Introduction

It is possible that Paul Wolfowitz is right and Indonesia is on the road to "real democracy." But the shape and quality of Indonesia’s democracy will depend in large part on what role the United States chooses to play.

Since its emergence from Dutch colonialism in 1945, Indonesia has had only five presidents. Sukarno, the founder of the modern state, ruled as "President for Life" until 1965 when General Suharto overthrew him in a military coup. Hundreds of thousands of people were slaughtered in the weeks that followed, setting the stage for Suharto’s regime.

General Suharto ruled for thirty-two years, in an administration marked by authoritarianism, corruption and military impunity. In the four years since he was deposed, there have been three presidents. Vice President Megawati Sukarnoputri became Indonesia’s fifth president on July 23, 2001, when the parliament forced out President Abdurrahman Wahid.

President George W. Bush welcomed President Megawati, expressing his hope for a "united, democratic, and economically successful Indonesia" and offering to resume the two country’s longtime military alliance. Are these the steps towards real democracy Wolfowitz meant?

While the international media has portrayed President Megawati as a reformist, in her own country she is characterized as subordinate to, and dependent on, the military. Her image as passive and dependent was reinforced by reports that she attended a screening of the animated movie Shrek in the midst of the crisis that lead to President Wahid ‘s ouster.

She takes the reins of a nation struggling with economic crisis, political upheaval, and many layers of conflict. Burdened by this instability and uncertainty, Megawati’s close ties to the military are particularly alarming and trigger questions about what role the United States -- Indonesia’s principal military benefactor-- should be playing.

Military aid from the United States has been restricted for the better part of the last decade because of Indonesia’s egregious human rights record and countless abuses. But many argue that Megawati is a clean break from the bloody Suharto legacy and now military aid should be restored to help her deal effectively with instability. This is dangerously premature and unfounded. At this critical juncture,

Washington has the opportunity to forge a different sort of relationship with the fourth most populous nation in the world, and encourage economic, political and social-- rather than military-- stability in Indonesia. To begin that process, the following questions need to be answered:

1. Do U.S. weapons sales and military training bestow professionalism and democratic standards as claimed?
2. Do they allow the United States to influence and advise in times of crisis?
3. Do they contribute to the nation’s stability?

Or do they in fact exacerbate the dangerous and dysfunctional overlap of military and political power, making war more likely and more deadly while benefiting U.S. weapons manufacturers, multinational corporations and Indonesian power elites?

What follows is an attempt to answer these pressing questions and urge for a maintenance and strengthening of the weapons and military training ban.

To begin, it is essential that politicians and citizens alike develop an understanding of the history of U.S.-Indonesian relations. Therefore U.S. support for the invasion of East Timor in 1975 and the military, political and economic support that continued through the massacres of 1999 is discussed. The Bush administration’s close ties to the oil and gas industry are analyzed as influential in shaping the emerging policies toward Indonesia, and a few arguments for resumption of military contact are scrutinized for vested interests and ulterior motives. The case of oil-giant ExxonMobil in Aceh and mining company Freeport McMoRan in Irian Jaya are examined in depth. Both companies benefit from close relationships with the military and have been credibly accused of human rights violations connected with the repression of local populations. Finally, President Megawati’s relationship with the military and what her leadership means for the future of U.S.-Indonesian relations is considered.

The Invasion of East Timor

In December 1975, Indonesia invaded the new nation of East Timor, which had just declared itself independent from Portuguese colonizers. By early 1980, more than 200,000 people, one-third of the pre-invasion population, were killed, leading Noam Chomsky to term it "the worst slaughter relative to population since the Holocaust."[1] The invasion took place just hours after U.S. President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger visited General Suharto in the Indonesian capital of Jakarta. While the international community protested, the U.S. government doubled military aid to Indonesia and prevented the United Nations from taking effective action against Suharto.[2]

In 1977, reacting to public pressure, Congress held hearings to investigate the U.S. role in Indonesia’s military action against its tiny neighbor. The House International Relations Committee revealed that several major U.S. weapons systems sold to Jakarta during this period -- including 16 Rockwell OV-10 "Bronco" counter-insurgency aircraft, 3 Lockheed Martin C-130 transport aircraft and 36 Cadillac-Gage V-150 "Commando" armored cars -- were used against East Timor. Other U.S. weapons linked to the occupation, and referenced during the hearing, included: S-61 helicopters, patrol craft, M-16 rifles, pistols, mortars, machine guns, recoilless rifles, ammunition, and extensive communications equipment.[3]

From 1975 through East Timor’s referendum for independence in 1999, the United States continued its military support, transferring over a billion dollars worth of weaponry. Everything from F-16 fighter planes to military helicopters to M-16 combat rifles was used in the suppression of dissent in East Timor and throughout Indonesia. These weapons were viewed as key for maintaining good relationships with Washington’s strategic ally. The State Department and White House portrayed Indonesia as a bulwark against Communism, a convenient launching pad for military action into Southeast Asia, a source of cheap labor and cheap resources, and a market for U.S. goods. One State Department official summed up the relationship by saying, "the United States wants to keep its relations with Indonesia close and friendly. It is a nation we do a lot of business with."[4] Indeed, the president of Coca-Cola went so far as to exclaim, "When I think of Indonesia—a country on the equator with 180 million people, a median age of 18 and a Muslim ban on alcohol—I feel like I know what heaven looks like."[5]

While this relationship was heaven for Coca-Cola executives, it was closer to hell for the Indonesian people. Human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests, extra-judicial killings, torture, as well as restrictions on freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association was the norm. By way of endorsement, U.S. weapons, military training and support flowed in. The Indonesian military still bristles with U.S. origin weapons and benefits from U.S. military training. The United States transferred $328 million in weapons and spare parts and almost $100 million in commercial weapons exports to the Jakarta regime in the last decade.[6] Military training has also been significant during this period-- the Defense Department allocated more than $7.5 million in International Military Education and Training program (IMET) funding for Indonesian soldiers.[7] Soldiers armed with U.S. weapons and training went on to maim, kill and torture.

Indeed, Washington has been forced to break off military relations with Jakarta twice because of the military’s abuse of power, violations of human rights, massacres, and extrajudicial killings. In 1991, military ties were suspended following the Santa Cruz Massacre in which Indonesian security officers fired into a peaceful crowd of protestors, killing 271 people. The relationship was partially restored in 1995, only to be severed again after the brutal military and militia response to the 1999 Timorese referendum for independence.

East Timor: Free but Battered

In August 1999 the people of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence from Indonesia in a United Nations-sponsored referendum. In the weeks that followed, the military and its militias went on a killing rampage throughout the territory. More than a thousand people were killed and 75% of the population was forced from their homes, streaming into the mountains or transported to West Timor. Investigations by the United Nations found that 60-80% of the property in East Timor was destroyed or damaged and estimated the death toll at 1,500-2,000, although the exact number may never be known.[8] Many of the East Timorese murdered were pushed from boats at sea and the few forensic experts sent by the United Nations arrived after the rainy season had destroyed much of the evidence.

As in the past, the United States, as a major supplier of Indonesian weapons and one of the chief political, economic and diplomatic supporters of Jakarta, bears more than a small burden of responsibility for the attacks. U.S.-origin weapons were given to the anti-independence death squads by the Indonesian government and military. Amnesty International found considerable evidence of "official involvement in the establishment of these militias and of the direct and indirect support of the military and police for their activities, including by providing weapons, training and facilities."[9] The UN Commission of Inquiry on East Timor found that "intimidation and terror attacks…would not have been possible without the active involvement of the Indonesian army, and the knowledge and approval of the top military command."[10]

Today, 60,000 - 80,000 refugees remain in West Timorese camps where they face daily intimidation and violence. The military-backed militias impede efforts at repatriation with terror and threats. UN officials estimate that two-thirds of the refugees would return to East Timor if they were permitted to do so by the militias.[11] International Organization for Migration spokesman Jean-Philippe Chauzy attributes the problems to the "ongoing ambivalence of certain Indonesian agencies toward the militias, despite their now well-documented record of crimes against humanity."[12]

Even in the face of such obstacles, East Timor is becoming more stable. A truth and reconciliation process is under way, a defense force and judicial body have been formed, and national elections are scheduled for August 30, 2001—the second anniversary of the referendum for independence.

But as East Timor slowly moves toward nationhood, the Indonesian military continues to resist civilian control and the militias they support persist in their campaign of intimidation and violence in East and West Timor. From the Fall of 1999 to the present, militias based in West Timor refugee camps have conducted cross-border raids that target East Timorese civilians and UN troops; in September 2000, a militia mob brutally three UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), even though local military officers had guaranteed their safety. Indonesian police stood by and did nothing to reign in the militia killers.[13] In May 2001, the six tried for the crime were convicted of "violence against people and property," as opposed to murder and given jail terms of 10 to 20 months—they had originally faced 34 years for multiple murders.[14] This travesty of justice confirms the East Timor Action Network’s claims that, "many TNI officers responsible for crimes against humanity in East Timor retain positions of prestige and power," and are "able to continue to wage terror campaigns."[15]

Within this context of political instability, military impunity and the ongoing suffering of the forcibly displaced refugees in West Timor camps, maintaining the military ban is of critical importance. In fact, the Republican controlled Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2000, which stipulates that no normal military ties will be restored until Indonesia has met the "Leahy conditions," named for Vermont Senator Patrick Leahy. The conditions include:

• Allow return of East Timorese forcibly displaced to West Timor and other parts of Indonesia.
• Use "effective measures to bring to justice" those members of the Indonesian military involved in "aiding or abetting militia groups" and members of the military and militias involved in human rights violations.
• Assist in investigations of human rights violations by the Indonesian military and its militias, and preventing further militia attacks.[16]

Despite the fact that none of these conditions have been met, there is a growing push from the Bush administration and the Pentagon to restore military ties.

The Weapons and Training Ban: Unpopular and Undermined

The State Department’s own 2000 Human Rights report asserts that the Indonesian military "continues to play a substantial internal security role in areas of conflict... Both the Indonesian National Army and the police committed numerous serious human rights abuses throughout the year."[17]

Ignoring the State Department’s assessments, some in Washington would prefer robust weapons sales and military training to stability and human rights. In its most recent Pacific Rim Diversification and Defense Market Guide, the Commerce Department states that "instances of human rights abuses have given rise to concern in the U.S. from time-to-time…. But the overall relationship provides opportunities for U.S. defense companies to benefit from the pace of economic growth and concomitant defense needs of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia."[18]

U.S. weapons manufacturers see a strong market for their wares in Indonesia and are eager to resume sales. The top six U.S. weapons manufacturers had a total of $60 million in contracts for Indonesia in FY99 (which ended in October 1999, only a few weeks after President Clinton imposed the ban on military transfers).

While not all weapons contracts are filled, the figure gives a good sense of the stake American weapons corporations have in "normal" relations with Indonesia. Lockheed Martin topped the list at $52 million in contracts, with Boeing winning a more modest $1.4 million.[19] In fiscal year 1999 alone, the United States delivered more than $8.9 million in weapons, including aircraft and missiles, before the ban was instituted. Over the past five years, Indonesia has received an average of $11 million in weapons per year.[20]

Military training is also forbidden under the 1999 ban, but those ties have been harder to break. The State Department claims that military training for Indonesian troops is aimed at "positively influencing" the military’s "professionalism and discipline" and heightening their understanding of "good civil-military relations and international human rights standards."[21] While that sounds good, a considerable portion of the training has gone to the notorious Kopassus counter-insurgency unit, "the most feared, most hated, and most abusive Indonesia unit in East Timor" accused of carrying out torture, disappearances and extrajudicial killings.[22] In fact, Indonesian soldiers continued to receive military training in Vermont even as violence ripped through East Timor in September 1999. The students were exempted from the ban on military training because Kopassus, not the U.S. government, paid their tuition and because they attend Norwich University, a private military college.[23]

Until 1998, the Pentagon was able to continue training under the Joint Combined Exercise Training program (JCET), which was not included in the 1991 ban, imposed after the Santa Cruz massacre in which U.S. weapons were used. U.S. soldiers trained Indonesia troops in air assault, urban warfare, and psychological operations thirty-six times between 1992 and 1997 without Congressional knowledge or approval. Mounting pressure from Capitol Hill and grassroots groups canceled the program.[24]

Journalist Allan Nairn alleges that even after that loophole was closed, the Central Intelligence Agency, Justice and Customs Departments, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigations, and U.S. Marshals all continued to train Indonesian officials. In the midst of the militia rampages in East Timor, he states that "there were colonels in the Indonesian National Police being trained at the New York Police Department."[25] The U.S. State Department now has its own program to train the Indonesian police force. Nairn also charges that, "the U.S. continued to ship ammunition and spare parts even as militia terror was intensifying" and only disengaged from Indonesia as a result of intense public pressure from organizations like East Timor Action Network.[26]

Despite U.S. reluctance to impose the embargo and ways in which it has been undermined, it remains effective. According to Defense News, half the country’s F-16s are not operational, and many C-130s are grounded. The Army and Navy’s Bell helicopters lack adequate spare parts and only eight of the Air Force’s helicopter fleet of 30 is operational. Even the Hawk aircraft transferred by Britain need U.S.-origin avionics in order to be fully operational.[27]

Jakarta has complained loudly about the debilitating impact of the weapons ban, and is lobbying hard for resumption of military-to-military ties. Washington is not complaining quite as loud-- officials limit their remarks to military training programs-- but they are quietly advocating for full resumption of military ties. Paul Wolfowitz, former Ambassador to Indonesia and current Deputy Secretary of Defense, spoke in favor of lifting the ban in testimony to Congress, saying that canceling military training programs, "did nothing to improve the human rights situation in East Timor. But it did diminish U.S. influence with the Indonesian military and deprived us of the opportunity…to teach them important things about how our democratic system works."[28] Admiral Dennis Blair expressed a similar sentiment in Congressional hearings last year, saying, "I believe that the [Indonesian] police also require a lot of assistance and training...I support that and think that should be increased."[29]

The U.S. military began direct reengagement with the Indonesian military in May 2000, when Indonesian officers took part as observers in U.S.-sponsored Cobra Gold military exercises in Thailand. The following month, Indonesian Navy, Marines, and Coast Guard trained in East Java with their U.S. military counterparts in a joint exercise called CARAT/2000.[30] While Cobra Gold observation and participation in "humanitarian" CARAT exercises do not technically violate the Congressional ban, Jakarta correctly interpreted them as a first step towards restoring full military-to-military ties. Jakarta was also pleased when the United States transferred spare parts for the C-130 troop transport planes, which the State Department insists can also be used for "VIP and leadership transport, transporting refugees back to East Timor, and for combating forest fires."[31]

European allies were the first to resume military sales to Indonesia, choosing not to extend the European Union embargo when it expired in January 2001. Soon after, Holland and Britain transferred naval radar equipment and Hawk attack aircraft respectively. The same month, President Wahid announced his intention to break Indonesia’s military dependence on the U.S. by developing military partnerships with Russia, China, India, and Jordan, while also strengthening the country’s ability to develop weapons domestically. Jordan offered to donate and sell military material, spare parts and equipment. India and Indonesia signed a military cooperation agreement at the beginning of this year, pledging to "expand military contacts and training opportunities and to step up defense purchases."[32]

In a remark pointed at the United States, the Indonesian president claimed that "we don’t need to depend on one country" for weapons.[33] Wahid’s efforts to diversify his weapons supply, coupled with the willingness of other nations to sell weapons and equipment and pressures from U.S. businesses, add up to powerful incentives for the U.S. to reestablish full military relations with Indonesia.

The Push to Restore Aid: Oil and Old Friends

Think tanks and institutions with close ties to the oil and gas industries and other corporations with interests in the region are urging resumption of military ties. The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, a private body made up of the heads of corporations with interests in Southeast Asia, released The Case for Strengthening American Involvement in Southeast Asia in February 2001.

Weapons contractors like Boeing, United Technologies, and General Electric serve on the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, alongside the mining companies, banks and ubiquitous corporations like Coca-Cola and Nike. The report calls on the U.S. to "lift [the] embargo on military equipment and training while reestablishing direct military-to-military contacts with the Indonesian military." While the report argues that the military plays a role in encouraging "stability," companies like Boeing and GE are likely more concerned with the stability of their profit margins, as they stand to benefit directly through new weapons contracts the moment the ban is lifted.

The U.S.-ASEAN Business Council also includes oil and gas companies. This sector generously donated $1.8 million to President George W. Bush in the last election cycle.[34] While Bush himself is not well briefed on the region—his one remark about the conflict in East Timor was an offhand and maladroit reference to the "East Timorians"—he is certainly influenced by those who are.[35] The high concentration of oil and gas magnates in the Bush administration—from Vice President Dick Cheney, former CEO of oil services giant Halliburton, to Bush’s own connections to the industry—makes the oil-rich archipelago particularly important. ExxonMobil, which has a vast project in Indonesia, gave more than a million dollars in campaign contributions in 2000—mostly to Republicans.[36] Then-Foreign Minister Alwi Shihab told reporters, "I am optimistic that the military sanctions will be lifted because the Bush government is more pragmatic and realistic."[37]

Pragmatism and realism notwithstanding, it certainly helps that both Cheney and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz are old friends with Indonesia’s former dictator, General Suharto. Cheney was Bush Senior’s Secretary of Defense at the time of the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre and traveled to Indonesia just a few months later, meeting with Suharto and top military officials. Rather than admonishing Jakarta for the military slaughter of 271 unarmed people during his visit, he reinforced the value of strong relations with the military, saying, "we have in the past worked with the Indonesia armed forces and are eager to continue to do that in the future."[38] Wolfowitz was Ambassador to Indonesia during the worst violence in East Timor and represented Washington’s indefatigable diplomatic, military and political support for the Jakarta regime. In 1997 testimony before Congress, Wolfowitz credited Suharto’s "strong and remarkable leadership" for Indonesia’s "significant progress."[39]

When asked about arms sales to Indonesia during his January confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Colin Powell insisted that, "every nation has the right of legitimate self-defense, and if they don’t buy it from us, they have many other sources in which they can get such weapons."[40] Powell’s use of the "better us than them" argument for U.S. weapons sales dovetails nicely with the "stability" argument. The latest version of this well-worn line of reasoning is a new report from the Council on Foreign Relations, The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration. Report chair J. Robert Kerrey, former Senator and current President of the New School University, sums up its central point by saying, "the Indonesian military remains essential to the country’s future stability."[41] The report characterizes the current ban on military sales and training as "heavy handed," and "short-sighted," warning that without military training the U.S. will lose the "opportunity to help shape a new attitude toward civil-military relations" in the Indonesian military.[42] Kerrey and his team conclude that "the United States must cease hectoring Jakarta and… re-engage Indonesia’s army."[43]

The report’s findings are based on a narrow and self-serving definition of the Indonesian military as guardians of big business. The composition of the panel is weighed heavily towards corporations; in fact the 27-member panel is 30% corporate representatives, including ExxonMobil and baked good giant Sara Lee, both of which have extensive investments in Indonesia. In addition, given the report’s pro-weapons sale position, it is not surprising that Dov Zakheim, former Reagan official who now serves as the chief financial officer in Bush’s Pentagon, drafted the report. Between working for Reagan and Bush II, Zakheim was a lobbyist for weapons manufacturers like McDonnell Douglas (now part of Boeing), promoting arms sales to Saudi Arabia, Israel and elsewhere.[44]

The report team was not of one mind on renewed military ties with Indonesia. Sidney Jones, Asia Director for Human Rights Watch and other members dissented from the conclusions. Their strongly worded statement was included in the report. They wrote that renewed military ties "would send exactly the wrong signal," and emphasized the need to consider the Indonesian military’s "role in obstructing prosecutions for past abuses and of the serious new human rights violations taking place, most notably in Aceh."[45]

In its 2000 assessment of U.S.-Indonesian relations, the State Department emphasizes the "important economic, commercial, and security interests in Indonesia."[46] ExxonMobil, Boeing, General Electric and Sara Lee, and the other companies who put their weight behind these studies from the Council on Foreign Relations and the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council agree. Thus, it seems likely that the Bush administration will pursue a policy of close relations with Jakarta, regardless of human rights violations, corruption, and brutal repression of separatist movements, and will prioritize military sales and training, in tandem with support for U.S. corporations and their aggressive exploitation of Indonesia’s vast oil reserves.

Indonesian Military: A Stabilizing Force for Whom?

The most salient arguments for the resumption of military aid are made on behalf of Aceh and Irian Jaya. In these beleaguered provinces separatist movements, recently reinvigorated by East Timor’s hard-won success, have been struggling for decades. Thousands have been killed, tens of thousands uprooted, and whole societies disrupted. Wahid has blamed the U.S. weapons ban and the lack of weaponry for his inability to suppress these "bloody ethnic conflicts," but a closer look at each province reveals that the military is not a force for stability and peace.[47] It also becomes clear that U.S. based corporations are benefiting from cheap labor and lax environmental laws in their pursuit of profit—and working in tandem with the military to ensure their ability to perpetuate this relationship. Rather than resuming weapons sales and military training, the U.S. should work to curb corporate abuses in Aceh and Irian Jaya.

Aceh

This oil-rich western province is located at the head of the Malacca strait that links the Pacific and Indian oceans-- one of the most strategic waterways in the world. While most Americans would be hard pressed to find Aceh on a map, its oil wealth is key to Jakarta’s power and extremely valuable for U.S. corporations. The New York Times acknowledged Aceh’s centrality when it noted that the province of 4.1 million people, "is far more important to Indonesia’s future and that of South East Asia than East Timor ever was."[48] Aceh’s oil and other commodities contribute 20% of Indonesia’s annual budget, but only 1% is reinvested into the province.[49]

In the late 1980s, in response to the burgeoning movement for independence, Jakarta declared the province a "Military Operations Area" (known by its Indonesian acronym DOM). During the DOM era, thousands of Acehnese civilians were killed, raped, tortured, and abducted.[50] The DOM was lifted in August 1998, but the violence continues. During two days in November 2000, more than a hundred unarmed Acehnese civilians attending a rally were shot dead by security forces.[51] Last year at least one thousand people, mostly civilians and separatists guerrillas, were killed—three times the number killed in 1999.[52] The death toll for this year has already exceeded 1,100.[53]

For the most part, the war in Aceh has taken place beneath the radar screen of Western media and politics. But two brutal incidents in late 2000 brought the plight the Acehnese and the role of U.S. weapons to the front pages of American newspapers. Jafar Siddiq Hamzah, a prominent Acehnese lawyer with permanent residence in the U.S., was working for human rights and a peaceful resolution to the conflict when he was disappeared, tortured and murdered. His body was found in September 2000 along with four other unidentified bodies in an area that the military frequently uses to dispose of bodies. A few months later, "military death squads" killed three Acehnese working for a Danish aid group.[54] A survivor of the attack was able to give his testimony to Human Rights Watch before going into hiding. He reported that the leader "carried a machine gun, I think it was an M-16, and had an FN pistol on his waist. Another one had a machine gun with a grenade launcher attached. The commander…had a pistol and an automatic rifle, most of the others also carried rifles."[55]

From the U.S. perspective, Aceh is important as a location for U.S.-owned oil companies, but their presence has not encouraged respect for human rights. ExxonMobil, the largest publicly held corporation in the United States, has a huge oil and gas operation in Aceh. The company was sued in June by International Labor Rights Fund on behalf of eleven Acehnese who lived and worked near ExxonMobil’s operations. The villagers contend that they and their families have been the victims of murder, torture, kidnapping and rape at the hands of Indonesian military units guarding ExxonMobil’s gas fields. The suit, filed in Washington, DC, charges that the company provided the Indonesian military with logistical and material support, including:

• Buildings used by the Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces) units to "interrogate, torture and murder Acehnese civilians."
• Heavy equipment like excavators used by the military to dig mass graves.
• Access to ExxonMobil constructed roads to transport victims to mass grave sites.[56]

This collaboration demonstrates the two party’s mutual goal of maintaining Indonesian control of the province. The IFRF suit claims that the ExxonMobil fears that the "creation of an independent state for the people of Aceh as the result of a democratic uprising" would nullify their "business arrangement with the Indonesian government."[57] Until March 2000, when ExxonMobil suspended operations after a spate of attacks on their pipeline, Jakarta received an estimated $100 million in revenue from the company every month. In an effort to ensure their revenue stream and reassure ExxonMobil, Jakarta sent three additional battalions of troops and an armored calvary unit to beef up security in the region.[58] ExxonMobil resumed limited production a few months later.

Irian Jaya

Also known as West Papua, this Indonesian province shares an island with Papua New Guinea and is home to three million indigenous people speaking 268 languages. While blessed with astounding ethnic and biological diversity, Irian Jaya’s mineral wealth is also a curse.

The people of the province did not support Irian Jaya’s incorporation into Indonesia. In a move backed by the United States, the United Nations brokered the transfer of control over Papua from the Dutch to the Indonesians. Jakarta’s control was formalized in the 1963 "Act of Free Choice," a cynically termed process in which 1,025 elders hand picked by the military "voted" to be integrated into Indonesia. Under Indonesian rule, an estimated 100,000 people have been killed in Irian Jaya.[59]

The small province is dominated by Freeport McMoRan, which owns the world’s largest gold mine and third largest copper mine. The New Orleans-based company was dubbed the "most maverick American multinational in the world today" by the Far Eastern Economic Review.[60] While CEO James "Jim Bob" Moffett boasts that his company is "thrusting a spear of economic development in the heartland of Irian Jaya," the $50 billion mine has given very little back to the people.[61]

The Freeport mine poses major health, environmental and safety threats to the people of Irian Jaya. The mine has created a wasteland in what was once a fertile river valley by dumping an average of 110,000 tons of silt and tailings into local riverways every day.[62] According to Project Diana, a human rights archive, this water contamination has caused "skin rashes, stomach problems, bloody coughs, and even death."[63]

Like ExxonMobil, Freeport employs Indonesian soldiers as security officers, making the district of Timika, where the mine is located, one of the most militarized areas of Indonesia.[64] An American visiting the mine described the scene: "As we stood in the highest security post inside the mine, surrounded by men carrying guns, this employee told me that the only difference between Indonesian soldiers and Freeport security guards is that the soldiers carry M-16s and Freeport security carries AK-47s."[65]

In addition to providing food, shelter and transport to soldiers in return for guarding the mine, the company provides the Indonesian army "with helicopters and vehicles to transport troops and with funds to construct barracks and office buildings."[66] While the company claims that the Indonesian military serve "the role that the police would serve in a more developed country," the Indonesian military has been implicated in serious and systematic violations of human rights in and around the Freeport mine.[67]

The story of Yosepha Alomang, winner of the prestigious Goldman Environmental Prize, exemplifies what many have suffered with the complicity of Freeport McMoRan. "Mama" Yosepha, as she is known, was held for a week in a Freeport shipping container without food or water, standing knee deep in water thick with human waste. She then endured six weeks of torture and interrogation, all for the crime of allegedly giving food to Papuan resistance fighters.[68] A report from the Irian Jayan Catholic Church found widespread use of Freeport facilities by the Indonesian military—Freeport buses, shipping containers and security posts were all used as torture chambers.[69]

In the face of such allegations and in response to international pressure, Freeport recently signed a code of conduct agreement—promising to report and investigate abuses of human rights.[70] The company also established a new Special Counsel on Human Rights position and their most recent annual report stated that, "we support and uphold the human rights of all people."[71] These are steps in the right direction. But the company is the number one taxpayer in Indonesia, adding a total of $1.42 billion to the public coffers since 1991, making Jakarta reluctant to seriously consider Irian Jaya’s grievances towards Freeport McMoRan and their demands for independence and self-determination.[72]

Indonesian Military and U.S. Business: A Winning Combination?

Reports from the Council on Foreign Relations, the U.S.-ASEAN Business Council, and a growing consensus within the Bush administration all view the military as central to Indonesia’s stability, especially in the strife ridden provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. But the characterization of the military as a stabilizing force ignores the military’s strong incentives for prolonging and exacerbating conflict in Aceh and Irian Jaya.

In an exhaustive report, Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Lesley McCulloch, a researcher for the Bonn International Center for Conversion, describes the synergistic relationship between multinational corporations wary of unrest and soldiers in need of extra money. As much as 80% of the military’s budget comes from illegal activities like drug smuggling, prostitution and illegal casinos and security arrangements with corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport McMoRan.[73]

Former Defense Minister Juwono conceded in an interview with McCulloch that "elements within the military had incited the unrest experienced by Freeport in order to highlight the benefits of their presence," leading the company to forfeit $35 million to the military, in addition to an annual payment of $11 million.[74] In Aceh, soldiers sell their weapons to the guerillas for as little as $6, ensuring their enemies remain a potent force.[75] Many soldiers and officials go so far as to refer to the Aceh fight as a "project," highlighting the role the war plays in filling their pockets, winning them promotions and keeping the institution as a whole powerful and relevant.[76]

While this is a winning combination for the Indonesian military and multinational corporations like ExxonMobil and Freeport, not to mention a vital market for U.S. weapons manufacturers, the people who live and work in the areas "protected" by the Indonesian military gain nothing but more suffering. Until this dynamic can be fully outlined and understood, arguments for arming the Indonesian military in order to ensure stability and end conflict must not be taken at face value.

The Megawati Factor

The Bush administration welcomed Megawati’s ascension to power, communicating a "strong interest and support for a united, democratic and economically successful Indonesia." But, while President Megawati superficially represents a clean break from the Suharto legacy, she remains indebted to the military and has not moved to change that dynamic. Sidney Jones, Asia Director of Human Rights Watch, went so far as to describe Megawati as "sort of a mascot" of the military, and said that she is likely to give "a green light to the military to do whatever it wants in Aceh and Papua."[77]

She will probably get a green light from Washington, in the form of new arms sales and offers of military training. As a reward for a smooth transition, and a pro-business cabinet, Bush has offered renewed military ties. While in the Australian capitol of Canberra for defense and security meetings in late July, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Secretary of State Colin Powell bent over backwards to welcome the new president and express their eagerness to resume military relations. Powell said, "we want to have a relationship with the Indonesian military"[78] Rumsfeld agreed, saying, "I am anxious to reestablish the military-to-military relationship with Indonesia."[79]

Even before becoming President, Megawati had dispatched her husband, prominent businessman Taufiq Kiemas, to meet with his close friend Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz. In those meetings, Kiemas asked for new weapons sales, reporting afterwards that "I tried to convince them that the attitude of our friends in the [Indonesian military] has changed. Now they respect human rights, so please stop the arms embargo."[80]

Even though Kiemas asked very nicely, resumption of weapons sales and military training will not contribute to Indonesia’s stability, and would be irresponsible and premature. In fact, given the current instability, it seems self evident that new shipments of weapons and military training from the United States would only pour gas on the raging fire of this 17,000-island archipelago.

Instead the Bush administration should press Indonesia’s new president to subordinate the military to civilian control, address the root causes of conflicts in Aceh and Irian Jaya and reconcile the legacy of human rights abuses and massacres. Only then can Megawati begin to achieve the "united, democratic, and economically successful Indonesia" that President Bush has described.

Notes

1. Noam Chomsky, "Why Americans Should Care about East Timor," Mother Jones, Aug. 26, 1999.
2. Matthew Jardine, East Timor: Genocide in Paradise, Odonian Press, November 1995.
3. William D. Hartung and Jennifer Washburn, "U.S. Arms Transfers to Indonesia 1975-1997: Who’s Influencing Whom?" World Policy Institute, June 1997.
4. Ross Waby, "Aid to Indonesia Doubled as U.S. Shrugs off Timor," The Australian, January 22, 1976.
5. Quote by Donald R. Keough, Dollars and Sense, May 1992, cited in Jardine, November 1995.
6. Department of Defense, Security Cooperation Agency, "Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts," as of September 30, 1999.
7. Department of Defense, September 30, 1999.
8. Report of the Secretary General of the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor, January 26, 2000.
9. "Indonesia and East Timor," Amnesty International, Annual Report 2000.
10. International Commission of Inquiry on East Timor, United Nations, January 31, 2000.
11. John McBeth, "Jakarta’s Shame," Far Eastern Economic Review, September 21, 2000.
12. "Harassment By Militias Stops East Timor Repatriations," Associated Press, March 7, 2001
13. Anthony Spaeth, "A Rage Unchecked," Time Asia, September 18, 2000.
14. "UN Chief ‘Shocked’ by Timor Sentences," CNN, May 4, 2001.
15. Memo from East Timor Action Network to the United Nations Commission on Human Rights, March 10, 2001.
16. Foreign Operations Appropriations Act of 2000.
17. "Indonesia: Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, 2000" Department of State.
18. Department of Commerce, Office of Strategic Industries and Economic Security, "Pacific Rim Diversification and Defense Market Guide: Indonesia," 1997.
19. Eagle Eye Publishers, DoD and FMS contracts to Indonesia, FY99.
20. Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, as of September 30, 1999.
21. "Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal years 1999 and 2000, Volume I," Defense and State Department, Joint Report to Congress, March 1, 2000.
22. Sidney Jones of Human Rights Watch, quoted in Terry Allen, "Indonesian Army Recruits in Vermont," Boston Globe, October 4, 1999.
23. Terry Allen, "Indonesian Army Recruits in Vermont," Boston Globe, October 4, 1999.
24. U.S. Training of Indonesian Troops Goes on Despite Ban," New York Times, March 17, 1998.
25. Alan Nairn in an interview with New Politics, October 18, 1999.
26. Nairn, 1999.
27. Philip Finnegan, "Jakarta Seeks Renewal Of US Military Ties," Defense News, May 1, 2000.
28. Testimony Of Paul Wolfowitz, Before The U.S. House Of Representatives Committee On International Relations Subcommittee On East Asian And Pacific Affairs Hearings On Indonesia, May 7, 1997.
29. Admiral Dennis Blair, "Hearings on Pacific Issues, U.S. Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense, March 28, 2000.
30. Slobodan Lekic, "U.S. Restarts Ties with Indonesia," Associated Press, July 26, 2000.
31. Author’s conversation with Indonesia Desk Officer, June 2000.
32. John Hasseman, "Indonesia Seeks New Sources for Equipment," Jane’s Defense Weekly, January 31, 2001.
33. Marianne Kearney, "Indonesian Air Display Team a Victim of Arms Ban," The Strait Times, April 10, 2001.
34. "Money in Politics: Backgrounder on the Energy Industry," Center for Responsive Politics, May 21, 2001.
35. David Corn, "Bush gets an F in Foreign Affairs," Salon.com, November 5, 1999.
36. Center for Responsive Politics, May 21, 2001.
37. "Jakarta optimistic the U.S. Will Lift Arms Embargo," Agence France-Presse, January 29, 2001.
38. The East Timor Estafeta, Summer 2000.
39. Testimony Of Paul Wolfowitz, Before The U.S. House Of Representatives Committee On International Relations Subcommittee On East Asian And Pacific Affairs Hearings On Indonesia, May 7, 1997
40. Confirmation hearing statement of Colin L. Powell before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, January 17 2001.
41. Tim Shorrock, "U.S. Called to Arms in South East Asia," Asia Times, July 21, 2001.
42. Robert Kerrey, The United States and Southeast Asia: A Policy Agenda for the New Administration, Council on Foreign Relations, 2001.
43. Kerrey, 2001.
44. Charles Sennott, "Armed for Profit, the Selling of US Weapons," Boston Globe, February 11, 1996.
45. Kerrey, 2001.
46. State Department, October 2000, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs.
47. Kearney, April 10, 2001.
48. Calvin Sims, "War Grips an Eden That Indonesia Won't Set Free," New York Times, November 11, 2000.
49. Project Ploughshares, Armed Conflict 2000 report.
50. "A Reign of Terror: Human Rights Violations in Aceh: 1998-2000," TAPOL: Indonesia Human Rights Campaign.
51. "Backgrounder on Aceh," Indonesia Human Rights Network.
52. "Indonesia: 2000," Human Right Watch 2000.
53. William Nessen, "Aceh Villagers Describe Atrocities: Indonesia Moves Against Guerrillas," Boston Globe, August 18, 2001.
54. Lely T. Djuhari, "Indonesia-Death Squad," Associated Press, December 13, 2000.
55. Testimony of Nazaruddin, Human Rights Watch, December 2000.
56. Terry Collingsworth of the International Labor Rights Fund, Suit filed June 11, 2001 in the U.S. District Court in the District of Colombia.
57. Collingsworth, June 11, 2001.
58. Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 28, 2001.
59. "West Papua Fact Sheet," Indonesian Human Rights Network.
60. John McBeth, "Bull’s Eye," Far Eastern Economic Review, December 4, 1997.
61. Eyal Press, "Corporate Predator: Freeport-McMoRan at Home and Abroad," The Nation, July 31-August 7, 1995.
62. Eyal Press, "Indonesia’s Misadventure: A Mining Giant’s Clash," Pacific Journalism Review, November 1996.
63. "Freeport McMoRan’s Poisoning of Irian Jaya, Indonesia," Project Diana: Online Human Rights Archive at Yale Law School, April 20, 1998.
64. "Mining Gold, Undermining Justice: Freeport and Human Rights Violations," Corporate Watch.
65. Press, November 1996.
66. Business Week Asia, July 2000
67. Press, November 1996.
68. Goldman Environmental Prize 2000 press release.
69. Violations of Human Rights in the Timika Area of Irian Jaya, Indonesia, Catholic Church of Jayapura, August 14, 1995.
70. Peter Beher, "Companies Sign Pact on Human Rights," Washington Post, December 21, 2000.
71. Freeport McMoRan 1999 Annual Report.
72. Freeport, 1999.
73. Lesley McCulloch, "Business as Usual," Inside Indonesia, July-September 2000.
74. Lesley McColloch’s interview with Defense Minister Juwono, quoted in Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business, Bonn International Center for Conversion "Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Factor" conference in Jakarta, Indonesia, October 17-19, 2000.
75. McCulloch, October 17-19, 2000.
76. Aceh: Why Military Force Won’t Bring Lasting Peace, International Crisis Group, June 12, 2001.
77. Jim Lobe, "U.S. Warned Against Full Embrace of Megawati," Inter Press Service, July 25, 2001.
78. Richard Paddock "In About Face, Military Seen as Indonesia’s Hero," Los Angeles Times, August 2, 2001.
79. Paddock, August 2, 2001.
80. "Megawati’s Man," Tempo, June 12-18, 2001.

Sources for More Information

Indonesia Human Rights Network
1101 Pennsylvania Ave. SE
Washington, DC 20003
Phone: 202-544-1211
Fax: 202-544-6118
E-mail: kurtbiddle@earthlink.net

Arms Trade Resource Center
66 Fifth Avenue, 9^th floor
New York, NY 10011
Phone: 212-229-5808 ext. 112
Fax: 212-229-5579
Email: berrigaf@newschool.edu

East Timor Action Network
P.O. Box 15774
Washington, DC 20003-0774
Phone: 202-544-6911
Fax: 202-544-6118
Email: etan@etan.org

Human Rights Watch
Indonesia: Transition and Regional Conflict
350 Fifth Avenue, 34th floor
New York, NY 10118
Phone: 212-290-4700
Fax: 212-736-1300
Email: hrwnyc@hrw.org

International Crisis Group
Indonesia Project
400 Madison Avenue, Suite 11C
New York, New York 10017
Phone: 212-813-0820
Fax: 212-813-0825
Email: icgny@crisisweb.org

International Labor Rights Fund
Sued ExxonMobil for abuses in Aceh
733 15th St., NW #920
Washington, DC 20005
Phone: (202) 347-4100
Fax: (202) 347-4885
Email: laborrights@igc.org

Trifungsi: The Role of the Indonesian Military in Business,
a paper by Lesley McCulloch of the Bonn International Center for Conversion, October 2000

Risky Business: The Grasberg Gold Mine
An Independent Report on PT Freeport from Project Underground, May 1998.

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