Tom Barry, co-director of Foreign Policy
in Focus, said, “Latin America is a continent
that is drifting to the left, maybe out of U.S.
control.” To many in Washington,
that seems to be at least as scary as a robust terrorist network
in their backyard.
[9]
ON THE GROUND IN LATIN AMERICA: The U.S. Military in Paraguay and Elsewhere
U.S.
military bases, forward operating locations and radar stations
like the ones listed on page five try to keep a low profile, but
they are not as elusive as on-again, off-again military “training
missions,” like those taking place in Paraguay
this summer.
The
United States
military and the Armed Forces of Paraguay are conducting joint
operations at a Paraguayan military base, including one that involves
U.S.
soldiers providing counterterrorism training to 65 Paraguayan
air force officers.
While
U.S.
officials, including Defense Secretary Rumsfeld, have denied Washington’s
interest in a permanent military base in Paraguay,
the location of the exercises raise suspicions. The military base
is 200 miles from the Bolivian border and almost as close to the
country’s natural gas reserves and fresh water aquifers. It is
also close enough to Brazil
to be threatening. In late July, the Brazilian army launched military
maneuvers along its border with Paraguay,
parallel to the arrival of U.S.
troops in Paraguay.
According to InterPress Service, the
United States
has conducted 46 military operations in Paraguay
since 2002.
[10]
U.S. BASES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
In
addition to strengthening the militaries of Latin America
through aid, training and equipment, the United
States continues to stake out
a claim on the use of Latin American territory for its own foreign
policy objectives. Some of these bases are well-known (and in
the case of the U.S. base at Guantanamo, notorious), while others-
in Honduras, El Salvador, Ecuador and Caribbean islands- are open
secrets.
What
follows is a list of what we know about the United
States’ “military footprint”
in the region (drawn largely from the work of the Center for International
Policy).
The
term Forward Operating Location is used to describe U.S.
arrangements with foreign nations for temporary access of military
bases. But in some cases, “temporary” can mean decades, not months.
Follow the link to view the list of U.S.
Military bases in Latin America, click here to view Tables
on U.S. military aid to the region.
RESOURCES FOR MORE INFORMATION
Just
the Facts: A Civilian’s Guide to U.S. Defense and Security Assistance,
Center for International Policy and the Latin America Working
Group Education Fund, ciponline.org/facts
U.S. Southern Command
U.S.
Weapons at War 2005: Promoting Freedom or Fueling Conflict? A
World Policy Institute Special Report, June 2005
September’s
Shadow: Post- 9/11 U.S. Latin American Relations, Latin America
Working Group, September 2004