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REPORTS - Weapons at War

Deadly Legacy Update:
U.S. Arms and Training Programs in Africa

A Special Issue Brief
By William D. Hartung and Dena Montague
March 22, 2001

The Clinton Legacy: Uplifting Rhetoric, Grim Realities

President Clinton and his foreign policy team prided themselves on drawing more attention to Africa than any other U.S. administration. In the spring of 1998, Clinton made an historic twelve-day trip to Africa during which he spoke of the potential for an "African Renaissance" sparked by a "new generation of African leaders" in nations such as Uganda, Rwanda, and Eritrea. In 1999, the administration obtained passage of the African Growth and Opportunity Act, with the stated goal of creating solid economic partnerships with African countries to integrate them into the global economy and help facilitate the African Renaissance. In January 2000, UN Ambassador Richard Holbrooke helped to spearhead the month on Africa at the United Nations Security Council, which focused much needed attention on long-neglected African conflicts.1

Looking past President Clinton’s upbeat statements to the realities of U.S. actions on the continent, it is clear that U.S. security policies toward Africa during his tenure continued to do more harm than good, through a combination of sins of omission and sins of commission. The Clinton administration was in power through the genocide in Rwanda, the chaotic transition of power from Mobutu to Laurent Kabila in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire), and throughout virtually all of Laurent Kabila’s controversial rule, which ended in January 2001 when he was assassinated by one of his security guards. Laurent Kabila was succeeded in office by his son, Joseph Kabila, who had been in charge of the DRC’s armed forces during his father’s rule. Although it failed to act against mass slaughter in Rwanda and human rights abuses in the Congo, the Clinton administration decided to openly support the undemocratic regimes of Paul Kagame in Rwanda and Yoweri Museveni in Uganda, holding them up as a model of the kind of new leadership that they believed was needed to solve Africa’s problems of debt, poverty, and conflict.

Unfortunately, President Clinton’s pro-democracy, pro-growth rhetoric concealed a policy that relied heavily on the same old policy instruments that had served as the linchpin of U.S./Africa policy during the Cold War – the provision of U.S. arms and training to favored allies. Despite evidence from the State Department’s country reports on human rights that the armed forces of Rwanda and Uganda continue to commit serious human rights abuses, in their own countries and within the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the United States has continued to provide millions of dollars worth of arms and training to these regimes. The Clinton administration attempted to make up for its shameful efforts to stop humanitarian intervention into Rwanda during the genocide by sending a hefty shipment of arms and military training to Paul Kagame’s government after the genocide. The U.S. sent $75 million in emergency military assistance to Rwanda in 1994, after Kagame drove the government that had perpetrated the Rwandan genocide from power; but when it could have supported efforts to stop the killing, the Clinton administration was instead actively lobbying to withdraw UN forces from the country.

Under Clinton’s watch approximately three million people in Rwanda and the eastern region of the DRC died, even as U.S. corporations were participating in questionable mining deals in the region. While many actors bear responsibility for allowing the Rwandan genocide to proceed unopposed -- and for allowing the war in the DRC to drag on -- the United States has a special obligation to take constructive action, both because of its role as the world’s "sole superpower" and because of the role of past U.S. arms shipments to Africa in fueling current conflicts in Angola and the DRC. During the Cold War, the United States shipped $1.5 billion in armaments to African military forces, including $400 million in arms and training to the Mobutu regime in Zaire (now the DRC) and over $250 million to Jonas Savimbi’s UNITA forces in Angola. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, U.S. arms transfers to Africa have continued, albeit at a slower pace. From 1989 to 1998, the United States provided over $227 million in weapons and training to African military forces, of which over $111 million went to governments that have been directly or indirectly involved in the war in the DRC: Angola, Burundi, Chad, DRC, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.2 These figures do not include the $75 million in emergency aid to Rwanda that was provided in 1994.

The United States has repeatedly declared its commitment to promoting peace in the Great Lakes region, and has supported every United Nations Resolution directed toward that goal. Yet the flow of U.S. arms and military training to countries involved in the DRC war has not ceased. Despite their failure to withdraw their armies from the DRC, Rwanda, Uganda, Namibia and Zimbabwe all continued to receive arms and/or military training from the U.S. as of 1999/2000, the most recent year for which full statistics are available. Of the $19.5 million in U.S. arms and training that was delivered to African armed forces in FY 1999, $4.8 million went to nations directly or indirectly involved in the war in the DRC, with about one-third of that total, $1.6 million, going to Uganda.3

While arms transfers have declined markedly in the last few years, U.S. military training programs in the region have maintained a brisk pace. An analysis by the Africa Demilitarization project at the Center for International Policy estimates that during FY 2000, the following countries involved in the war in the DRC or other African conflicts received substantial U.S. training: Chad ($2.9 million), Zimbabwe ($1.4 million), Rwanda ($.13 million), Namibia ($.5 million), Uganda ($.1 million), and Ethiopia and Eritrea (roughly $100,000 each).4 Meanwhile, participation by African nations in the Pentagon’s Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) program dropped significantly in FY 1999, the most recent year for which full statistics are available. JCET programs in Africa during 1999 were conducted in Chad (35 personnel trained), Namibia (39 students trained), Djibouti, Mali, and Malawi.5 And the African Center for Strategic Studies, a U.S.-initiated school that allegedly trains foreign military personnel in management issues, has hosted soldiers from Angola, Chad, the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Liberia, Namibia, Rwanda, Sudan, Uganda, and Zimbabwe in recent years (see tables at the end for additional details).

Although these figures on U.S. arms and training programs in Africa are fairly modest compared to the scale of U.S. arms sales worldwide, which exceeded $16 billion in 1999, they are symbolically and substantively important because they reflect a tacit endorsement by the United States of the activities of several of the key nations involved in the war in the DRC.

Economic Interests: The Missing Link

Economic interests are a significant factor in the fighting in the DRC. Much has been made of the economic exploitation of the DRC by direct parties to the conflict, including Zimbabwe, Namibia, UNITA, Angola, the CLF (Congolese Liberation Front, formerly Movement for the Liberation of Congo, MLC) and RCD (Congolese Rally for Democracy) Goma and RCD Kisangani to help fuel their war effort. But little attention has been given to Western corporations that are continuing to exploit the DRC for its mineral wealth, even in the midst of a multi-sided civil war.

Africans need Western technology, investment and cooperation to transfer minerals. Africans do not process these minerals; they are processed in the West. Africans are not dependant upon minerals used in high-tech industry, sophisticated defense projects, or materials used in space exploration. The West, and particularly the United States, is dependent upon the availability of strategic minerals, many of which the U.S. does not produce. Africa does not have a vibrant market for diamonds, which are cut and distributed in the West. Uganda has been the target of criticism and suspicion for exporting diamonds although it is not a diamond-producing nation, and even these exports could not occur without the assistance or acquiescence of Western corporations.

A recent report by Karl Vick of the Washington Post on the increasing exports of "Col-Tan" – colombium-tantalum – from Eastern Congo provides an excellent case study of the role of strategic minerals in sustaining the war in DRC.6 Tantalum is a scarce strategic mineral that is utilized in everything from aircraft engines to computer chips. Tantulum exports from Eastern Congo via Rwanda skyrocketed in late 2000. The potential profits to all parties to the dispute that can be gained by exploiting the DRC’s mineral wealth are an issue that will have to be dealt with in any viable peace accord.

Western corporations are aware that revenues from mineral exploitation received by African countries involved in war are used to purchase military equipment. During the latest war in the DRC, corporate collaboration with the rebels has been very quiet. But it has clearly had a significant influence, as evidenced by the severe fighting in mineral rich areas in Katanga province and the brutal fighting between RCD factions in Kisangani. Considering the history of a strong U.S. corporate presence in the DRC, it is quite likely that U.S. mining interests have benefited from the war.

The potential economic windfall from controlling key mining areas makes the possibility of implementing a durable cease-fire much more difficult. The U.S. has encouraged mineral investment in the unstable, fractured, and undemocratic country. The State Department claims that "the DRC is also a potential partner for increasing U.S. investment in minerals,"7 and suggests that these investments are in the U.S. national interest. The U.S. has done little to encourage human investment. During Kabila’s march across Zaire there was a distinct correlation between mining interests and support for Kabila’s military.

U.S. corporations were very active in vying for new mineral deals with Laurent Kabila, even while he was still a rebel leader. As U.S. corporations were lining up to cut deals with Kabila, The Wall Street Journal was able to gather information about the war from, "an American pilot flying for the rebels."8 Mawampanga Mwana, a U.S. trained rebel high commissioner of finance, was a key liaison for negotiating deals with U.S. mining companies.9 Bechtel Corporation worked closely with Kabila to draw up "the most complete mineralogical and geographical data of the former Zaire ever assembled, information worth a fortune to any prospective mining or oil firm." The relationship between Bechtel and Kabila’s rebels went beyond business. Robert Stewart, an executive from Bechtel became a close advisor to Kabila travelling the country at his side "to help him deal with ethnic uprisings."10 There were strong suspicions that Bechtel’s information assisted Kabila in determining his war strategy.

In a classic case of cronyism the first mining deal made with Laurent Kabila was made with American Mineral Fields. At the time, the head of AMF was Mike McMurrough, a native of Bill Clinton’s home town of Hope, Arkansas. AMF secured a $1 billion deal for the mining of cobalt and copper. It was reported that AMF had been in negotiations with Kabila well before many people throughout the DRC were aware of Kabila’s visions or political philosophy.11

The minerals in the DRC are considered to be among the purest in the world, while also considered to be "under-explored" in the eyes of many experts. Both conditions add to the attractiveness of the Congo to mining interests. Because of the quality and quantity of the DRC’s mineral resources, many corporations are willing to endure the instability of the country in the hopes of reaping massive profits in the future. Unlike many other African countries where large, established firms control natural resource extraction, the DRC is somewhat of a frontier that is "wide open for business…as vast mineral resources are beckoning foreign companies, prompting a scramble that recalls the grab for wealth 120 years ago."12

In January 2001 the rebel Congolese Rally for Democracy issued a statement that said it was selling mining ‘monopolies’ in areas it controls.13 It has also been reported that the area controlled by Jean Pierre Bemba "has become a separate economy" in which "Foreign entrepreneurs are involved in developing businesses for a market of some seven million people."14

Bush Policy and Prospects for Peace in the DRC

Currently, the situation in the DRC lingers in an uneasy peace. The UN Mission in the DRC reported cease-fire violations in Equateur province on March 13, 2001. Fighting between CLF (a new faction composed of the MLC and a breakaway faction of RCD Kisangani) and the Congolese army also continues. Although Rwanda and Uganda have made efforts to withdraw troops from the DRC, Joseph Kabila continues to ask Western countries to apply pressure on Rwanda and Uganda to completely withdraw troops from the DRC. On March 14, 2001 Joseph Kabila met with Robin Cook and Tony Blair to ask for help in removing "the forces of Rwanda and Uganda, which are in the Congo illegally."15 United Nations representatives have expressed hope that under Joseph Kabila’s leadership, the DRC government may be ready to engage constructively in the peace process, and the Security Council passed a resolution in March calling for withdrawal of all foreign forces and a ceasefire among internal combatants as a condition for inserting a 3,000-strong UN monitoring force into the DRC.

Although the situation in the DRC remains tense, this is the first time since the war began that belligerent countries have actively withdrawn their troops. Observers of the DRC war remain hopeful the cease-fire is on the road to full implementation.

From the Bush administration we may expect many of the same tactics pursued by the Clinton administration, albeit cloaked in slightly different rhetoric. Although Bush stated during the campaign that Africa was not a major area of national security interest to the United States, his key advisors have suggested otherwise.

Secretary of State Colin Powell has stated an interest in Africa. Diplomats from the Africa Bureau were the first group from a regional bureau to meet with Powell when he took office, and he has expressed concern in recent months about the AIDS crisis in Africa and the need to resolve the longstanding war in the Sudan. Powell has also shown a strong interest in countries such as Angola and Nigeria, which are major oil exporters in the region. Powell’s views are worth watching, but a more detailed assessment of what we may expect from the Bush Administration in terms of Africa may come from predicting the goals of Walter Kansteiner III, Powell’s recent appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs. Kansteiner is yet another member of the new administration recycled from the first Bush administration. Mr. Kansteiner held a position at Department of Defense working on a strategic minerals task force and was formerly Executive Vice President of a commodity trading and manufacturing company that mainly worked with developing countries. Therefore it is expected that Mr. Kansteiner will most likely follow an economically driven policy rather than one centered on humanitarian concerns.

Kansteiner’s background fits well with an administration heavily influenced by corporate ties to mineral resources. Historically these connections have driven U.S. policy in Africa and particularly in the DRC. The collaboration of corporate interests and arms and training to African countries have had devastating effects.

In several essays published during the 1990s, Kansteiner expressed his opinion regarding the Clinton administration's policy in the Great Lakes region. Kansteiner agreed with what he perceived as Clinton’s neglect of the unfolding disaster, "any U.S. attempt to become militarily involved would have been a very unfortunate mistake."16 But the U.S. already had quite an extensive legacy of military involvement in the region. Although he freely admits the U.S. has political and economic interests in central Africa and claims "Zaire is the key country in the region," he states "our involvement needs to be on the quiet diplomatic and political level."17 Unfortunately this line of thinking follows the myth that the U.S. has historically been disengaged in the former Zaire and the current DRC. The U.S. has been disengaged on humanitarian issues but not military and economic issues.

Kansteiner’s wholehearted belief in market-oriented economic reforms opening the way for American trade and investment seems to ignore evidence that focusing on the extraction of mineral resources fosters government corruption rather than economic development. A narrow focus on resource extraction typically leaves the populace in abject poverty, more prone to take up arms and fight in ‘diamond wars’, and ‘oil wars’ which may offer a miniscule amount of wealth, but still offer more opportunity than their own government provides. Kansteiner believes "economies are more apt to prosper with private sector management,"18 resulting in benefits for all Africans. He does not address the importance of creating a strong civil society before encouraging private investment. He has difficulty understanding why free market policies alone may not foster democratic change, and may even serve as an impediment to democracy in some cases. On the one hand he has criticized Clinton for supporting the Ugandan government because of "Museveni’s excellent economic policies."19 On the other he has asserted that "market-oriented systems [will] integrate the continent into the world economy."20 This approach will lessen government control, allowing African economies to flourish, in Kansteiner’s view.

When Joseph Kabila visited the U.S. after the death of his father earlier this year, he met with the Corporate Council on Africa, and was introduced by Maurice Tempelsman. Kabila, "promised to make the country safe for investors and reassured the Chevron Oil Company that under his leadership there would be stability."21 Chevron has at least a $75 million investment in the Congo.22 Chevron’s connection with Condoleeza Rice has been well publicized. The National Security Advisor sat on the board of Chevron Corporation and was such an asset to the corporation, Chevron named an oil tanker after her.

The DRC has made significant moves to liberalize the oil and diamond sector. A commission has been set up specifically to deal with liberalization, and Joseph Kabila is committed to drawing up a new mining code. Such developments fit well with the economic theories of the Bush administration, but this approach does nothing for the humanitarian situation in the DRC, nor does it contribute toward building a solid infrastructure, integrating the country, or encouraging the development of democratic institutions. In fact, an exclusive focus on the mining sector could undermine the possibility of such developments.

Despite Colin Powell's acknowledged interest in Africa and expressed concern about the development of major oil producing countries such as Angola and Nigeria, beyond short meetings with Kagame and Joseph Kabila, he has not been outspoken about the peace process in the DRC.

Given their military, security, and corporate backgrounds, Colin Powell, Condoleeza Rice, and Walter Kansteiner appear to lack the humanitarian experience and a humanitarian perspective that are essential elements for crafting a constructive policy towards the DRC. Conservative Republicans have been notoriously skeptical of humanitarian aid and any apologies or reparations for destructive U.S. policies before, during and after the Cold War. That said, there is little hope of this administration dedicating significant funds to building an infrastructure that focuses on human need, not the mining industry, or canceling debt accrued under the leadership of Cold War puppets like Mobutu Sese Seko.

The Path to Peace: Recommendations

The 5,000-plus UN troops pledged to MONUC, the United Nations monitoring group in the Congo, will do little to end the war. If they truly want to see an end to the fighting, Colin Powell and the Bush administration should lobby for a substantially increased UN presence. Currently the UN has authorized a force of 13,000 to Sierra Leone, a far smaller country geographically and in terms of population. The difficulties the UN has faced in this tiny country have been well publicized. Considering the size and complexity of the DRC conflict, a UN authorized force less than half the size of the Sierra Leonian mission is pathetically small. Also, as we have seen in Sierra Lone, Angola and other African countries, once mineral resources are at stake it becomes much more difficult to put an end to the fighting. As recent UN reports have shown, the linkages between arms and mining are quite extensive and the players are particularly savvy. Millions of dollars are at stake. Not only should the UN increase peacekeeping presence, but the Security Council should be prepared to impose an embargo on corporations, individuals, and nations that seek to plunder the DRC’s mineral resources in ways that fuel the civil war.

An arms embargo should be implemented against all remaining parties in the DRC. There is absolutely no reason to continue arming a region that has seen millions of civilians die in less than ten years.

Finally, there must be a substantial effort, particularly from Western countries that have investments in the DRC, to earmark a significant amount of funds for peacekeeping, disarmament and the establishment of a democratic and civil society in the DRC. Recent research from the World Bank has suggested that countries that rely heavily on primary commodity exports, have low educational levels, and limited economic opportunities for youth are most likely to suffer from protracted civil conflicts. If they want to change the conditions that breed conflict in Africa and elsewhere in the post-Cold War world, the United States and the major donor nations need to re-think their policy of "free market fundamentalism" towards developing countries. A new approach must be developed which de-emphasizes austerity and "structural adjustment" in favor of direct public investments in education and productive, employment generating activities. This is a big agenda, but the alternative – more years of war, with millions more lives at risk – is simply unacceptable. Because of the role of the United States in fostering instability in the DRC due to its decades-long support of the Mobutu regime, it has a special responsibility to take the lead in a new policy of investing in peace, not fueling conflict, in the DRC.

U.S. Foreign Military Training to Africa*

IMET Training

JCET Training

Africa Center For Strategic Studies (DoD)

* Countries selected have been directly or indirectly involved in the DRC conflict and/or recent or current war.

Sources: Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1999; Foreign Military Training and DoD Engagement Activities of Interest In Fiscal years 1999 and 2000, Volume I – U.S. Department of Defense and U.S. Department of State, Joint Report to Congress, March 1, 2000; Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, Annual Report under section 2011 of Title 10, United States Code, transmitted to Congress on April 3, 2000.

Footnotes:

1 For a critical analysis of Clinton’s Africa policy, see William Minter, "The United States and Africa: Starting Points for a New Policy Framework," in Martha Honey and Tom Barry, editors, Global Focus: U.S. Foreign Policy at the Turn of the Millennium (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), pp. 255 through 281.

2 On these points see William D. Hartung and Bridget Moix, Deadly Legacy: U.S. Arms to Africa and the Congo War, New York, World Policy Institute, January 2000, pp. 8-10.

3 Figures include deliveries under the Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Commercial Sales, and International Military Education and Training (IMET) programs for FY 1999, from U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales, and Foreign Military Assistance Facts as of September 30, 1999 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, 2000). The figures do not include other U.S. military training programs such as the Pentagon’s Joint Combined Exchange Training program (JCET).

4 "U.S. Foreign Military Training to Africa, Fiscal Year 2000," available at www.ciponline.org/africa/demilitarization/fmt_fy2000.htm.

5 Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations/Low-Intensity Conflict, annual report under section 2011 of Title 10, United States Code, transmitted to Congress on April 3, 2000. Thanks to Adam Isaacson of the Center for International Policy for providing a copy of this report.

6 Karl Vick, "Vital Ore Funds Congo’s War: Combatants Profit from Col-Tan Trade," Washington Post, March 19, 2001, Page A01.

7 U.S. State Department Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations FY 2000 p.96

8 Block, Robert "Zaire’s Rebels Are Set To Win, but Can They Govern?", Wall Street Journal Monday, May 5, 1997.

9 Block, Robert "As Zaire’s War Wages, Foreign Businesses Scramble for Inroads", Wall Street Journal Monday, April 14, 1997.

10 Block, Robert "U.S. Firm Seek Deal in Central Africa" Wall Street Journal October 14, 1997.

11 Misser, Francois "Zaire: Kabila’s Desirable Deals"African Business June 1997.

Block, Robert "As Zaire’s War Wages, Foreign Businesses Scramble for Inroads" Wall Street Journal Monday April 14, 1997.

12 ibid

13 "Deadly Reasons for New Congo Borders" Houston Chronicle February 8, 2001.

14 Misser, Francois "While Kabila flounders, rebel thrives" African Business October, 2000.

15 UN Integrated Regional Information Network (Nairobi) "Kabila Calls for UK Pressure on Rwanda, Uganda" March 14, 2001.

16 Kansteiner, Walter "Zaire" Issue Briefs: The Forum For International Policy April, 1997.

17 ibid

18 Kansteiner, Walter "President Clinton’s African Experience" Issue Briefs: The Forum For International Policy May 6, 1998.

19 Kasteiner, Walter "Mr. Clinton Goes to Africa" Issue Briefs: The Forum For International Policy March 16, 1998.

20 Kasteiner, Walter "President Clinton’s African Experience" Issue Briefs: The Forum For International Policy May 6, 1998.

21 "Maneuvering to Control Congo" Post of Zambia February 12, 2001.

22 "Chevron to Boost Investment in Democratic Republic of Congo" PR Newswire January 26, 2000.

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