|
ARMS
TRADE RESOURCE CENTER
Tangled
Web:
The Marketing of Missile Defense 1994-2000
A Special Issue
Brief
by William D. Hartung and Michelle Ciarrocca
May 2000
Summary of
Findings
Finding 1
– Playing politics with defense: Given the serious technical,
cost, and arms control problems plaguing the Clinton administration’s
proposed National Missile Defense (NMD) system, the most convincing
explanation for the undue haste with which this issue is being decided
is that both the Clinton administration and its conservative adversaries
in Congress and the Bush campaign are playing politics with the
missile defense issue.
Finding 2
– The NMD Two-Step – Republicans Lead, Clinton Follows:
In its ongoing effort to "triangulate" by coopting Republican issues,
President Clinton has slowly but surely met conservative missile
defense boosters more than half way on the NMD issue, to the point
where his administration has little room to maneuver in putting
the program on hold in pursuit of a new round of nuclear arms reductions
with Russia. In the mean time, Republicans in Congress and on the
Bush campaign have stepped up their calls for an elaborate, multi-tiered
NMD system akin to Ronald Reagan’s ill-fated Star Wars scheme of
the 1980s.
Finding 3
– NMD Is Unaffordable: With cost projections for NMD
ranging from a Congressional Budget Office estimate of $60 billion
for the Clinton administration’s "limited" two site system to as
much as $240 billion for a "robust," multi-tiered approach, missile
defense is fast outpacing the willingness of the public or large
parts of the national security establishment to pay for it, particularly
compared to what these vast sums could do to address other pressing
national needs.
Finding 4
– NMD Is Lucrative: The nation’s Big 3 weapons contractors,
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon, are looking to missile defense
as a medium-to-long term source of revenues and profits to help
them recover from recent management and technical problems that
have slashed their stock prices in half and reduced their profit
margins. In FY1998-99, the four largest missile defense contractors
(the Big 3 plus TRW) have shared over $2.2 billion in Pentagon research
and development funding for research projects. These four firms
completely dominate the missile defense program at this point, accounting
for 60% of total missile defense contracts issued by the Pentagon
in FY1998-99.
Finding 5
– The Political Pace of the NMD Program Is Being Pushed by An
Alliance of Conservative True Believers and Right-Wing Foundations
Centered Around Frank Gaffney’s Center for Security Policy:
Every major milestone in the NMD program, from its inclusion in
Newt Gingrich and Dick Armey’s "Contract With America" in 1994 to
the Rumsfeld Commission’s extreme "worst case" assessment of the
"rogue state" missile threat in 1998 to the passage of pro-NMD legislation
in both houses of Congress in the spring of 1999, has been propelled
forward by a highly disciplined and effective coalition of conservative
organizations. This pro-NMD network includes the Heritage Foundation
and Empower America, and neo-Reaganite Republicans like Rep. Curt
Weldon (R-PA) and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ), all of whom are represented
on the Board of Advisors of the Center for Security Policy, which
serves as the de facto nerve center of the missile defense lobby.
Finding 6
– The Four Largest Missile Defense Contractors Are Making a Major
Political Investment in the Promotion of an NMD System:
Since Republicans took control of the House in 1995, weapons industry
PAC contributions have favored Republican congressional candidates
by a margin of 2 to 1. In this election cycle alone, Lockheed Martin,
Boeing, Raytheon and TRW have given over $2 million to the 25 most
hard-core NMD boosters in the Senate who signed a recent letter
from Jesse Helms to President Clinton threatening to kill any U.S.-Russian
arms agreement that puts ANY limits on the scope of future NMD deployments.
These companies also spent $34 million on lobbying during 1997-98,
and they have helped finance a series of pro-NMD breakfasts on Capitol
Hill in conjunction with the National Defense University Foundation
and the National Security Industrial Association (the weapons industry’s
largest trade association).
From
Star Wars to National Missile Defense
Inside the Missile Defense Lobby
Missile Defense Revisited: Article of Faith or Political
Cover?
More Buck for the Bang: Cashing In on NMD
Missile Defense Fraud: The Other Enduring Legacy
Where do we go from here?
Table I: Soft Money Donations, PAC Contributions
and Lobbying Expenditures from the Top Missile Defense Contractors
Appendix A Tables:
Table A: Defense Companies Receiving the Largest
Dollar Amounts of Pentagon Missile Defense Contracts 1998-99
Table B: Top Senate Recipients of Defense Industry
PAC Campaign Contributions 1995-99
Table C: Top House Recipients of Defense Industry
PAC Campaign Contributions 1995-99
Appendix B: Missile Defense Resource List
Acknowledgments
From
Star Wars to National Missile Defense
On March 23,
1983, when Ronald Reagan surprised the nation and the world by announcing
an ambitious research program designed to render nuclear weapons
"impotent and obsolete," he noted that this "formidable technical
task...may not be accomplished before the end of this century."
The end of the 20th century has come and gone, but Reagan’s
dream of an impenetrable shield against nuclear weapons is no closer
to reality than it was when he gave his "Star Wars" speech. Over
the past eighteen years, U.S. taxpayers have spent $70 billion on
various mutations of Reagan’s ballistic missile defense vision,
with precious little to show for it.
The original
enthusiasm generated by Reagan’s Star Wars plan had diminished substantially
by the end of his second term, as technical problems, cost overruns,
and progress on U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms reductions made the program
seem both unworkable and irrelevant. Missile defense continued as
a research program during the Bush years, soaking up $3 to $4 billion
per year in taxpayer funds, but the zeal that had characterized
the Reagan administration's approach to the program had largely
dissipated. By the time President Clinton took office, then Secretary
of Defense Les Aspin proclaimed "the end of the Star Wars era."
Research funding for missile defense remained steady, but the emphasis
was placed on "theater" defenses designed to deal with short-to-medium
range ballistic missiles. But just when it seemed like Star Wars
had become a relic of the Cold War era, the demand for a National
Missile Defense system reemerged as a major issue on Capitol Hill
as conservative Republicans set out to "win one for the Gipper."
When Newt Gingrich
and his conservative colleagues took control of the House of Representatives
in 1994 they ran on a legislative platform called the Contract with
America, which had been co-authored by Gingrich and his colleague
Rep. Dick Armey (R-TX). In its only specific defense/foreign policy
plank, the Contract called for "renewing America's commitment to
an effective national missile defense system by requiring the Defense
Department to deploy anti-ballistic missile systems capable of defending
the United States against ballistic missile attack."
Republican missile
defense efforts were held in check during the first two years of
the "Gingrich revolution," in large part due to concerns among Republican
"deficit hawks" about the program’s staggering price tag, which
the Congressional Budget Office had pegged at $31 to $60 billion.
Despite the political difficulties faced by National Missile Defense
(NMD) in Congress, in mid-1996 the Clinton administration agreed
to a compromise "3+3" plan, which involved three more years of intensive
missile defense research followed by a deployment decision. If a
decision to deploy the NMD system was justified by the threat, the
technology, the cost, and its net impact U.S. security, a crash
program would be undertaken to put the initial elements of the system
in place within three years (this timeline was later adjusted to
five years by Secretary of Defense William Cohen). Now, in keeping
with Clinton's readjusted 3+3 plan, the administration is planning
to make an NMD deployment decision this fall, smack in the middle
of the 2000 presidential campaign. Political considerations, which
have been a central driver of the missile defense program since
its inception, will loom large in President Clinton’s decision.
NMD has been
scaled down from Reagan's original vision of a multi-tiered "umbrella
defense" designed to thwart thousands of incoming Soviet warheads
to the more modest goal of intercepting what Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright has described as a few "tens of warheads" launched
intentionally by a "rogue state" like North Korea, or accidentally
by an existing nuclear power like Russia or China. But despite its
far less demanding mission, so far the proposed NMD system has been
plagued by the same kinds of cost and technical problems that characterized
its more elaborate predecessor, Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative
(SDI). The first NMD test, which took place in October of 1999,
hit the target by sheer luck after homing in on a decoy warhead.
The January 2000 intercept test failed outright as a result of a
leaky tube. This mixed record makes the outcome of the next test
- scheduled for late June or early July - a critical factor in President
Clinton's decision on whether or not to move full speed ahead on
deployment of a National Missile Defense system.
In total, just
21 intercept tests are to take place before completion of the NMD
system scheduled for 2005. Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director
of the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO), claims that
the NMD testing program is designed to ensure that it will work
with a "very high level of confidence." However, in comparison to
other weapon development programs with less demanding missions,
the Union of Concerned Scientists points out that, "the Pentagon
expects to test the NMD system less than a typical military system."
As arms control
expert Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace has rightly pointed out, one of the greatest flaws of the
proposed NMD program is that it is like a "balloon mortgage." All
the risks – undermining the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty,
sparking a new nuclear arms race, and straining U.S. relations with
its NATO allies – come up front. On the other side of the ledger,
the purported security benefits of NMD deployment will not be realized
for years, if at all. Even BMDO Director Ronald Kadish acknowledged
in a recent breakfast briefing that he will not feel entirely comfortable
that the system will work as intended until much later in the testing
process, some time in the year 2004. That means if President Clinton
makes a deployment decision this fall without persuading key players
like Russia, China, and other nuclear or near-nuclear powers that
it poses no threat to them, he risks sparking three to four years
of global nuclear instability before we know whether a limited
NMD system will work for the narrow mission of blocking a few
"rogue state" missiles.
Furthermore,
a recent report by Philip Coyle of the DoD's Independent Office
of Testing & Evaluation and two reports by the special panel
of missile defense experts chaired by former Reagan administration
Air Force Chief of Staff Larry Welch all raise questions about whether
the NMD program can meet its ambitious goal of fielding a modest
but workable system by 2005. Both reports cite inadequate and compressed
testing schedules that place NMD programs in a "high risk" category
and both concur that the NMD intercept tests are not representative
of real world threats where attack by a rogue state would be accompanied
by easily employed countermeasures and decoys. These concerns have
been echoed by a recent report by a panel of scientists convened
by the Union of Concerned Scientists and the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, and by an independent analysis by MIT scientist Theodore
Postol which was based on data generated by a controversial 1997
test by TRW. Former TRW employee Nira Schwartz has filed a civil
suit against the company alleging that she was forced to cover up
test results which demonstrated that in a vast majority of cases,
an NMD interceptor would not be able to tell the difference between
a warhead and a decoy.
The Clinton/Gore
NMD plan envisions at least two phases of deployment at a cost estimated
by the Congressional Budget Office at up to $60 billion, if one
counts associated satellite systems. For their part, Republican
Star Warriors on Capitol Hill won't be satisfied until the U.S.
has built a massive missile defense "triad" consisting of sea-,
space-, and ground-based interceptors. The Council for a Livable
World has estimated that this more elaborate system would cost at
least $120 billion, while the Center on Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS) has suggested that a truly "robust" system could
cost up to $240 billion, four times the estimated costs of the Clinton/Gore
plan. The "robust" system advocated by Republican Presidential nominee
George W. Bush in his May 24th speech on nuclear weapons
and U.S. foreign policy would come in at the high end of this cost
range.
But even if
the NMD system can be made to "work" on the military/technical level
without breaking the budget, a hasty decision to deploy NMD poses
grave risks to U.S. security and global stability. Unless Russia
agrees to amend the treaty to allow NMD deployment, going forward
with Clinton’s "limited" missile defense plan will violate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty, threatening three decades of progress on nuclear
arms control in the process. A deployment decision by President
Clinton or his successor could also derail the recent offer by Soviet
premier Vladimir Putin to reduce U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals
to 1,000 strategic warheads each. It would also almost certainly
provoke new nuclear weapons production by Russia and China.
As the Clinton
administration's self-imposed deadline to decide the fate of NMD
fast approaches, there has been little national debate about what
is really at stake. A balanced view of the potential risks and benefits
suggests that NMD deployment will most likely create more security
problems than it will solve. According to a May 19th article by
Bob Drogin and Tyler Marshall of the Los Angeles Times, a
forthcoming National Intelligence Estimate suggests that a decision
to deploy an NMD system could provoke "an unsettling series of political
and military ripple effects from the proposed U.S. deployment that
would include a sharp build-up of strategic and medium-range nuclear
missiles by China, India, and Pakistan and the further spread of
military technology in the Middle East." Given these risks, Sen.
Carl Levin (D-MI) is right in saying "Unless and until we are confident
that deployment of an NMD system will make us more secure, we should
not deploy."
Against this
backdrop it is clear that President Clinton’s "rush to judgment"
on National Missile Defense has been spurred on, not by a realistic
assessment of the threats facing the United States in the decades
to come, but, instead, by strong political pressures generated by
a committed cadre of "true believers" and special interest groups
that stand to benefit from a decision to deploy missile defenses.
This grouping of contractors, conservative think tanks, and weapons
scientists make up a formidable lobbying force in Washington, but
their big payday will only come if NMD moves forward from a lavishly
funded research and development effort to a crash program aimed
at rapid production and deployment of a missile defense system.
Inside
the Missile Defense Lobby
The most effective
advocate for the deployment of an open-ended NMD system is former
Reagan Pentagon official Frank Gaffney the director of the Center
for Security Policy (CSP). The Center is a small but extremely effective
boiler room operation that puts out nearly 200 press releases and
"national security decision briefs" per year on issues like the
North Korean missile threat, Chinese nuclear espionage, and the
alleged dangers to U.S. security of supporting various arms control
treaties. Ironically, even though Gaffney claims to be carrying
on the work of Ronald Reagan many of the arms control treaties that
he is trying to dismantle, including the ABM treaty, the Intermediate
Nuclear Forces (INF) treaty, and the START accords, were implemented
by Republican presidents, namely Richard Nixon, Ronald Reagan,
and George Bush.
To transpose
Will Rogers’ famous comment, Gaffney has never encountered an arms
control agreement he didn’t dislike. From the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty that would bar testing of new nuclear weapons to the
anti-personnel land mine treaty that recently went into force after
years of sustained public education carried out by a worldwide movement
of citizen activists and government and military officials, Gaffney’s
Center has a predictable position: agreements are bad because foreign
countries can’t be trusted, so we’re better off seeking a position
of unchallengeable military superiority that will allow the United
States to act unilaterally and with impunity. And those countries
that we must deal with – such as our NATO member allies – basically
need to be "educated" and pressured until they toe the U.S. line.
The Center for
Security Policy claims to be a "non-partisan organization committed
to stimulating and informing the national and international debates
about all aspects of security policy." But upon closer inspection,
CSP's central role in bringing together conservative members of
Congress, the arms industry, and major conservative think tanks
into a powerful, unified force on behalf of NMD deployment makes
Gaffney’s organization the nerve center of the Star Wars lobby.
CSP’s 100-member
board of advisors is made up of a virtual "Star Wars Hall of Fame"
including weapons scientist Edward Teller, former Reagan science
advisor George Keyworth, and Elliott Abrams, former Reagan State
Department official. From the world of conservative foundations
and think tanks, the CSP board boasts such key figures as Bill Bennett
and Jeanne Kirkpatrick of Empower America, Heritage Foundation president
Edward Feulner, and Henry Cooper of the High Frontier organization.
Representatives of the weapons industry include two top Lockheed
Martin executives, Charles Kupperman, the company’s Vice President
of Washington Operations, and Bruce Jackson, the firm’s Vice President
for Strategic Planning. Rounding out the CSP board are sitting members
of Congress such as Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), Rep. Curt Weldon
(R-PA), Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX), Sen. James Inhofe (R-OK)
and Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) who provide a strong core of leadership
on missile defense issues on Capitol Hill.
Unlike most
think tanks that work on national security issues, the Center for
Security Policy receives roughly 25% of its annual revenue from
corporate sponsors, many of which are weapons manufacturing firms.
Top missile defense contractors Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon,
and TRW have all contributed generously to Gaffney's organization,
which has received more than $2 million in corporate donations since
its founding in 1988.
This conservative/contractor
alliance represented on CSP’s board of advisors was instrumental
in encouraging former House Speaker Newt Gingrich to insert the
plank on National Missile Defense in the Contract with America,
a pivotal political turning point in the resurrection of the missile
defense issue on Capitol Hill. Even more importantly, the creation
of the allegedly objective, bipartisan Rumsfeld Commission to assess
the ballistic missile threat facing the United States, was carried
out pursuant to an amendment that was inserted into the FY 1997
defense authorization bill by staunch CSP supporter and board of
advisors’ member Curt Weldon of Pennsylvania.
The Rumsfeld
Commission - which one veteran missile defense analyst has described
as "something Curt Weldon probably dreamed up while he was in the
shower one morning" - has emerged as a critical weapon in the conservative
drive to reshape the debate over National Missile Defense and create
a sense of urgency for deployment of an NMD system. The report painted
the ultimate worst case scenario by systematically ignoring all
of the real world obstacles Third World countries face in trying
to obtain a long-range ballistic capability and playing up any factors
(however remote) that might increase their chances of getting usable
ballistic missiles in a shorter time frame. As a result, the Rumsfeld
panel gave NMD boosters in Congress the quasi-official endorsement
they needed to push the program forward.
In an effort
to give the panel a bipartisan, objective gloss, Newt Gingrich and
Trent Lott appointed six of the nine members, but the remaining
members were picked by House Minority Leader Dick Gephardt and Senate
Minority Leader Tom Daschle. More importantly, they chose former
Ford administration Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, who has a
longstanding reputation as a "pragmatic" moderate on security issues,
to chair the panel. When Rumsfeld’s report was released in July
of 1998, its key finding was the assertion that "rogue states" like
North Korea or Iraq could acquire ballistic missiles within "five
years of a decision to do so," not the ten to fifteen years suggested
by previous U.S. intelligence estimates. Newt Gingrich immediately
jumped on the report’s findings, loudly proclaiming that they represented
"the greatest warning for U.S. security since the end of the Cold
War."
Upon closer
examination the Rumsfeld panel looks less like a balanced analysis
of the Third World missile threat and more like a slightly more
nuanced replay of the tactics that motivated the famous "Team B"
panel of the 1970s - a team of conservative outside experts brought
in by Congressional hawks to second guess the CIA’s official estimates
of Soviet military strength. In the case of the Rumsfeld panel,
commission members looked at essentially the same data used in a
1995 National Intelligence Estimate and a subsequent independent
review convened by former Reagan CIA Director Robert Gates and gave
it a different spin. The fact that conservatives got two chances
to reverse the official estimate of the missile threat prompted
a well-known arms control expert to dub it the "Team C" report.
The problem
was not that the Rumsfeld panel manufactured data or openly lied,
it was that they gave an alarmist slant to the information that
the U.S. intelligence community had collected on emerging ballistic
missile threats. For example, rather than looking at the realistic
economic, political, and technical impediments facing so-called
"rogue states" like Iraq and North Korea in developing long-range
ballistic missiles, the Commission focused on speculative questions
such as, "What if China gave North Korea advanced missile
technology (or even a completed missile)?"
Few remarked
at the time that the panel's chair Donald Rumsfeld was far from
an objective analyst on this particular subject matter, given his
parallel role as a card-carrying member of the missile defense lobby.
In recent editions of the Center for Security Policy’s annual report,
Rumsfeld is described as a "trusted advisor" and listed as a financial
supporter of the organization. He also serves on the board of Empower
America, which ran misleading pro-Star Wars radio ads against incumbent
Democratic Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) in the 1998 elections, just
a few months after Rumsfeld’s allegedly non-partisan analysis of
the Third World missile threat was released. Lest anyone overlook
Rumsfeld’s close ties to the missile defense lobby, he was awarded
CSP's "Keeper of the Flame" award for 1998 at a gala dinner attended
by retired military officers, conservative political and foundation
leaders, and representatives of missile defense contractors like
Lockheed Martin. In addition to Rumsfeld, past recipients of the
"Keeper of the Flame" award have included Ronald Reagan, Newt Gingrich,
Curt Weldon, Jon Kyl, and Christopher Cox.
Beyond their
close working relationship with the chairman of the panel, the fingerprints
of the Gaffney network are all over the Rumsfeld Report. Gaffney
board members William Graham and William Schneider served as members
of the Rumsfeld panel, and CSP has publicly bragged that a number
of its former staffers and interns went on to serve as staff members
of the Rumsfeld commission.
Even now, in
May of 2000, as Rumsfeld has stepped forward as one of the Republican
"foreign policy wise men" – along with George Shultz, Henry Kissinger,
Brent Scowcroft and Colin Powell who will advise George W. Bush
on major foreign policy issues like missile defense – the Center
for Security Policy, which Rumsfeld works closely with is involved
in an advertising and web site project called "Protect Americans
Now." The new coalition is involved in a shameless and inaccurate
campaign of scare-mongering regarding the ballistic missile threat
to the United States. Is this the kind of advice George W. Bush
can expect from Rumsfeld and his colleagues once he takes office?
Missile
Defense Revisited: Article of Faith or Political Cover?
Missile defense,
an issue which split the Republican and Democratic parties during
the Reagan era, now appears as if it has achieved broad bipartisan
support inside the Beltway. But it also seems clear that this increased
support has more to do with short-term politics – i.e., Democrats
not wanting to be viewed as "soft on defense" – than it does with
any strong belief in the technological promise of NMD. On the Republican
side of the aisle, a core group of Reaganite true believers has
managed to impose a remarkable level of party unity on the missile
defense issue, which has become a virtual litmus test for Republican
Congressional and Presidential candidates. As a result, it would
require strong, persistent presidential leadership to buck the political
tide towards NMD deployment, a quality that has unfortunately been
in short supply during the Clinton era. Missile defense expert John
Pike of the Federation of American Scientists has aptly summed up
the situation: "NMD has more to do with defending Al Gore from George
Bush than it does with defending the United States from ballistic
missiles."
Despite the
fact that the Rumsfeld report made no policy recommendations whatsoever
and therefore did not advocate deploying a National Missile
Defense system, the release of the report served as the primary
weapon in a renewed conservative assault on arms control. Coupled
with the September 1998 North Korean missile test and charges of
Chinese nuclear espionage – which were highlighted in hearings chaired
by another CSP advisor, Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA) -- the Rumsfeld
report helped clear the way for the spring 1999 passage in the House
and the Senate of bills calling upon the President to deploy an
NMD system "as soon as technologically feasible." In the Senate,
Democrats supported the bill with two amendments. The first reaffirmed
that it is U.S. policy to continue to seek nuclear reductions with
Russia, and the second required funds for any NMD system to be appropriated
on an annual basis. As a result, NMD skeptics have argued that these
high profile pro-NMD votes do not really commit the U.S. to deploying
a missile defense system at all if the conditions on arms control
and affordability are not met. Even so, there is no question that
the events of the past year have shifted the political ground in
favor of a decision to deploy a missile defense system. In essence,
the passage of the two bills changed the focus of the Washington
debate from whether to deploy NMD to when to do so.
The conservative
crusaders bent on deploying missile defenses and destroying the
ABM treaty have been emboldened by last year’s successful Senate
campaign to thwart ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban treaty.
The leader and chief tactician of that effort was CSP advisory panel
member Sen. Jon Kyl of Arizona, who renewed his vow to pursue "peace
through strength rather than peace through paper" at a February
2000 post-mortem on the CTB vote organized by Gaffney’s Center for
Security Policy. Staunch supporters of missile defense in Congress
want to start deployment immediately, and they have made it clear
that they do not intend to settle for the limited National Missile
Defense system that the Clinton administration is marketing to the
international community and the American public. Contrary to Madeline
Albright's assurances that the U.S. seeks to deploy a modest system
that will not "degrade Russia’s deterrent," conservatives on Capitol
Hill have a much grander scheme in mind.
In a letter
to President Clinton on April 17, 2000, 25 Republican Senators urged
him not to negotiate a revised ABM Treaty that would limit future
missile defense options. The letter states that "the [Clinton Administration's]
approach fails to permit the deployment of other promising missile
defense technologies - including space-based sensors, sufficient
numbers of ground-based radars, and additional interceptor basing
modes, like Navy systems and the Airborne Laser - that we believe
are necessary to achieve a fully-effective defense against the full
range of possible threats. " The letter goes on to ask Clinton to
"reconsider your Administration's current approach to NMD policy
and arms control and consult further with us. Without significant
changes to your approach, we do not believe an agreement submitted
to the Senate for consideration should be ratified." Among the signatories
were Jesse Helms (NC), Jon Kyl (AZ), Thad Cochran (MS), and Trent
Lott (MS). The 25 Senators who signed the letter have been the beneficiaries
of generous campaign contributions from defense contractors, receiving
more than $2 million in PAC contributions from weapons makers like
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon in the current election cycle.
More
Buck for the Bang: Cashing In on NMD
On issue after
issue - from expanding NATO, to rolling back restrictions on arms
sales to repressive regimes, to deploying National Missile Defense,
the arms industry has been spending heavily in recent years on candidates
and lobbyists who will promote their agenda in Washington. Indeed,
the 'unwarranted influence' acquired by the military-industrial
complex that President Eisenhower warned about in his 1961 farewell
address to the nation is still painfully evident toady. But the
primary factor motivating the arms lobby is profit, NOT U.S. national
security interests, or even U.S. jobs. The "Big Four" weapons contractors
-- Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW – have received over
$2.2 billion in missile defense research and development (R&D)
funding during FY 1998 and the first three quarters of FY 1999.
They stand to make billions more if a national missile defense system
is actually deployed.
The Big Four
NMD contractors also control a huge share of Pentagon procurement
and R&D spending, accounting for more than one out of every
four dollars doled out by the Defense Department for these purposes
in FY 1999, for a total of over $32 billion in Department of Defense
contracts. This huge annual infusion of taxpayer funds, combined
with their large political footprint – Boeing employs 250,000 people
worldwide and Lockheed Martin brags of having facilities in all
50 states -- makes the defense industry a potent political force.
As impressive as their dominance of overall Pentagon contracting
is, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW control an even larger
share of the missile defense pie – during FY 1998 and FY 1999, an
average of 60% of all Pentagon missile defense R&D contracts
went to just these four companies.
During the past
decade the major weapons makers have made generous campaign contributions
to key members of Congress and invested tens of millions of dollars
in their already formidable DC lobbying operations in an effort
to ensure a "soft" (and profitable) landing during the inevitable
cutbacks that accompanied the end of the Cold War . Since 1995,
shortly after the Republicans took control of the House in the wake
of threats from Newt Gingrich to ensure that companies that failed
to back Republican candidates would face "the coldest two years
in Washington" that they had ever experienced, weapons industry
Political Action Committees have favored Republicans over Democrats
by a 2 to 1 margin in races for the House and Senate. By contrast,
when Democrats controlled the House, that arms industry favored
them by a more modest margin of 55% to 45%.
The two key
issues that have distinguished the pro-defense Clinton/Gore Democrats
from the hawkish Gingrich/DeLay/Armey Republicans are the conservative
Republican commitment to deploying a robust missile defense system
as soon as possible AND their willingness to add billions of dollars
per year to the Pentagon’s budget request, for everything from more
$1.5 billion per copy helicopter carriers for the Marines built
at Litton’s shipyard in Trent Lott’s hometown of Pascagoula, Mississippi
to Lockheed Martin C-130 aircraft built in Marietta, Georgia, just
outside of Gingrich’s old Georgia district and smack in the middle
of the district of the Clinton-hating class of ‘94 Republican and
NRA poster boy Rep. Bob Barr.
From 1991 to
1997, defense companies spent even more political donations than
those other well-known merchants of death, the tobacco lobby. From
1997 to the present, the Big Four missile defense contractors --
Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW -- have kept up a brisk
pace of political giving, doling out more than $3.7 million in PAC
contributions to members of Congress. Soft money contributions by
the four major missile defense contractors, which go to the parties,
are running at $2.1 million for the same time period. But this lavish
political giving pales in comparison with what these firms have
spent on lobbying: 1997-98, the most recent years for which figures
are available, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, and TRW spent
$34 million on lobbyists. (see charts below)
While missile
defense spending is not the only -- or even the most urgent -- issue
on the weapons makers list of lobbying priorities, NMD deployment
still figures heavily in the medium-to-long term revenue projections
of these firms. For the three largest defense contractors – Lockheed
Martin, Boeing, and Raytheon – the prospect of a decade or more
of growing NMD contracts is one of the few bright spots in a surprisingly
troubled financial picture.
In the early
and mid-1990s, when these three "lumbering behemoths of the apocalypse"
were assembled as a result of a dizzying array of defense industry
mergers that were encouraged and partially subsidized by the Clinton
administration, their financial prospects looked bright. But once
the relatively easy period of growth subsided for each of these
new weapons manufacturing conglomerates – growth that derived primarily
from the increased revenue streams of the combined firms and cost
savings based on laying off workers and cutting back factory floor
space – financial and management problems set in.
Lockheed Martin
experienced a series of high-profile failures on its Theater High
Area Altitude Defense (THAAD) program that almost provoked the Pentagon
to replace it as prime contractor of the system. The firm also drew
fire for essentially blowing up a $1 billion military intelligence
satellite due to a faulty launch, and for cost and quality problems
on its C-130J and F-22 aircraft programs. Shortly after its merger
with McDonnell Douglas in December 1996, Boeing also went into a
financial tailspin driven largely by production and management problems
in its commercial aircraft programs. Raytheon was the last of the
Big 3 to take the plunge, and it continues to face serious challenges
based on quality control – hundreds of its Patriot missiles sold
to U.S. allies after the 1991 Persian Gulf War have been recalled
as defective – and the firm recently loss a major missile contract
with the United Kingdom to a European consortium. These technical,
management, and competitive problems have combined to cut the stock
prices of all three firms by one-half or more in the past two years,
and have prompted them to seek government relief in the form of
streamlined export rules, relaxed auditing and accounting standards,
and outright subsidies. In this context, the prospect of big new
contracts flowing from NMD deployment are too good an offer for
these major weapons conglomerates to pass up. All three firms have
touted their involvement in NMD and other missile defense programs
in their most recent annual reports, shortly after the sections
in which each company’s top management apologizes for the firm’s
subpar financial performance over the past year.
A listing of
major missile defense projects underway at Boeing, Lockheed Martin,
Raytheon and TRW follows (data in this section is pulled from company
annual reports, and is not intended to be an exhaustive accounting
of each firm’s NMD work).
Boeing
- NMD Lead
System Integrator Prime Contractor - responsible for the development
and integration of all NMD elements including the ground-based
interceptor, ground-based radar, and the battle management command,
control, and communications system.
- Boeing is
currently the "hot backup" to Raytheon in developing an Exoatmospheric
Kill Vehicle (EKV) and will continue to build and test the EKV
for potential integration into the NMD system.
- Teamed up
with Raytheon on the Navy Theater-Wide Missile Defense program
- Boeing is responsible for the guidance unit, ejector, kinetic
warhead integration, assembly and test.
- Leader of
the Team Airborne Laser (ABL) (with Lockheed and TRW) - the ABL
program will mount a laser weapon on a modified Boeing 747 freighter
jet to detect and destroy theater ballistic missiles in their
boost stage. Boeing is responsible for the weapon system integration
and supplies the 747-400F aircraft and battle management, command,
control, communications, computers and intelligence.
Lockheed
Martin
- Contractor
for the NMD Payload Launch Vehicle - which provides the vehicle
to launch the EKV.
- Prime Contractor
for the "high" component of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)
which provides the NMD system with early warning of missile launches
against the U.S.
- Prime Contractor
for the Theater High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system - a
ground-based system designed to destroy the full range of theater
ballistic missile threats to troops, military assets and allied
territories.
- Member of
Team ABL (with Boeing and TRW) supplying the Beam Control/Fire
Control system that accurately points and fires the weapon with
sufficient energy to destroy the target.
- Provides
the acquisition, tracking and beam control expertise, as well
as significant spacecraft integration skills for the Space-Based
Laser (SBL) program.
- Prime Contractor
for the Patriot Advanced Capabilities-3 (PAC-3) version of the
Patriot to defend troops and fixed assets against lower-tier threats,
primarily short- and medium-range ballistic missiles.
- Upgrading
the AEGIS combat system and AN/SPY-1 radar for the sea-based Navy
Are Theater defense which has a comparable range to PAC-3.
- Making additional
radar and AEGIS combat system upgrades and modifications for the
Navy Theater Wide system.
- Medium Extended
Air Defense System (MEADS) is being funded and developed by the
three countries involved, Lockheed Martin of the U.S., Alenia
Marconi Systems from Italy, and Daimler Chrysler Aerospace of
Germany.
Raytheon
- Prime Contractor
for the Exoatmospheric Kill Vehicle (EKV), which is the intercept
component of the Ground Based Interceptor, the weapon element
of the NMD system with the mission of locating and destroying
its target using kinetic energy, or hit-to-kill technology.
- Produces
the NMD program's X-band Radar and Upgraded Early Warning Radar.
- Providing
the Radar Sensor for the THAAD system.
- System integrator
for the PAC-3 program.
- Prime Integrator
for the upper-tier sea-based Navy Theater-Wide program developing
the Standard Missile-3, with a Lightweight Exoatmospheric Projectile
to engage attacking missiles.
- Developing
another version of the Standard Missile with existing fire control
systems on AEGIS ships for the lower-tier sea-based Navy Area
Defense.
- Teamed up
with TRW for the Program Definition Risk Reduction phase of the
Space-Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS Low) program.
TRW
- Responsible
for the NMD Battle Management Command, Control and Communications
system.
- Responsible
for Theater Missile Defense family of systems synergy across the
full spectrum of missile defense systems.
- Teamed up
with Raytheon for the Program Definition Risk Reduction phase
of the Space-Based Infrared System Low (SBIRS Low) program.
- Member of
Team ABL (with Boeing and Lockheed Martin), designing and developing
the system's Chemical Oxygen Iodine Laser (COIL) and providing
ground support.
- TRW also
supports BMDO's Joint National Test Facility.
Table
I:
Soft
Money Donations, PAC Contributions and Lobbying Expenditures from
the Top Missile Defense Contractors
|
Company
|
%
R
|
%
D
|
1997-98
|
1999-2000
|
Total
Soft Money Donations
|
|
Boeing
|
57%
|
43%
|
$529,000
|
$400,725
|
$929,725
|
|
Lockheed Martin
|
64%
|
36%
|
$253,000
|
$251,000
|
$504,000
|
|
Raytheon
|
57%
|
43%
|
$176,200
|
$191,125
|
$367,325
|
|
TRW
|
100%
|
0%
|
$195,250
|
$116,025
|
$311,275
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total $2,112,325
|
|
Company
|
% R
|
% D
|
1997-98
|
1999-2000
|
Total PAC Contributions
|
|
Boeing
|
63%
|
37%
|
$660,175
|
$333,750
|
$993,925
|
|
Lockheed Martin
|
66%
|
34%
|
$1,043,745
|
$625,694
|
$1,669,439
|
|
Raytheon
|
64%
|
36%
|
$448,858
|
$219,900
|
$668,758
|
|
TRW
|
69%
|
31%
|
$236,008
|
$142,229
|
$378,237
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Total $3,710,359
|
|
Company
|
1997
|
1998
|
Lobbying Expenditures*
|
|
Boeing
|
$10,020,000
|
$8,440,000
|
$18,460,000
|
|
Lockheed Martin
|
$3,600,000
|
$6,600,880
|
$10,200,880
|
|
Raytheon
|
$1,640,000
|
$1,660,000
|
$3,300,000
|
|
TRW
|
$1,360,000
|
$1,400,000
|
$2,760,000
|
|
|
|
|
Total $34,720,880
|
Notes:
*1999 Lobbying
expenditures not available at this time.
%R - percent
given to Republican candidates
%D - percent
given to Democrat candidates
All data compiled
from the Center for Responsive Politics as of May 1, 2000.
Use the following
links for a complete analysis of defense campaign contributions
and congressional voting records on the issue of missile defense
(Senate
or Representatives).
Missile
Defense Fraud: The Other Enduring Legacy
Despite the
scaled-down size and goal of the newest incarnation of Reagan's
Star Wars shield, the proposed National Missile Defense system has
many similarities to its predecessor. Not only is it an enormous
waste of taxpayer money, but it has been plagued with cost overruns,
technical glitches, and now, what looks to be outright fraud on
the part of one contractor. Recent news reports indicate that TRW,
a subcontractor for NMD, faked tests and evaluations of key components
that were to be used in the development of the NMD system.
The story, which
ran in the March 7th edition of the New York Times, reveals
that TRW, one of the Pentagon's top 10 military contractors, did
not accurately disclose test results. The whistle-blower, former
TRW senior engineer Dr. Nira Schwartz, served on TRW's anti-missile
team in 1995 and 1996 and contends that in test after test the interceptors
being developed failed but TRW insisted that the technology performed
adequately. The New York Times reported that upon repeated
appeals to her boss and colleagues to alert industrial partners
and the military to her findings they told her "not to worry" -
days later she was fired.
The discrepancies
in the test results revolve around the interceptor being developed
for the NMD system. While presently Raytheon is the contractor designing
the interceptor, TRW still has a supporting role in the project.
Equally important, Boeing, which was the designer of the TRW interceptor
and a partner with TRW in carrying out the project, has now been
elevated to the status of Lead Systems Integrator for National Missile
Defense, which means that it will take responsibility for running
the NMD test program AND supervising major subcontractors. Hopefully
Boeing will do a better job in this phase of its NMD work than it
did while it was working with TRW on its now discredited interceptor
program.
In using computer
programs to certify to the government that TRW's interceptors would
pick out enemy warheads - rather than decoys - 95% of the time,
Schwartz found that the interceptors could do so only 5 to 15% of
the time. The New York Times points out that Dr. Schwartz
"concluded that all the current discrimination technologies were
too feeble to work and that at some level the Pentagon and its contractors
were in collusion." To further back up her allegations another former
TRW employee stepped forward. Retired senior engineer Roy Danchick
agreed with Schwartz, admitting that TRW manipulated the test data
so it appeared more successful than it actually was.
Schwartz abruptly
stated what missile defense really boils down to: "It's not a defense
of the United States...It's a conspiracy to allow them to milk the
government. They are creating for themselves a job for life."
Some time after
Schwartz’s charges were made public, weapons scientist Theodore
Postol of MIT conducted an independent review of the data generated
by TRW’s tests of its system for discriminating decoys from warheads.
Postol found that not only were the test results inflated, but that
the real meaning of the data was that the decoys and the warheads
were basically indistinguishable, and that therefore discriminating
one from the other using any existing technology would be
impossible. When Postol sent his findings in a letter to White House
official John Podesta, the Pentagon responded by classifying Postol’s
letter on the grounds that it contained secret information. In turn,
Postol has accused the Defense Department of improperly using the
classification system to cover up waste, fraud, and abuse in the
missile defense program.
Nira Schwartz’s
description of the rationale for test-rigging by TRW is eerily similar
to an earlier case of deception in the Reagan Star Wars program
that was uncovered by Tim Weiner of the New York Times in
a 1993 article. Weiner’s piece revealed results of an allegedly
successful June 1984 intercept test of Lockheed’s Homing Overlay
Experiment (HOE) had in fact been manipulated. Nine years late the
truth came out:
"We rigged
the test," the scientist said. "We put a beacon with a certain
frequency on the target vehicle. On the interceptor, we had
a receiver." In effect, the scientist said, the target was talking
to the missile, saying, "Here I am, come get me."
"The hit
looked beautiful, so Congress didn't ask questions."
Weiner goes
on to note that when the scientist was asked why they rigged the
test, he cited economic motivations, not national security concerns:
"We would lose hundreds of millions of dollars if we didn't perform
it successfully. It would be a catastrophe."
Given the extremely
critical findings of the recently released Coyle Report from the
DoD's Office of Testing & Evaluation and the November 1999 Welch
report chaired by former Reagan administration Secretary of the
Air Force Larry Welch, the great technological strides claimed by
ardent supporters of the NMD system like Sen. Thad Cochran (R-MS)
and Rep. Curt Weldon (R-PA) have to be taken with a grain of salt.
The Coyle report
states the successful intercept test in October "was an important
test in ballistic missile defense and demonstrated new technology,"
but "it had significant limitations to operational realism." The
report also concludes that the Pentagon's Deployment Readiness Review
-- which is supposed to serve as the basis of a fall 2000 decision
by President Clinton on whether to move towards deploying an NMD
system -- will be limited because it will be "based on a few flight
tests with immature elements."
A lot is riding
on the next intercept test scheduled, how do we know it won't be
rigged or to put it more politely, conducted in a "highly scripted"
fashion designed to maximize the chances of success?
Where
do we go from here?
The complex
web of contractors, conservative think tanks, and pro-NMD members
of Congress that make up the missile defense lobby have managed
to put missile defense at the top of the nation's political agenda.
In fact, the connections between the various factions have become
so minuscule that it becomes difficult to answer "Who controls whom?"
The same technical
failures, cost overruns, and negative impacts on arms control that
brought Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative to a halt in the early
1980s are present today in Clinton's proposed National Missile Defense
system. The President's decision on NMD will have tremendous consequences
for the future of arms control. If the U.S. and Russia are not able
to come to an agreement on an amendment to the ABM Treaty that will
permit the deployment of a limited NMD system, there is a real danger
that the Clinton administration or its successor could proceed with
deployment in violation of the ABM Treaty. George W. Bush’s recent
pledge to unilaterally deploy a multi-tiered missile defense system
whether or not it undermines existing arms control arrangements
would be even more costly and destabilizing than the Clinton/Gore
plan.
Furthermore,
U.S. pronouncements about deploying NMD have sparked bitter denunciations
by officials in Beijing and Moscow, as well as condemnation from
delegates representing France, Great Britain, South Africa, and
others. In total, "the whole world is asking the United States not
to build NMD, but no one in Washington is listening," says Daniel
Plesch, Director of the British American Security Information Council.
In fact, Congress seems impervious to the mounting criticism within
and outside of the U.S. As Stephen Schwartz of the Bulletin of Atomic
Scientists points out, the U.S. is willing to "forsake deep reductions
in the Russian and American arsenals in favor of deploying a limited
missile defense against a threat that doesn’t yet exist."
As for the North
Korea threat - the supposed impetus behind NMD - it is the U.S.
that is backtracking on negotiations under the nuclear framework
agreement, an accord which could result in a cap on North Korea's
nuclear weapons and ballistic missile programs. Congress and the
Clinton administration have been withholding economic assistance
to North Korea that has been mandated under the U.S.-North Korean
agreement. In the context of consistent, good faith negotiating
by the U.S., the North Korean missile threat could be eliminated
for an investment that would be a tiny fraction of the price tag
for deploying an NMD system.
As a high-ranking
U.S. intelligence official acknowledged in an interview with Bob
Drogin and Tyler Marshall that ran in the Los Angeles Times
on May 19th, neither North Korea nor Iran has made significant
advances in their missile programs over the past year or so, and
in point of fact North Korea’s program has been frozen since October
1998. The official further noted that the whole concept of the "rogue
state" creates a predisposition towards deploying an NMD system
against such a nation, whether or not it is justified by the facts
of the situation.
The lack of
a credible threat, workable technology, or an affordable plan for
National Missile Defense sort of makes you wonder what the big rush
to judgement on deploying an NMD system is all about. Neither Al
Gore nor George W. Bush has provided persuasive evidence to suggest
that they are doing anything other than playing politics with the
missile defense issue at this point, with potentially grave consequences
for U.S. and international security.
Note on sources:
This report has drawn on a wide variety of interviews, government
and industry documents, articles in major newspapers and the defense
trade press, and analyses conducted by other think tanks. For specific
cites on any of the facts or quotes cited above, contact the authors.
A resource list with links to the major resources used in the production
of this report is provided below, in Appendix B.
APPENDIX
A:
STATISTICAL
TABLES
Table
A:
Defense
Companies Receiving the Largest Dollar Amounts of
Pentagon
Missile Defense Contracts 1998-99
|
Company
|
% of total
1998 1999*
|
Total of Contracts
|
|
Boeing Co.
|
18.01%
|
28.95%
|
$812,538,000
|
|
Lockheed Martin Corp.
|
21.59%
|
10.80%
|
$617,275,000
|
|
TRW, Inc.
|
12.91%
|
11.79%
|
$448,660,000
|
|
Raytheon Co.
|
9.54%
|
9.57%
|
$344,301,000
|
|
Teledyne, Inc.
|
3.20%
|
3.33%
|
$117,161,000
|
|
Thermo Electron Corp.
|
2.50%
|
3.41%
|
$103,767,000
|
|
Nichols Research Corp.
|
2.74%
|
3.01%
|
$102,730,000
|
|
Science Applications Intl
Corp.
|
2.82%
|
1.83%
|
$84,651,000
|
|
Mevatec Corp.
|
1.88%
|
2.38%
|
$75,226,000
|
|
Colsa Corp.
|
1.62%
|
2.06%
|
$64,943,000
|
|
Dynetics Inc.
|
1.21%
|
1.74%
|
$51,437,000
|
|
Computer Sciences Corp.
|
-
|
3.30%
|
$49,335,000
|
|
$2,872,024,000
|
Source note:
Contract data is taken from CD-ROMs of Deparment of Defense contract
awards of $25,000 or more produced by Eagle Eye Services of Fairfax,
Virginia.
Explanation
of headings:
% of total: Represents percent of total missile defense contracts
awarded to each firm in the year in question (e.g., Boeing receiving
28.95% of all missile defense contracts awarded by the Pentagon in
the first three quarters of FY 1999).
Total of contracts: Total missile defense contracts for FY1998-99.
*only first 3 quarters of 1999
Table
B:
Top
Senate Recipients of Defense Industry
PAC
Campaign Contributions 1995-99
|
Recipient
|
Position/Committee
|
Amount Received
|
|
John Warner (R-VA)
|
Chairman, Armed Services
|
$380,225
|
|
Ted Stevens (R-AK)
|
Chairman, Appropriations; Chairman, Defense
Subcom.
|
$255,650
|
|
Richard Shelby (R-AL)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$229,383
|
|
Christopher Bond (R-MO)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$186,700
|
|
Pete Domenici (R-NM)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$153,774
|
|
James Inhofe (R-OK)
|
Member, Armed Services
|
$128,000
|
|
Strom Thurmond (R-SC)
|
Member, Armed Services
|
$127,500
|
|
Robert Torricelli (D-NJ)
|
Member, Governmental Affairs
|
$111,250
|
|
Arlen Specter (R-PA)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$109,975
|
|
Mitch McConnell (R-KY)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$103,754
|
|
Robert Smith (R-NH)
|
Chairman, Strategic Forces Subcom., Armed
Services
|
$100,790
|
|
Jeff Sessions (R-AL)
|
Member, Strategic Forces and Emerging Threats
& Capabilities Subcom., Armed Services
|
$99,958
|
|
Rick Santorum (R-PA)
|
Chairman, Airland Forces, Armed Services
|
$99,788
|
|
Jack Reed (D-RI)
|
Member, Airland Forces and Seapower Subcom.,
Armed Services
|
$93,265
|
|
John Kerry (D-MA)
|
Member, Select Intelligence
|
$88,900
|
| |
Total
|
$2,268,912 |
Table
C:
Top
House Recipients of Defense Industry
PAC
Campaign Contributions 1995-99
|
Recipient
|
Position/Committee
|
Amount Received
|
|
John Murtha (D-PA)
|
Ranking Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$366,050
|
|
Duncan Hunter (R-CA)
|
Chairman, Military Procurement Subcom., Armed
Services
|
$342,614
|
|
Randy "Duke " Cunningham (R-CA)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$284,690
|
|
Jerry Lewis (R-CA)
|
Chairman, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$260,050
|
|
Thomas Davis III (R-VA)
|
Member, Government Reform
|
$252,194
|
|
Floyd Spence (R-SC)
|
Chairman, Armed Services
|
$247,300
|
|
C. W. Bill Young (R-FL)
|
Chairman, Appropriations; Member, Defense
Subcom.
|
$221,275
|
|
Norm Dicks (D-WA)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$214,100
|
|
Ike Skelton (D-MO)
|
Ranking Member, Armed Services; Member, Military
Procurement Subcom.
|
$197,810
|
|
Curt Weldon (R-PA)
|
Chairman, Military Research & Development
Subcom.; Member, Armed Services
|
$184,050
|
|
Henry Bonilla (R-TX)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$171,454
|
|
Chet Edwards (D-TX)
|
Member, Appropriations
|
$164,749
|
|
Herbert Bateman (R-VA)
|
Chairman, Military Readiness Subcom., Armed
Services
|
$160,600
|
|
James Moran Jr. (D-VA)
|
Member, Defense Subcom., Appropriations
|
$148,250
|
|
Tom Delay (R-TX)
|
Majority Whip; Member, Appropriations
|
$144,975
|
|
|
Total $3,360,161
|
Appendix
B:
Missile
Defense Resource List
Non-Governmental
Organizations
- World
Policy Institute - www.worldpolicy.org/projects/arms
- Star Wars Revisited, by William Hartung and Michelle
Ciarrocca, April 2000.
- Union
of Concerned Scientists - www.ucusa.org/arms/index.html
- Countermeasures: A Technical Evaluation of the Operational
Effectiveness of the Planned US National Missile Defense System,
by UCS and the Security Studies Program at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology, April 2000.
- Coalition
to Reduce Nuclear Dangers and Council for a Livable World
- www.clw.org/coalition
- Pushing the Limits: The Decision on National Missile Defense,
by Stephen W. Young, April 2000.
- Federation
of American Scientists - www.fas.org/starwars/index.html
- John Pike of FAS provides up to date news coverage, as well
as useful links on missile defense.
- Center
for Defense Information - www.cdi.org
- "Star Wars: New Hope or Phantom Menace?"video released March
30, 2000.
- Global
Network Against Nuclear Power and Weapons in Space -
www.globenet.fee-online.co.uk/ - Worldwide protests against
Star Wars tests are planned for June 24 to July 4.
- Don't
Blow It -
|