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The
Political Economics of Secession : BARCELONA REPORT: PANEL TWO
Panel Two
Charles Ehrlich, a Senior Member of Wolfson College in Oxford, England, presented findings on the international aspects of secession. Ehrlich underlined the importance of changing global demands on secessionist states, that secessionist movements, if they are to succeed, must know their place in the world and must be able to smoothly and rationally integrate into the global economic and political system. He noted that the Catalan movement is well prepared economically for such a venture should it choose to do so because it is wealthy. The Catalans are also politically mature in that they are pragmatic (Catalans refer to it as seny). Ehrlich stated: "Economically, the region prospers; politically, Catalonia's nationalist politics today trace a fine line." Ehrlich stated that secessionist movements can have profound international repercussions and that the Catalan strategy itself can serve as a model for other secessionist movements. He said that the Catalan nationalist movement, the Democratic Convergence of Catalonia (CDC) led by Jorde Pujol, insists on de facto independence, including an independent football team and representation in international organizations such as the United Nations (UN) and the EU, without threatening the viability of the Spanish constitution. By following this path they have avoided confronting the Spanish Government directly, which might incite a nationalist response from Spain or other minority groups. He noted that the original Catalan political party, the Lliga Regionalista, which appeared in 1901, sought autonomy within the Spanish State. He said that it also recognized the special role Catalonia, as the leader of Spanish industrialization and economic performance, could play in reshaping Spanish politics to the advantage of Catalan development and culture. Although it eventually lost out to more nationalistic movements over the decades, the Catalan movement never strayed from its sense of seny. The Spanish Constitution of 1978 provided for a strong central state, but allowed for regional autonomy and local self-government. While Madrid controls the distribution of power and resources to the regions, "nations" are able to establish their own systems of power. The policy of the CDC, which has ruled Catalonia since 1980, has been to expand the powers of Catalonia as much as possible within the confines of the Spanish State. Ehrlich also noted that international institutions can play a role in encouraging secessionist or autonomous movements. In the case of Catalonia, the CDC sees the EU as a way of justifying demands for greater sovereignty without seeming extremist. The Assembly of European Regions has provided the Catalans with a venue for the expression of the need for devolution and respect for "nations." Pujol has taken a leading role in the "Europe of Regions," a movement that seeks to redefine the EU by recognizing the continent as an "assemblage of peoples and historic regions which could form the basis of a new Euro-federation." So, nationalism can be cast as something quite different and innocuous, in this case, "functional regionalism." In addition, Pujol has stressed the economic merits of greater "regionalism," avoiding reliance on the cultural role regional autonomy plays. The Catalan movement, according to Ehrlich, has been successful not only because of its pragmatism and patience, but also because Pujol and his colleagues recognize the essential role the post-Cold War global economic and political order plays in the success of any secessionist movement. The CDC understands that an independent Catalonia would not be able to be truly independent from its parent state; economic growth and prosperity depend on close economic relations between Catalonia and Spain and the other states of the EU. The realities of this system leave "little room for petty nationalist sentiments." Ehrlich stated that in the present global order politics and economics are fusing to an unprecedented extent. He noted that the expanding role multinational corporations play in international relations places economic stability and prosperity in the same category as military security - long the primary vehicle for international relations during the Cold War. Thus, the conduct and structure of international relations is changing. He stated: "Where once theories concerned themselves with state vs. state actors, they now involve the examination of underlying and overlying processes, movements, and concerns - the structure of the global system." This transformation of the international system has diluted the power and relevancy of the state as an international actor. As the influence of multinational corporations grows, regions and "nations" can be expected to play a greater role in the future. This system dictates moderation, realism and the need to address political desires for self-determination both in the political and economic spheres. Success lies in understanding that "economic viability" depends on the ability of the secessionist state to take "its place within the global system." Pere Esteve, the Secretary General and Spokesman for Convergencia Democratica de Catalunya (CDC), focused his presentation on two broad issues: Catalonia as an example of a moderate secession and the rise of a "New Political Culture" and the "power of identity." Building on the ideas offered by Charles Ehrlich, Esteve emphasized the importance of the Catalan movement's moderation and integrationist strategy vis-à-vis greater sovereignty. He noted that the policies promoted by the Catalans since the formation of the post-Franco democratic state have been moderate, based on dialogue and mutual understanding. Dialogue and the commitment to democracy make the Catalan case unique. Catalonia's emphasis on economic development makes it "willing to adapt to any transformation which in practical terms means that material progress in Catalonia has gone beyond the original boundaries and surpassed the rigid structure which the political powers placed on its development." Esteve's second point focused on the importance of a New (European) Political Culture, which stresses the cooperation, interdependence, and power of plurality and diversity. The development of the EU is the result of this important change in mentality among European states and peoples. The creation of supranational structures robs the traditional nation-state of some of its political power: he said, "...the assertion of cultural identities and national differences...occurs in the simple fact that the capacity to unite a society based on its cultural identities is far greater than those based on administrative or institutional structures." These "changes in the traditional forms of political action" create a force of decentralization and greater respect for diversity. Esteve remarked that states and their "nations" are stronger for it, as "more dynamic answers" are required by complex societies. He pointed out that the EU has created a common space of prosperity and security where for centuries there was little or no stability. Structures that recognize the importance and contributions of minorities and institutionalize respect for nations and cultures will be the most successful entities in the future. He said "a new reality is being built" and again Catalonia can serve as a model not only for the EU, but also for other states struggling with the issue of identity, ethnic diversity, and state cohesion. Fransesc Cabana, an Associate Professor at the Universitat Internacional de Catalunya, stated that the problems between Spain and Catalonia over the degree and structure of Catalan autonomy have been present, with varying degrees of intensity, throughout much of Spanish history. Spanish governments have used a broad range of responses, but most, according to Cabana, have been "repressive." Cabana focused on three realities of the Catalan issue. First, he talked about the economic and industrial power of Catalonia. He said that his region is a "unique case in the South of Europe." Catalonia is richer and more modern than any region in Spain, even richer than the capital, Madrid, which didn't industrialize until the 20th century. Catalonia's economic might is built upon a diversified industrial base and its role as a center for foreign investment. The fact that Catalan wealth and innovation has been the "driving force" behind economic development in Spain has created a contradiction: the region subsidizes the growth of other Spanish regions, while its per capita income is held down below that of other EU states. Secondly, Cabana spoke of the tension between Barcelona and Madrid. He said that there is a feeling of "discomfort" throughout Spain about Catalonia and its demands for either cultural and political autonomy or sovereignty. While cultural demands [he said that whatever shape Catalan demands take in the future, they must be implemented democratically and "with maximum consent"] create tension with Spain, it is the economic demands that are most worrying. Thirdly, he said that Catalonia would certainly be able to survive and prosper in the global market. He said that those who argue against this base their theory on the flawed notion that the Catalan economy is "captive" to the Spanish economy, i.e. the Catalan economy depends on Spain for its export market. He said that this ignores the reality and opportunities of the EU market. Lastly, he said that the fiscal arrangements between Catalonia and Spain harm Catalonia. He said that while Catalans understand that they need to "show solidarity" towards other regions in Spain, fiscal activities should be more transparent and Catalan leaders should have more input in the fiscal process. Cabana ended his presentation by reiterating the commitment of Catalan leaders to the ideals of democracy and moderation, arguing that Catalan support for the EU is indicative of this. He said that while Catalonia has been flexible in accepting a "gradual return to her political and economic rights," tension will remain at some level because Madrid perceives the Catalans as always asking for more than what they already possess. Xavier Rubert
de Ventos, a Professor at the School of Architecture at the University
of Barcelona, began by reviewing the history of agreement and bargaining
between politicians in both Catalonia and Spain. He spoke of the
"complementary interests" that have developed between both sides
as Spain has lost political, military, and economic sovereignty
over the years and Catalonia has gained some economic and political
sovereignty. But, he stressed that these interests are no longer
sufficient to solve the issue of Catalan sovereignty and Spanish
cohesion because Madrid and Barcelona are "less complementary and
much more competitive." Rubert de Ventos' main point was that the
traditional approach towards Catalan sovereignty, supported by many,
and based on the construction of cultural autonomy, is flawed. He
said now that cultural autonomy has been achieved, the Catalans
must construct a "political approach." He listed several reasons
in support of this argument: Catalonia's size, demographic structure, and level of development make it a "plausible model...for political and social innovation"; Catalonia can experiment more effectively than larger states the Spanish Constitution and the Statute of Autonomy are insufficient to allow the Catalans to "consolidate" their autonomy because the only reason Catalan nationalist politics are paid any attention is because they are the swing votes critical to any governing coalition in Spain's proportional parliamentary system; this is not stable: "a building like this cannot be maintained if it's based on an arithmetic equation that can change tomorrow" According to Rubert de Ventos, "political consolidation" is the natural next step in a process for sovereignty that has already achieved much in the way of cultural concessions and freedoms. The next move should be to establish "political consolidation within the framework of the Spanish state and Europe." He doubts, however, that such an arrangement will be viable and tolerated within the Spanish establishment. Jorde Sole Tura, a member of the Spanish Parliament and of the seven deputies elected to create the new constitution following the end of Franco's rule, presented a brief history of the formation of the current Spanish constitution and offered an argument against independence and "fundamentalism" in Spain. When the new constitution was written in 1978, there was much concern about the issue of Catalan autonomy. Sole Tura said that all political parties agreed that no democracy would be successful in Spain without some degree of self-determination for Catalonia. There was a question of whether Catalonia would be able to create autonomy and democracy by itself, without the help of Spanish democrats and the participation of the Catalan working class who were 90% Spanish. It was an issue of moderating nationalist rhetoric. The constitution of 1978 established a system based on autonomy for various regions. He said that the debates on what form the Spanish state would take and the resulting arrangement were important because the creators of post-Franco Spain could not be sure that democracy would hold; they were seeking "a political system that would prevail." And the system based on regional autonomy with Madrid in charge of revenue dispersal worked. He remarked that what has worked for the last twenty years may not be applicable today. The fast changing global economic and political system with interdependence and an increased sense of economic and physical security may allow for further changes to state bargains. He noted that Spanish and European societies have gone through remarkable changes and that political structures may have to be modified to meet the demands of a fluid international system. Finally Sole Tura stated his opposition to independence for Catalonia. He stated that Catalonia should take the lead in forming a "New Spain" that is less centralist and less "fundamentalistic." Catalonia should make a place for itself inside a new arrangement based on greater pluralism, diversity, and autonomy. Pasqual Maragall, a Presidential Candidate from the Catalan Socialist Party, reiterated Sole Tura's objections to Catalan independence. He stressed the need for continued moderation and pragmatism in the formation of Catalonian policy. He said that trends and ideas formulated within the EU have an effect on national questions. He stated that European unity will not be possible unless two conditions are met: member states forfeit some portion of their traditional sovereignty to the supranational structures of the EU; and secondly, there must be a choice of devolution, the ability of regions or urban areas to take on more responsibility for "all the competences that they can develop better than nation-states can." This is tied to the reality of shrinking regional aid funds from Brussels as the EU expands into Eastern Europe. Maragall insisted that formulation of Catalan demands will have to take that fact into account in the future. This is one reason why Catalonia must continue its cooperation with Spain and "prove that it has been useful, that it has been important and prove that it is willing to go on, but not prepared to accept that the situation will not change." Maragall reinforced his opposition to Catalan secession by stating that the majority of Catalans do not want secession because it does not "suit their conditions." Catalans must continue to maintain cohesion or risk losing out on European regional development aid. Secondly, Maragall stated that outright independence, unless accepted by all in Spain - which is unlikely as Catalonia provides much of the regional development revenue for the Central Government - would create an unstable situation. In addition, the reality of intermarriage and the large population of immigrants from Spain in Catalonia makes the prospect for separation complicated. Therefore, Catalans should push for "virtual independence through contractual reasoning." Ian Bremmer
The
Political Economics of Secession :
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