|
ARMS
TRADE RESOURCE CENTER
REPORTS - Welfare
for Weapons Dealers: The Hidden Costs of the Arms Trade
For further
information:
William D. Hartung,
212-229-5808, ext. 106
or Frida Berrigan,
212-229-5808, ext. 112
United States
Arms Deliveries to Regions of Conflict
by William D.
Hartung
Acknowledgments
This report was written by William D. Hartung, the Director of the
Arms Trade Resource Center at the World Policy Institute at the
New School for Social Research, with substantial research input
from Rosy Nimroody, Project Senior Research Associate.
In addition to
the individuals and organizations who provided research support
(see text and notes), the Institute would like to thank the following
foundations whose support made this project possible: the CaReth
Foundation, the Compton Foundation, the S.H. Cowell Foundation,
the John Merck Fund and the Ploughshares Fund.
Table of Contents
Summary of Findings
I. Introduction: The Role of Economics
in Arms Transfer Decisionmaking
II. Hidden Costs (I): Government Subsidies
III. Hidden Costs (II): Offsets
IV. Hidden Costs (III): Threat Creation
V. Employment Effects and Alternatives
VI. Recommendations
Notes
Appendix: List of Publications, Arms Transfer
Control Project
 top
Summary
of Findings
Over the past several years, the purported economic benefits of
arms transfers have had a predominant influence in shaping U.S.
arms sales policy. So far, this preoccupation with the economics
of the arms trade has been notably one-sided. The considerable costs
of pursuing a policy of relatively unrestrained weapons exports
-- including short-term budgetary costs and long-term economic consequences
-- are rarely considered in official deliberations over the wisdom
of a particular arms deal. It is the aim of this report to promote
a more balanced assessment of the economics of weapons exports by
highlighting the hidden costs of the arms trade.
At best U.S.
arms exports provide marginal short-term gains for the U.S. economy,
in the range of a few billion dollars per year. Once all major factors
are taken into account, including the cost of taxpayer subsidies
for arms exports, the impact of industrial offset programs, the
role of arms transfers in fostering regional arms races that can
result in additional U.S. defense expenditures, and the opportunity
costs for the U.S. and international economies that result from
promoting weapons exports instead of commercial activities, promoting
arms exports results in a long-term net cost to the U.S. economy.
In addition to this overall finding, the report identified five
specific effects of U.S. weapons exports:
1) The
Militarization of the Foreign Aid Budget: At a time when the end
of the Cold War has created new needs for economic assistance to
help spur the democratization of Russia and the former communist
regimes of Eastern Europe and to support the Mideast peace accords,
a substantial portion of the U.S. foreign aid budget is tied up
in security assistance programs that directly or indirectly subsidize
the export of armaments. For F.Y. 1994, arms export-related subsidies
accounted for 43% of the entire U.S. foreign aid budget, and 56%
of U.S. bilateral aid programs.
2) Hidden Taxpayer
Subsidies: A comprehensive analysis of the United States government's
"arms export infrastructure" -- the whole constellation of policies,
practices, and personnel involved in promoting weapons sales --
indicates that taxpayer subsidies in support of these exports
amount to more than $7 billion per year. This figure includes
the costs of security assistance programs that support arms exports,
U.S. government involvement in air and trade shows, the 15,000
to 20,000 U.S. government personnel involved in facilitating arms
exports, U.S. government publications devoted to arms sales promotion,
and the cumulative costs of writing off bad foreign military sales
loans. These hidden subsidies amount to more than one-third of
the total value of U.S. arms exports in any given year, a substantial
cost which seriously undercuts the net gains to the U.S. economy
from foreign military sales.
3) The Costs
of Offsets: The industry practice of providing offsets -- commitments
to steer business to arms purchasing nations in connection with
a foreign arms sale -- further diminishes the economic benefits
of U.S. weapons exports. Although comprehensive statistics on
the impact of offsets are not publicly available, existing evidence
suggests that offset arrangements are routinely valued at 50 to
100% of a given sale. Since offsets frequently involve taking
business from U.S. firms and giving it to foreign suppliers, they
drastically reduce the net economic benefits of arms sales to
the U.S. economy.
4) Minimal
Employment Impacts: A vigorous program of arms transfer restraint
would displace less than .1% of the nation's working population.
These job losses could be offset by shifting funding from arms
export subsidies into domestic investments in areas such as housing,
education, and health care, which would produce one and one-half
to two times as many jobs per billion dollars spent. Alternatively,
a long-term effort to promote larger markets for U.S. commercial
exports could ultimately result in a net gain in jobs for the
U.S. economy compared with a continuing policy of arms export
promotion.
5) Concentrated
Geographic Impacts: A handful of states would suffer the bulk
of the negative economic impacts from a policy of reducing arms
exports. Just five states -- Texas, California, Florida, Michigan
and Massachusetts -- accounted for over 63% of all foreign military
sales contracts awarded to U.S.-based firms in F.Y. 1992. Economic
adjustment funds could be targeted to these areas to help ease
their transition from dependence on weapons exports. The vast
majority of states and communities would suffer little or no economic
dislocation as a result of a change in arms export policy.
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I.
Introduction: The Role of Economics in Arms Transfer Decisionmaking
During fiscal year 1993, the United States entered into agreements
for the sale of over $31 billion worth of conventional armaments
to more than 140 nations.[1] In theory, these decisions to transfer
U.S. weaponry to foreign customers were based on a careful analysis
of their implications for the future security of the United States
and their impacts within regions of potential conflict. In practice,
domestic economic considerations have emerged as a predominant factor
in arms transfer decisionmaking and an obstacle to developing a
multilateral regime for the control of the international arms trade.
The most dramatic
evidence of the growing power of pork barrel politics to shape arms
export policy came during the 1992 presidential campaign, when President
Bush announced nearly $20 billion in new arms sales agreements within
a six week period starting in September of 1992. The two biggest
deals, a $6 billion sale of 72 F-15 combat aircraft to Saudi Arabia
and a $9 billion sale of 150 F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan, were
announced at campaign-style rallies staged at the factories where
the planes are manufactured. President Bush explicitly presented
the F-15 sale as an economic decision, telling a rally of McDonnell
Douglas workers in St. Louis that "in these times of economic transition,
I want to do everything I can to keep Americans at work." An official
involved in the F-16 deal gave a similar explanation of that arrangement
to the Washington Post when he acknowledged that "the driver of
this is the politics and economics of it, not the national security
issue."[2]
Despite the fact
that he was running on a Democratic platform that promised to "press
for strong international limits on the dangerous and wasteful flow
of weapons to troubled regions," Bill Clinton chose not to criticize
the Bush Administration's last minute arms sales binge, apparently
out of fear that he would be labeled "anti-jobs" in the middle of
a recession.
These two major
arms sales policy decisions were not made in a vacuum. General Dynamics,
which at that point controlled the F-16 production line in Forth
Worth, Texas, worked behind the scenes to get a bipartisan group
of Texas politicians ranging from Rep. Joe Barton (R-TX) to Sen.
Lloyd Bentsen (D-TX) to press for a reversal of a ten-year-old U.S.
ban on selling sophisticated fighter aircraft to Taiwan. And McDonnell
Douglas waged what Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) has described as "the
most sophisticated and far reaching campaign to promote an arms
sale that I've seen since I've been in Congress." Exaggerated claims
about the economic benefits of the sale were the centerpiece of
the McDonnell Douglas lobbying effort, which included the distribution
of a state-by-state breakdown of its alleged effects on employment
and income, hundreds of presentations of a slick video warning of
dire economic consequences if the sale didn't go through, and the
generation of over 20,000 letters to Congress in favor of the deal.[3]
Whatever their
true economic impacts, the potential costs of these two fighter
sales for the future of U.S. security were dangerously high. The
two deals played a major role in scuttling the so-called P-5 arms
transfer control talks that had been initiated among the United
States, the Soviet Union (whose seat at the talks was later filled
by Russia), China, France, and the United Kingdom at the end of
the 1991 Gulf conflict. The F-16 deal violated a 1982 communique
between the United States and China in which the U.S. had pledged
not to exceed then current levels of arms transfers to Taiwan, and
China walked out of the P-5 talks in protest over the sale. The
F-15 sale to Saudi Arabia pushed U.S. sales to the Middle East since
the beginning of the Gulf conflict to over $38 billion, severely
undermining U.S. credibility as an advocate of arms transfer restraint
to the region.[4]
The Clinton Administration
has yet to establish clear priorities in its own arms transfer decisionmaking
process, but there are a number of early signs to indicate that
economic factors have been accorded a high priority. Commerce Secretary
Ron Brown has been a strong advocate for U.S. arms sales, to the
point of personally lobbying foreign defense officials to purchase
U.S. weaponry. And an official involved in developing the administration's
conventional arms sales policy has stated that "our first concern
is to level the playing field -- we're not about to entertain any
proposal [on limiting conventional arms sales] that would disadvantage
our manufacturers." These economic emphases have been tempered by
commitments on the part of President Clinton and Secretary of State
Christopher to seek means to limit the spread of conventional armaments
as part of broader strategies for conflict prevention and non-proliferation.
If these arms control objectives are to be achieved, it will be
essential that the economics of the arms trade be assessed in a
more realistic perspective.[5]
It is the aim
of this report to give a clearer picture of the economic impacts
of weapons exports on the U.S. economy by outlining the hidden costs
of the arms trade. By providing a fuller accounting of the costs
as well as the benefits of arms exports, the report will provide
a more reliable baseline for considering the economic impacts of
reductions in the arms trade.
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II.
Hidden Costs (I): Government Subsidies
Industry claims about the benefits of arms transfers for domestic
employment and income routinely overlook the substantial costs involved
in sustaining a policy of arms export promotion. The most obvious
costs are the generous government subsidies, both direct and indirect,
that are provided to weapons contractors in support of foreign sales
of their products.
Over the past
ten years, total U.S. arms exports have averaged roughly $19 billion
per year. During this same time period, government loans, grants
and cash payments to U.S. arms clients for use in purchasing U.S.
weaponry averaged over $6 billion per year. Therefore, any fair
accounting of the economic impacts of weapons transfers must begin
by acknowledging that in any given year, approximately one-third
of all U.S. arms exports are paid for by U.S. taxpayers, not by
foreign governments. These subsidized exports provide no net gain
to the U.S. balance of payments, and to the extent that they stimulate
domestic employment, it is at a lower level than would be the case
if these same government funds were invested in fulfilling civilian
domestic objectives (this point will be discussed in more detail
in section V, below). The U.S. government's arms export subsidy
budget represents a net drain on the U.S. economy, not a net benefit.[6]
The extent of
direct and indirect financial subsidies for U.S. arms exports in
the Fiscal Year 1994 budget is documented in Table A. The major
elements include the Pentagon's Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
program, which provided $3.2 billion in grants and $800 million
in subsidized loans for the purchase of U.S. military equipment
and services; the International Military Education and Training
program (IMET), which allocated $42 million for the training of
foreign military personnel; and the Economic Support Fund (ESF)
program, a $2.2 billion effort which provides mostly cash assistance
to key U.S. arms clients such as Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Morocco.
The Foreign Military Financing program represents a direct subsidy
to U.S. arms exporting firms, while the IMET and ESF programs are
indirect subsidies. The IMET budget is routinely justified at least
in part as a means of generating an interest in U.S. equipment among
foreign military officials. To the extent that it serves this purpose,
the funds spent on it can be considered as supportive of arms industry
marketing efforts. While a small portion of the Economic Support
Funds budget goes to support infrastructure and development projects
in poor nations, the funds are allocated according to security considerations,
not economic development criteria. And because the majority of ESF
funds are disbursed as cash payments to governments that are major
arms clients of the United States, the program serves in effect
as an indirect subsidy to weapons exports.
Taken together,
these direct and indirect subsidies for weapons exports (Foreign
Military Financing, Economic Support Funds, and IMET) total more
than $5.6 billion in the Fiscal Year 1994 budget, accounting for
43% of the U.S. foreign aid budget, and 56% of U.S. bilateral aid
(see Table A).
Over time additional
costs are likely to be incurred as a result of defaults or forgiveness
on U.S. foreign military sales loans and related export finance
programs. As of early 1993, there were nearly $20 billion in outstanding
U.S. government guaranteed loans for weapons exports, and the prospects
were high that a significant portion of those funds would at a minimum
have to be rescheduled, and ultimately might not be repaid at all.
The forgiveness of $7 billion in U.S. military loans to Egypt during
the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict was a dramatic example of how loans
for weapons exports can be transformed into taxpayer-funded giveaways
at the stroke of a pen. Similarly, the more than $2 billion in outstanding
U.S. government loan guarantees for technology transfers to Iraq
during the late 1980s are likely to result in a similar taxpayer
bailout. And if an industry plan to launch a new $1 billion arms
export loan guarantee fund is approved by the Clinton Administration,
the likelihood of more lending to other unreliable borrowers will
follow in its wake. While full statistics on the status of U.S.
government sponsored military sales loans were not available as
of early 1994, the available evidence points to a minimum of $1
billion per year in costs generated by bad military-related loans
over the past decade alone.[7]
| Table
A: Arms Export-Related Subsidies As a Share of the Foreign
Aid Budget Fiscal Year 1994 (thousands of dollars) |
| I. Total
Arms Export Subsidies |
$5,667,744 |
| Consisting
of: |
Foreign Military
Sales Financing
(Grants and loan subsidies) |
$3,195,809 |
| Economic
Support Funds |
$2,364,562 |
| Other Security
Assistance |
$107,373 |
| II. Total
Foreign Aid Budget |
$12,982,666 |
| III. Total
U.S. Bilateral Aid |
$10,080,681 |
IV. Arms
Subsidies as a % of
Total Foreign Aid |
43.6% |
V. Arms Subsidies
as a % of
Bilateral Foreign Aid |
56.2% |
Source: Figures
are drawn from the final version of the F.Y. 1994 foreign operations
bill, as reprinted in Congressional Quarterly, December 11, 1993,
p. 82.
In addition to
the costs involved in the financing of weapons exports, there are
significant resources devoted to what may be called the "arms export
infrastructure" -- the constellation of policies, personnel, and
programs that are utilized in whole or in part to promote the export
of U.S. weapons to overseas customers. These hidden subsidies include
the use of U.S. government personnel and equipment at international
air and trade shows; the production of U.S. government publications
that are utilized in promoting weapons exports; and the ongoing
involvement of government employees in monitoring, approving, and
facilitating arms sales.
For example,
a March 1993 analysis by the General Accounting Office found that
the military services spent at least $3.8 million on equipment and
personnel that were deployed at six major air and trade shows held
between June of 1991 and September of 1992. These estimates do not
include hundreds of thousands of dollars in fees and civilian salaries,
nor do they cover the $18.9 million cost of an AV-8B Harrier jet
that crashed while leaving the 1992 Singapore Air Show. Taking into
account the scores of smaller air and trade shows that include a
U.S. military/governmental presence each year, the overall costs
of subsidizing these exhibitions average well in excess of $25 million
per year. After taking a promising step toward limiting U.S. government
subsidies for air shows by prohibiting direct involvement of Department
of Defense personnel at the 1993 Paris Air Show, the Clinton Administration
has now backtracked and argued that "it is in the national security
interests of the United States" for the Pentagon to participate
directly in the February 1994 Singapore Air Show. Preliminary estimates
of the costs of U.S. government involvement at Singapore put the
cost at $550,000.[8]
In addition to
the periodic expenditures associated with air and trade shows, there
are substantial ongoing governmental expenditures incurred for the
promotion of arms sales. One of the most blatant examples of this
kind of activity is the "Catalog of U.S. Defense Equipment and Services,"
a listing of available U.S. weaponry, complete with pictures and
descriptions, that is published by the Pentagon's Defense Security
Assistance Agency (DSAA) and made available to potential foreign
customers at U.S. security assistance offices in 74 nations. The
catalog represents just one small part of DSAA's roster of activities
in support of overseas arms sales, which includes helping to negotiate
major arms deals with foreign governments, handling the financing
and paperwork involved in processing weapons exports, training personnel
for overseas security assistance missions, and even running a school
for civilian and military personnel involved in the arms trade,
the Defense Institute for Security Assistance Management (DISAM).
By one estimate, there are on the order of 15,000 to 20,000 personnel
in the Pentagon and the military services who play some role in
facilitating arms exports. In F.Y. 1993, the Army, Navy, Air Force,
and DSAA alone employed nearly 5,000 full-time equivalent personnel
in foreign military sales and security assistance activities, at
a cost of roughly $300 million. Taking into account thousands of
additional employees who work on arms export issues in related agencies
such as the State Department's Center for Defense Trade and the
Commerce Department's international trade promotion programs, the
overall costs of ongoing arms export promotion activities may be
conservatively estimated at $500 million per year.[9]
Looking at the
whole picture of U.S. government-supported arms export promotion
and facilitation -- including direct and indirect financing, promotional
activities at air and trade shows, production of publications, and
the employment of thousands of personnel in government for the purpose
of facilitating weapons exports -- the sum total of U.S. government
subsidies for arms sales comes to more than $7 billion per year,
or more than one-third of the total value of all U.S. arms exports
in an average year.[10]
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III.
Hidden Costs (II): Offsets
Beyond the subsidies provided by the United States government, the
defense industry itself provides its own form of subsidy to its
foreign clients: industrial offsets. An offset arrangement is a
commitment by the arms producing company to channel business to
the arms purchasing nation as a way of "offsetting" the costs of
buying an expensive weapons system. Offset deals may include agreements
to let contracts for the production or assembly of all or part of
the weapons system in the purchasing country (coproduction); to
provide contracts to companies in the purchasing nation for work
on other products produced by the arms manufacturing company; commitments
to make specified investments in the purchasing country; or efforts
to use the arms manufacturing company's personnel and networks to
help market products made in the purchasing country.
Although reliable
statistics on the total value of offset arrangements entered into
by U.S. defense firms in a given year are not publicly available,
it is clear that this practice substantially reduces the net benefits
of arms sales to the U.S. economy. A number of industry sources
have indicated that for most sales outside of the Middle East, a
100% offset target has become standard practice. That means that
if the offset agreement is fulfilled, the arms manufacturing company
will channel a volume of business to the purchasing country that
is equivalent to the total cost of the weapons system that is being
exported to that country. A substantial portion of this "offset"
business will be comprised of activity that might otherwise have
been carried out in the United States by U.S. firms and U.S. workers.
The result is to drastically undercut the net benefits that accrue
to the U.S. economy from weapons exports.[11]
While company
offset commitments may not be completely fulfilled (in the sense
that they don't always steer the promised amount of business to
the purchasing nation), the evidence that exists on this practice
indicates that it entails a substantial drain on the U.S. economy.
A survey of major arms sales during the period from 1980 through
1987 by the Commerce Department's Bureau of Economic Analysis identified
$35 billion in military exports involving offset arrangements. The
reported value of the offset deals was approximately $20 billion,
or more than 57% of the value of the original exports. Given the
increasing demands of major purchasers for 100% offsets on new weapons
sales, the proportion of offsets to original sales is probably even
higher now than it was during the 1980s. As noted in section II
(above), anywhere from one-third to one-half of the value of U.S.
weapons exports is subsidized by the taxpayers. Add to this the
fact that 50% or more of the value of most major U.S. arms sales
is offset by steering other kinds of business from the United States
to the purchasing country, and it becomes apparent that the net
value of arms exports to the U.S. economy in a given year will range
somewhere between a small net gain and a small net loss. After subtracting
the costs of taxpayer subsidies and offsets, in an average year
U.S. arms sales probably result in a net inflow of no more than
a few billion dollars; depending on how rigorously U.S. firms fulfill
their offset commitments to foreign purchasers, arms sales may even
represent a net loss to the U.S. economy. A few examples of current
offset arrangements will demonstrate how this process works.[12]
In August of
1993, McDonnell Douglas announced an agreement to sell 8 F/A-18
fighter aircraft to Malaysia. The deal was part of a "split decision"
in which the Malaysian government opted to buy 18 Russian MIG-29
fighter aircraft along with the 8 F/A-18s. It was agreed from the
outset that as a condition of the sale McDonnell Douglas would enter
into a long-term industrial cooperation pact with Malaysia that
would include "development of repair facilities in Malaysia and
appropriate offsets that would facilitate Malaysian development
of indigenous aerospace capabilities by 2020." Several months later,
the commitment was formalized with the signing of a ten-year, $250
million offset program between McDonnell Douglas and Malaysia the
would involve among other things establishment of maintenance and
training facilities in Malaysia and production of some F/A-18 components
there. While McDonnell Douglas officials contemplate some additional
weapons exports to Malaysia during the term of the offset arrangement,
it is significant to note how large and long-term a commitment the
company made to Malaysia on the basis of an arms sale that with
a value that is unlikely to exceed $300 to $350 million.[13]
Offset agreements
frequently take business directly out of the hands of U.S.-based
firms. Sen. Russ Feingold (D-WI) has highlighted a particularly
egregious example of this in connection with Northrop's efforts
to meet an offset commitment to the government of Finland, tied
to the purchase of F/A-18 fighter aircraft. The Beloit Corporation,
a subsidiary of the Wisconsin-based Harnischfeger Industries, was
in competition with a Finnish company, Valmet Corporation, to sell
a $50 million papermaking machine to a major paper manufacturer.
During the course of the negotiations, Northrop offered the paper
manufacturer over $1 milliion if the company would agree to buy
the papermaking machine from the Finnish company rather than from
Beloit. Northrop justified its action as part of an offset arrangement
that it had entered into with the government of Finland in keeping
with the company's role in producing roughly 40% of the F/A-18 aircraft.
Feingold has pressed for an investigation of this practice, but
so far the relevant U.S. government agencies -- including the Commerce
and Defense Departments and the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative
-- have adopted a hands off attitude, indicating that Northrop was
within its rights in offering what amounts to a veiled bribe to
take business away from a U.S. firm and steer it to a foreign arms
customer. A forthcoming General Accounting Office report requested
by Senator Feingold may shed more light on how prevalent this practice
is, and what its impacts are on U.S. companies.[14]
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IV.
Hidden Costs (III): Threat Creation
In May of 1993, Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, the Director of the
Office of Naval Intelligence, presented his agency's annual overview
of potential threats to U.S. security. He noted that a major consideration
in the threat assessment was "what weapons systems are (and will
be) available for purchase on the international arms market? By
whom will they be purchased and how well will they be maintained
and used?" He concluded that as a result of the ready availability
of advanced arms and military technology on the world market "future
[U.S.] operations are likely to face an increasing number of regional
powers with relatively sophisticated weapons and sensors. . . more
worrisome are the levels of sophistication of the systems -- at
times approaching that of U.S. equipment -- and the speed at which
they are becoming available to potential adversaries."[15]
In September
of 1993, then Secretary of Defense Les Aspin released the Pentagon's
long-awaited "bottom-up review" of U.S. military forces and defense
strategy. The focal point of the new post-Cold War strategy was
on maintaining a capability to fight and win two major regional
conflicts "that occur almost simultaneously." The document went
on to pinpoint the need to "project power into regions important
to U.S. interests and to defeat potentially hostile regional powers,
such as North Korea or Iraq."[16]
By highlighting
these two regions -- Asia and the Middle East -- the Pentagon inadvertently
underscored the link between unrestrained conventional arms transfers
and the growth of aggressive regional powers that pose potential
threats to U.S. forces. Asia is the fastest growing market for conventional
armaments, while the Middle East/Persian Gulf area is the largest
market for these weapons systems. The United States was the largest
supplier of conventional armaments to each of these regions in 1992,
the most recent year for which full statistics are available. United
States arms transfers to these two areas and other regions of potential
conflict contribute both directly and indirectly to the threats
faced by U.S. forces, helping to keep the U.S. defense budget at
$260 billion-plus Cold War levels in the process.
One of the most costly effects of U.S. arms transfers is the likelihood
that some U.S. armaments will fall into the hands of U.S. adversaries.
The last three times the United States has sent troops into combat
in significant numbers -- in Panama, Iraq, and Somalia -- they faced
opponents who had received U.S. weapons or U.S. military technology
in the period leading up to the conflict. In addition to the risks
these transfers can pose to the lives of U.S. troops, they have
a direct economic cost as well. In Somalia, a relatively small conflict
compared to many in which the U.S. has intervened in the post-World
War II era, $300 million in U.S. security assistance to the Siad
Barre regime during the 1980s not only contributed to the civil
conflict that drove his regime from power and set the stage for
the current warfare in Somalia, but U.S.-supplied weapons found
their way into the arsenals of Somali warlords who in turn did battle
with U.S. peacekeeping troops. The cost of Somali peacekeeping efforts
to the U.S. treasury so far exceeds $2 billion. If U.S. policy had
worked to limit arms transfers to Somalia and the Horn of Africa
as a whole during the 1980s, the civil war in Somalia might never
have broken out; at a minimum, it would have been far less costly
to control the conflict, both in terms of the lives of Somalis and
UN peacekeeping troops and in economic terms.[17]
Even when U.S.
arms do not end up under the control of hostile forces, they can
contribute to a regional arms race dynamic that serves to elevate
both the levels of tension and the quantity and quality of armaments
available in regions where U.S. forces are most likely to be employed.
Iran's $2 billion or so in annual weapons purchases are made in
part with an eye towards the tens of billions of U.S. arms that
have been purchased by Saudi Arabia over the past few years. U.S.
sales to South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, and
other regimes in Asia are part and parcel of the process that has
transformed that region into the fastest growing arms market in
the world. With U.S. arms sales to the Third World now at three
and one-half times its nearest rival, France; ten times the levels
of sales undertaken by Russia; and more than one hundred times greater
than the total volume of Chinese sales, it is evident that any multilateral
arrangement to limit weapons exports will have to start with action
on the part of the United States.[18]
A new U.S. policy
that promotes multilateral arms transfer restraint would reduce
the likelihood of warfare breaking out in areas of particular interest
to the United States, and it could ultimately save tens of billions
of dollars in annual U.S. defense expenditures. A 1992 study by
the Congressional Budget Office identified $10 billion in potential
savings that could flow from an arrangement to cut arms imports
to the Middle East in half; the study went on to argue that "limits
on the growth in the size and sophistication of Mideast forces could
reduce pressures to modernize U.S. forces," a move which "could
save additional billions of dollars a year in defense budgets."[19]
Comparable savings could be realized if a similar arrangement was
sought to limit the growth of arms spending in Asia.
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V. Employment
Effects and Alternatives>
If a serious policy of arms transfer restraint were to be adopted,
the most likely potential impact would be a reduction in overall
U.S. arms sales by roughly one-third, or the equivalent of $5 to
$6 billion in an average year. Reductions at this level would result
in the displacement of approximately 150,000 person years of work
in the defense industry. Given that most procurements of major weapons
systems take at least three to five years to complete, the employment
impact would be spread over time, with the effects in the first
year likely to be on the order of 50,000 to 75,000 jobs displaced
or foregone in the defense industry. That represents roughly 2 percent
of all defense industry employment, and less than one-tenth of one
percent of total national employment.[20]
This level of
job displacement would have a minimal impact on the overall U.S.
economy. To the extent that the cuts in arms sales were disruptive,
the effects would be felt in particular communities such as St.
Louis, Missouri, Fort Worth, Texas, or Boston, MA, where major export
items like the F-15 and F-18 aircraft, the F-16 fighter plane, and
the Patriot missile are produced. A review of contracts issued under
the Pentagon's Foreign Military Sales program, the principal channel
for U.S. arms exports, demonstrates how narrow the geographic impact
of arms export reductions is likely to be. For Fiscal Year 1992,
five states accounted for more than 63% of total FMS contracts (see
Table B). And even for these five states, Foreign Military Sales
awards were a small proportion of their overall Pentagon contracts:
4.4% for California, 8.3% for Massachusetts, 9.9% for Florida, 16.3%
for Texas, and 27% for Michigan.[21]
But no matter
how small the employment impact as a share of the overall national
economy, nor how narrow the geographic distribution of contract
reductions (and consequently, job displacement), arms export-related
jobs are obviously of overriding importance to the individuals who
hold these jobs and the communities where they are employed. A program
of targeted assistance to displaced workers and a strategy for generating
alternative sources of income and employment would be the most effective
ways to address the negative employment effects of arms transfer
reductions on export dependent communities.
| Table
B: Top Ten Arms Export-Dependent States, Fiscal Year 1992
(thousands of dollars) |
| State |
Total FMS
Contracts |
% of Total
FMS Awards |
| 1. Texas |
$1,382,329 |
23.6% |
| 2. California |
$948,046 |
16.2% |
| 3. Florida |
$475,003 |
8.1% |
| 4. Michigan |
$449,825 |
7.6% |
| 5. Massachusetts |
$437,817 |
7.5% |
| Total, Top
5 States |
$3,693,620 |
63.1% |
| 6. Missouri |
$304,428 |
5.2% |
| 7. New York |
$263,553 |
4.5% |
| 8. Maryland |
$249,456 |
4.3% |
| 9. Ohio |
$193,627 |
3.3% |
| 10. Indiana |
$154,458 |
2.6% |
| Total, Top
10 |
$4,859,239 |
82.8% |
Source: Author's
calculation from Fiscal Year 1992 Department of Defense Prime Contract
Data supplied by Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc., Vienna, Virginia. Total
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) contracts to U.S.-based firms for F.Y.
1992 totaled $5,862,462.
Alternative investments
of the funds now devoted to subsidizing weapons exports would be
one way to create new jobs to replace those lost as a result of
arms export reductions. For example, a $3 billion shift of funds
now used to subsidize weapons exports into new investments in housing,
education, and health care could result in a net gain of 49,000
person-years, or 10,000 to 16,000 jobs per year over a three to
five year period. Putting the same $3 billion into state and local
government services could yield a net job gain of 12,000. Either
of these approaches could offset between one-quarter and one-third
of the total job displacement resulting from a significant policy
of arms transfer restraint (see Table C).[22]
| Table
C: Jobs Per $1 Billion of Expenditure, Subsidized Weapons
Exports Versus Domestic Alternatives |
| Activity |
Jobs Per
$1 Billion Spent |
| Health Care |
47,000 |
| Education |
41,000 |
| Housing |
36,000 |
| Mass Transit |
30,000 |
| Arms Exports* |
25,000 |
Source: Greg
Bischak, Marion Anderson, and Michael Dee Oden, A Shift in Federal
Spending: What the Peace Dividend Can Mean to Maine (Lansing, MI:
Employment Research Associates, 1990).
* The estimate
for arms exports is based on an estimate for "other transportation
equipment," a category that includes frequently exported items of
military equipment such as tanks, missiles, and military aircraft.
A second strategy
for mitigating the job impacts of arms transfer reductions would
be to promote alternative exports of civilian products. A key element
of a civilian export strategy would involve working to reduce arms
imports and military spending in developing nations and channeling
those funds into more productive economic uses. The potential increase
in export markets that would result from such an approach would
be substantial. A recent study by the International Monetary Fund
has estimated that a 20% reduction in worldwide military spending
could yield more than $190 billion in new markets for consumer products
by the end of this decade, a figure that dwarfs the annual value
of the weapons trade, which averages roughly $50 billion per year.
Similarly, the Congressional Budget Office found that cutting arms
imports into the Middle East in half could result in an increase
in imports of civilian merchandise of as much as 20% or more in
some states in the region, creating new potential markets for U.S.
firms in the process. And a study by the Overseas Development Council
covering the mid-1980s showed that depressed growth in developing
nations during that period cost the U.S. economy a total of 1.8
million jobs as a result of lost export opportunities. To the extent
that reductions in arms imports and military spending are coupled
with productive investments in developing nations, an arms sales
restraint policy could become a pivot point for ushering in a period
of renewed growth in the developing world that could sustain hundreds
of thousands of new jobs in U.S. export industries. But as long
as U.S. policymakers are tied to the dead end strategy of subsidizing
weapons exports as a way of propping up an oversized defense industry,
these new opportunities for promoting enduring growth in the United
States and abroad will never be fully realized.[23]
 top
VI.
Recommendations
Based upon the findings of this report, the following changes in
U.S. government policy are recommended:
1) Conduct
an Arms Sales Policy Audit: Using the full investigatory and auditing
powers at its disposal, the Clinton Administration should conduct
a comprehensive arms sales "policy audit" that reviews the full
costs of U.S. government efforts to promote arms sales, and takes
into account the potential costs to U.S. security (and the U.S.
defense budget) of continuing a policy of relatively unrestrained
weapons exports. The findings of this policy audit should be used
as a guide for reforming and reorienting U.S. arms transfer policies
and practices to bring them into line with the demands of the post-Cold
War security environment.
2) Shift Economic
Incentives Away From Arms Export Promotion Towards Arms Sales
Restraint: The more than $5 billion in U.S. security assistance
funds that are now utilized to directly or indirectly finance
arms exports should be gradually phased out, and the funds freed
up as a result should be invested in programs to promote commercial
exports and assist dislocated workers in the arms export sector.
The Clinton Administration should reject industry efforts to create
a new $1 billion arms export loan guarantee program. The $500
million or more in taxpayer funds that pays for personnel, publications,
and activities related to arms sales promotion should be cut back
dramatically, based on the findings of the administration's policy
audit (see recommendation one, above). As a start in this direction,
the Clinton Administration should adopt a policy of prohibiting
direct Department of Defense involvement in the promotion of U.S.
weaponry at international air and trade shows.
3) Put A Cap
on Offsets and Strictly Limit New Coproduction Agreements: The
Clinton administration should seek multi- lateral limits on offsets
in foreign military sales, with an eye toward the ultimate elimination
of these arrangements. New coproduction agreements should be curtailed
on the grounds that they promote the spread of weapons production
capabilities, and other major suppliers should be encouraged to
do the same.
4) Bolster
Civilian Export Promotion: By encouraging reductions in military
spending in regions of potential conflict and investing in programs
to help U.S. firms capture new commercial markets, the Clinton
Administration should develop policies aimed at increasing the
capacity of developing nations to purchase civilian goods and
services from U.S. firms, and at assisting U.S. firms to meet
this growing area of demand. Funds for these initiatives can be
taken from reductions in subsidies for arms exports (see recommendation
2, above).
5) Provide
Targeted Economic Adjustment Assistance to Communities and Workers
Affected by Reductions in Arms Exports: Existing economic adjustment
funds should be targeted to assist communities and workers experiencing
significant economic dislocation as a result of reductions in
arms exports. Programs for worker retraining, development of new
business, and assistance to existing firms to expand commercial
exports should be integrated into an overall strategy for assisting
arms export dependent areas.
Looked at in
perspective, the economic benefits of arms exports are much smaller
than the assertions of defense industry officials would indicate.
The short-term economic benefits are marginal at best, and any negative
consequences of a policy of arms transfer restraint would be narrowly
focused on a few areas. Furthermore, in the long run there are substantial
potential economic gains for the U.S. and world economies that could
result from a policy of limiting arms sales and military spending
in regions of potential conflict. Taking U.S. government resources
out of the arms export promotion business and putting them into
building a strong domestic economy and promoting enduring commercial
markets would be a far better strategy for the future of the U.S.
economy and U.S. security than the current approach of letting the
short-term economic benefits of arms sales stand in the way of arms
transfer restraint.
 top
Notes
1. U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional
Presentation for Security Assistance Programs, Fiscal Year 1994
edition; and remarks by Lt. Gen. Thomas Rhame, Director, Defense
Security Assistance Agency, at a conference on "Defense Exports
in the Post-Cold War Environment," Tysons Corner, Virginia, October
5, 1993.
2. Michael Wines,
"$8 Billion Directed to Wheat Farmers and Arms Workers," New York
Times, September 3, 1992; Don Oberdorfer, "1982 Arms Policy With
China Victim of Bush Campaign, Texas Lobbying," Washington Post,
September 4, 1992; and William D. Hartung, "Arms Sales Win Votes
and Little Else," New York Times, October 25, 1992.
3. Statement
by Rep. Howard Berman at a briefing on the proposed sale of F-15s
to Saudi Arabia sponsored by the Project on Demilitarization and
Democracy and the National Commission on Economic Conversion and
Disarmament, Washington, DC, July 8, 1992; for a detailed description
of the McDonnell Douglas lobbying campaign on behalf of the Saudi
F-15 sale see Chapter 8, "The Permanent Arms Supply Network: The
Corporate Arms Merchants," in William D. Hartung, And Weapons for
All, (New York: HarperCollins, forthcoming, March 1994).
4. Lee Feinstein,
"U.S. Arms Transfers to the Middle East Since the Invasion of Kuwait,"
The Arms Control Association, August 11, 1993.
5. William D.
Hartung, "Why Sell Arms?," World Policy Journal, Vol. X, No. 1,
Spring 1993, pp. 57-64.
6. Calculations
by the author, based on figures in Defense Security Assistance Agency,
Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and
Foreign Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1992; and
U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department of Defense, Congressional
Presentation, op. cit., F.Y. 1994 edition.
7. Clyde H. Farnsworth,
"Egypt's 'Reward': Forgiven Debt," New York Times, April 10, 1991;
and Defense Security Assistance Agency, "Status of DoD Guaranteed
Loans as of September 30, 1992," and "Status of DoD Direct Loans
as of September 30, 1992," February 24, 1993.
8. United States
General Accounting Office, International Air and Trade Shows: DoD
Increased Promotion, But It's Policies Are Not Well-Defined, GAO
Report #GAO/NSIAD-93-96, March 1993.
9. U.S. Department
of Defense, DSAA, memorandum on the "Catalog of U.S. Defense Articles
and Services," February 20, 1990; "U.S. Defense Articles and Services
Catalog," DISAM Journal, vol. 14, no. 1, Fall 1991 (Dayton, Ohio:
Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management, 1991), pp.
99-100; Michael T. Klare, The American Arms Supermarket (Austin,
Texas: University of Texas Press, 1984), pp. 60-61; and figures
provided to Rosy Nimroody by the Office of the Comptroller, Defense
Security Assistance Agency, as well as the security assistance offices
of the Army, Navy, and Air Force.
10. The estimate
includes spending on Foreign Military Financing, Economic Support
Funds, and other security assistance programs
totalling $5.6 billion; $25 million for the costs of U.S. government
subsidies for weapons exhibitions at international air and trade
shows; a $1 billion allowance for the average annual cost of bad
or forgiven foreign military sales loans (based on the experience
of the past decade); and $500 million for the costs of U.S. government
personnel involved in facilitating arms sales. The resulting $7.1
billion figure is a conservative estimate, as it excludes such costs
as the price of publications and supplies used in governmental efforts
to promote weapons exports.
11. The prevalence
of 100% offset targets was confirmed in interviews by the author
at the 1993 Paris Air Show, as well as in a series of interviews
with defense industry executives in the Northeast and Midwest by
Michael Oden of the Project on Regional and Industrial Economics
at Rutgers University.
12. U.S. General
Accounting Office, Defense Production Act: Offsets in Military Exports
and the Proposed Amendments to the Act, GAO Document # GAO/NSIAD-90-164,
April 1990, p. 10. A brief example will demonstrate how dramatically
offset arrangements can reduce the net economic benefits of arms
sales. If the value of U.S. arms exports is at an average level
of $19 billion per year, and two-thirds of these exports involve
offsets of roughly 60%, the net result will be an outflow of $8
billion in business from U.S.-based firms to companies in weapons
purchasing nations. Add to this the more than $7 billion in direct
and indirect arms export subsidies provided each year at taxpayer
expense, and the net gain to the U.S. economy from arms exports
falls to about $4 billion in an average year. If offset targets
of 100% become the norm, and more customers demand such arrangements,
even this relatively modest net gain from arms exports could be
eliminated.
13. Barbara Opall,
"McDonnell Forms Malaysian Pact," Defense News, August 16-23, 1993;
and "Offset Deal Signed for Malaysian Hornet Buy," Jane's Defense
Weekly, November 6, 1993.
14. "Feingold
Launches Investigation Into Arms Sale Payoff Offer," Press Release,
Office of U.S. Senator Russ Feingold, March 2, 1993; and correspondence
from Senator Feingold to the Department of Justice, the Department
of Defense, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the General Accounting
Office, February 24, 1993.
15. Testimony
of Rear Admiral Edward Sheafer, Director of the Office of Naval
Intelligence, May 3, 1993, as cited in Lora Lumpe, editor, The Arms
Sales Monitor, Issue No. 21, July 15, 1993.
16. Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin, Report on the Bottom Up Review, October 1993,
p. 7.
17. Testimony
of Dr. Caleb S. Rossiter, Director of the Project on Demilitarization
and Democracy, Before the Subcommittee on International Security,
International Organizations and Human Rights and the Subcommittee
on International Operations, House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
November 9, 1993; and testimony of William D. Hartung, Director,
Project on the Control of the International Arms Trade, World Policy
Institute at the New School, before the same two subcommittees,
November 9, 1993.
18. Statistics
are calculated by the author from Richard F. Grimmett, Conventional
Arms Sales to the Third World 1985-1992 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 1993).
19. Congressional
Budget Office, Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle
East, (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992), p.
72.
20. A figure
of 25,000 jobs per $1 billion of arms sales was used to generate
the estimate of 150,000 person-years of work displaced by a $6 billion
cut in U.S. weapons exports. The 25,000 per $1 billion figure is
based on Congressional Budget Office, Limiting Conventional Arms
Exports to the Middle East, op. cit., p. 58; for another analysis
of the employment impacts of arms exports see Greg Bischak and James
Raffel, Economic Conversion and International Inspection: Alternatives
to Arms Exports and Militarism, National Commission on Economic
Conversion and Disarmament, November 1991, pp. 32-34.
21. Author's
calculation based on DoD contract data for Fiscal Year 1992, provided
by Eagle Eye Publishers, Inc., Vienna, Virginia. Foreign Military
Sales (FMS) contracts are awarded under the Pentagon's Foreign Military
Sales program, a government-to-government arrangement under which
the Department of Defense negotiates the terms of a sale with a
foreign government, collects the money for the weapons purchase,
and passes the funds along to the arms exporting companies. Sales
through the Pentagon's FMS program generally account for 70 to 90%
of total U.S. arms sales in a given year; the remaining sales are
made directly by the arms producing companies to foreign purchasers,
and are known as commercial sales. Since there are no data on the
geographic distribution of commercial arms sales, the data presented
here on FMS contracts do not give a complete picture of the geographic
impact of U.S. arms sales -- however, because major FMS contractors
are also active in commercial sales, these data give a good rough
accounting of the relative concentration of economic activity related
to arms sales among states and regions of the country.
22. Employment
estimates in this section are from Greg Bischak, Marion Anderson,
and Michael Dee Oden, A Shift in Federal Spending: What the Peace
Dividend Can Mean to Maine (Lansing, MI: Employment Research Associates,
1990), p. 7; the 49,000 net gain in person-years of work is based
on expenditures of $1 billion each on health care, housing, and
education using funds that would have otherwise gone to subsidize
weapons exports. On the employment impacts of arms sales, see also
Rosy Nimroody, "U.S. Doesn't Need to Boost Subsidies for Arms Sales,"
Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 1993.
23. David Wessel,
"Global Defense Cuts Could Be A Big Boon to Living Standards," Wall
Street Journal, September 24, 1993; Congressional Budget Office,
Limiting Conventional Arms Exports to the Middle East, op. cit.,
p. 49; and Testimony of Dr. Caleb Rossiter, November 9, 1993, op.
cit.
 top
Appendix:
Publications List
Arms Trade Resource Center
World Policy Institute at the New School for Social Research
And Weapons for
All, a critique of U.S. arms transfer policies from the Nixon through
Clinton administrations, New York, HarperCollins, 1994 (updated
paperback to be released in May of 1995).
"Conventional
Arms Proliferation: Rethinking U.S. Policy," Issue Brief prepared
for Business Executives for National Security, Washington, DC, December
1993.
Testimony of
William D. Hartung, Senior Research Fellow, World Policy Institute
at the New School, at Hearings on Conventional Arms Transfer Policy
Before the Subcommittee on International Security, International
Organizations, and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on International
Operations, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives,
November 9, 1993.
"Transparency
in Armaments: Implications for the Future Security of the Mediterranean
Region," in Disarmament Topical Papers 15 -- Transparency in Armaments:
The Mediterranean Region, New York, United Nations Office of Disarmament
Affairs, November 1993.
"U.S. Has the
Corner on the World's Weapons Trade," Seattle Post- Intelligencer,
October 13, 1993.
"U.S. Doesn't
Need to Boost Subsidies for Arms Sales," (by project associate Rosy
Nimroody), Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 1993.
"Welcome to the
U.S. Arms Superstore," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, September
1993.
"Failure to Curb
Lucrative Arms Trade Puts World in Jeopardy," Buffalo News, May
23, 1993.
"Arms Trade:
Jobs Ahead of Lives," Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 4, 1993.
"Global Gunrunning,"
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, May 2, 1993.
"Why Sell Arms?"
World Policy Journal, Spring 1993.
"Proliferation's
Profiteers," CEO/International Strategies, February/March 1993.
"Conventional
Arms Sales," World Policy Institute Issue Brief, January 1993.
Unless otherwise
noted, publications are by Project Director William D. Hartung.
Copies of project publications can be obtained by writing or calling
the World Policy Institute at the New School, 66 Fifth Avenue, 9th
fl., New York, NY 10011, tel. 212-229-5808.
 top
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