|
|
|
The
Political Economics of Secession : BARCELONA REPORT: PANEL THREE
Panel Three
To open the discussion on the secessionist conflict between Abkhazia and the former Soviet Republic of Georgia, Ian Bremmer, Senior Fellow at the World Policy Institute and President of the Eurasia Group in New York, listed seven characteristics common to most secessionist conflicts in the former Soviet Union: no overarching structure exists to prevent such conflicts from erupting, to provide stability or guarantees for newly secessionist states; the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed under the direction of the Russian Federation and most of its constituent members acceded under duress ethnic migration - particularly forced and/or by political gerrymandering - plays a significant role in the eruption of such conflicts; artificial borders established by Soviet authorities has exacerbated traditional ethnic tensions the impact of outside actors, primarily Russia, in extending or worsening conflicts; also the role Russia didn't play - not intervening in several critical regions where Russian minorities are concentrated, such as Ukraine/Crimea and northern Kazakhstan, dampening the prospects of other conflicts from occurring the high degree of violence (Ossetia, Karabakh, Abkhazia) the existence of very new, weak, and vulnerable state structures that do not provide the stability and cohesion needed to prevent conflicts relatively little indigenous economic base to provide for a prosperous future an untenable status quo - little or no progress in addressing underlying issues, conflicting goals and concerns exacts a high human cost in the best case scenario and actively intensifies the conflicts in the worst; by contrast, if no change were to occur in Catalonia, Quebec or Scotland, the consequences would be far less dramatic Stephen Jones, Associate Professor of Russian and Eurasia Studies at Mount Holyoke College, presented a historical context for the conflict in Georgia. He stated that reliance on explanations of history and sentiment often obscures the real issues behind the causes and continuation of such conflicts. An examination and understanding of the "real concrete motives" behind such struggles is necessary. Jones said that this is not an easy task in the case of Abkhazia, as "the brutalities of war and fears of Georgian retribution turns everything into a national question." He asserted that because the Abkhaz conflict involves "multiple identities, multiple motives, and multiple interests," one must get beyond the distorting influence of national proclamations and sentiment in order to effectively fashion a resolution. Jones stated, however, that history cannot be discounted as one of the myriad causes. He underlined the sense of "victimization" in the Abkhaz culture, dating back to the 1860's when the Russian Empire annexed the republic and forced many Abkhazians into exile, and the cultural "Georgianization" of Abkhaz culture during the 1930's. History does have a role to play in several ways: it can explain the origin of the sentiment of a community; it is an important tool for both sides to either intimidate the other side or as a rationalization for the expulsion of another community and the claiming of disputed territory; and, in the Abkhaz case, it is useful in highlighting the special role of Caucasian political culture, the tradition of violence, revenge, and retribution, that is a major factor in post-Soviet conflicts in that region. Demographic decline, fear of cultural extinction, concerns about their minority status vis-à-vis the Georgians and concerns about the rise of Georgian nationalism in the late 1980's can explain the "subjective basis" behind Abkhazian hostility to the declaration of Georgian independence in 1991. Jones noted that the issue, if viewed from a historical and ethnic standpoint, may not in fact be about sovereignty (many Abkhaz wanted the republic to be "attached" to the Russian Federation in lieu of independence), but rather about seeking protection from what they see as a Georgian threat. He also said that he did not think that the conflict could be explained simply in terms of ethnic disputes or demographic fears. The conflict is more about the collapse of the Soviet Union and the instability that resulted from a weak state that was not able to control its own communities. These issues contribute to the complexity of the Abkhazian/Georgian conflict, but ethnic and historical considerations can be exaggerated. Other factors involved: economic discrimination and perceived economic inequalities the role of outside powers (Russia) and other actors, such as organized crime groups and arms dealers who have an interest in seeing the conflict continue from a strategic or economic profit standpoint the wealth or strategic importance of the territory (fertile land, temperate climate, and strategic sea ports), concomitant with the psychological and emotional factors of preserving what is considered sacred territory Jones asserted in response to Robin Bhatty during the question and answer session that "language" and bad luck can be overstated and that the Abkhazian/Georgian conflict was so complex that it was the result of many different factors. This shows a tangible lack of consensus among experts on a basic and critical issue: the causes of ethnic conflict in the FSU. Jones stated that the most critical factor in his opinion is the sense of fear of cultural destruction, making the Abkhaz conflict fundamentally about security. If progress is to be made, Jones said, the multiple factors at play must be identified and "concrete demands" should be "addressed [and] divorced, whenever possible, from ethnic issues." Addressing such issues as safety, infrastructure repair, better healthcare and education, the end of political and economic institutional discrimination, and the replacement of corrupt officials with effective ones to administer real plans for improving the lives of the people in both communities is a start. Jones said, "Conflict resolution should begin by trying to fix these complaints in cooperative non-ethnic frameworks." One of these non-ethnic settings, Jones said, is economic development - economic prosperity is a common goal for all peoples, they are "concrete, mutually beneficial, and (usually) promote cooperation across ethnic divisions." Both sides of the Abkhazia/Georgia conflict have to realize that they have mutual economic interests, such as the Ingur-Hess hydroelectric plant, repairing North-South transit routes to facilitate trade from the FSU and Turkey, and reaping the benefits of Western investment in the Caspian Sea. Economic cooperation could play several roles: it could lay the basis for popular reconciliation, especially in eliminating some of the popular resentment in Abkhazia in response to the Georgian economic blockade it could spur greater involvement by the international community, especially Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) the failure to make Georgia pay for the conflict has alienated Abkhazia and the chance to share in the economic development beginning to enter Georgia may serve as a catalyst Conversely, the presence of 250,000 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) who have a "volatile influence" on radicalizing Georgian politics and are an economic burden and the fact that the conflict has prevented improvements in Russian-Georgian relations, may provide incentives for Georgia to lift the sanctions and begin to engage Abkhazia on an economic level Jonathan Cohen, Program Associate at Conciliation Resources in London and an Amnesty International delegate to Georgia, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia, said that because the conflict in Georgia is a particularly violent one (in which some 10,000 people have died and hostilities continue sporadically) it would be useful to look at the negotiating process to better understand the conflict. He said that this process has many layers: the UN in Geneva; attempts by outside powers like Russia to push the parties to the table; bilateral talks between Georgian and Abkhaz authorities that have proven mostly futile; and "second track diplomacy" conducted by NGOs. Cohen said the conflict should be seen not as a series of independent actions or events, but as a process. Mentioning the negotiation process and illuminating domestic considerations was one way of showing this. Cohen analyzed the various internal constraints on Georgian and Abkhazian policy, on how both states operate internally and externally, especially in terms of moderating their negotiating stance. Neither state is a "monolith" and, therefore, such factors must be considered. On the Georgian side, Cohen said there are numerous constraints on how the Georgian political elite can operate in the peace process. Georgian policy and flexibility is handicapped by several internal realities of the Georgian State: the existence of tension with Ossetian and Ajarian minorities within Georgia that place constraints on the way in which the Georgian state functions and how it proceeds in the negotiating process with Abkhazia the presence of between 200,000 and 300,000 displaced Georgians from Abkhazia (IDPs) which serves as a "tremendous constituency that can disrupt the way in which an attempt to pursue a rational policy occurs" Moreover, there is the very straight-forward fear that moderating its negotiating stance towards Abkhazia would provide the recognition Abkhazia seeks, but also the confidence to push for an independent state or eliminate restrictions to uniting with Russia. Likewise, Abkhazia has its own constraints. The fact that Abkhaz society is smaller makes the Abkhaz political elite narrower and more susceptible to irrational nationalist policy. While there is political debate within Abkhazia, the Abkhazian elite has sought to "impose solidarity" in the face of the Georgian threat. It is this unity of community and of purpose that enabled Abkhazia to stand against the Georgian threat; pluralism is therefore seen as a threat. In addition, the lack of a functioning economy to meet the needs of social welfare has radicalized Abkhazian society itself. Cohen noted that, "there are many people within the civil society circles who are in many ways more radical than the President of Abkhazia." The power of organized crime in business operations, clan mentality, the influence of nationalistic nomenklatura, and the creation of an entire generation of displaced, alienated, and traumatized youth all factor into sustaining the violent status quo. Cohen stated that both sides see many risks in making their negotiation stance more accommodating. For Georgia, the fear of giving Abkhazia any recognition has hindered Georgia's ability to engage the Abkhaz in negotiating political or economic solutions. While such engagement may in fact build confidence in Abkhazia, Georgians see risk. Rezo Adamia, the Chairman of Defense and Security in the Georgian Parliament, posited that the conflict in Abkhazia is neither ethnic nor economic and that, as with most of the conflicts in the region, it was the direct result of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Adamia places the blame on Russia for inciting violence among the ethnic groups of the newly independent states to foster fear and provide a rationale for joining a reconstructed "modernized union" of states. He asserted that Abkhazia offered no proclamations of liberty or prosperity to explain the reasons behind their drive to separate from Georgia; their motivations were political. Adamia said that Abkhazia's secession has had direct economic costs. He stated that the three main sectors of the Abkhazian economy - transport, tourism, and agriculture - have suffered enormously from stalled negotiations and periodic violence; all three sectors are "shadows" of what they used to be. In addition, Adamia said that the exodus of many of Abkhazia's residents, including most of the trained and educated people, has left mostly militants in the republic. Lastly, he noted that the Abkhazian political leadership is regressive, "orthodox communist," and not interested in making economic reform or development a priority. He said that the Abkhaz leader, Ardzinda, and his "Soiuz" political faction were very much pro-Russian and are the "most vigorous supporters of Russian imperialism..." Viacheslav Chirikba, the Official Abkhaz Representative to Western Europe, presented the Abkhazian position on resolving the conflict. Abkhazia's first position is its insistence on its independence. Chirikba said that there is no document in history that ties Abkhazia with Georgia and the Abkhaz leaders insist that Georgia sign the agreement reached on 4 April1994. He stated that Abkhazia has all the trappings of an independent state: its own constitution (of 1994), parliament, president, foreign policy, and army. He insisted that discussions will not involve the internal political structure of Abkhazia because the 1994 agreement preserves both states' constitutions and that any further negotiations will be relegated to constructing a federal association of an "independent" Abkhazia with the Republic of Georgia. Under such an agreement, both sides will maintain their constitutional structures and remain "separate entities within the framework of a union state." Several duties would be delegated to a joint governmental board: foreign policy and foreign economic relations, public control regulations, cost and services, energy regulation, transport, communications, ecology, and human rights. Chirikba noted that the 1994 agreement was signed by Abkhazia and witnessed by the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN). Chirikba further maintained that the UN stated its support for Abkhazian "sovereign rights" in a report dated 3 May 1994 and that the Abkhaz position has remained unchanged for five years. Chirikba said
that the Abkhazian/Georgian conflict was one of the most "manageable"
conflicts of the FSU because Abkhazia has stated its determination
to reunite with the Republic of Georgia under a different negotiated
federal agreement. Secondly, he noted that Georgia has stated its
willingness to cede a great deal of autonomy and power to Abkhazia.
These two elements were absent in Nagorno-Karabakh and Chechnya.
He offered three steps towards reaching a settlement: end the propaganda war, which "poisons the atmosphere of the talks," creating radical positions on both sides promote reconciliation between two communities which have no history of animosity prior to the conflict; this can facilitate the repatriation of refugees thereby eliminating a destabilizing element By taking such steps, Chirikba asserted, both sides can create an atmosphere conducive to a lasting settlement. Robin Bhatty, a Fellow in Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Toronto, presented an economic analysis of the effects international structures have on the economic prospects of both seceding and parent states. Bhatty said that economic analysis should provide a clear answer to why secession happens. He said that secession should occur when the economic result would be an increase in the quality of life for the residents of that state. He said that economic costs should be a "powerful tool for deflating secessionist movements," but because of ethno-political factors, this is not always the case. Bhatty used external energy investment as the tool for this analysis because "private sector calculation of risk" may offer an alternative to purely political explanations. He said that while the economic benefits of oil investment would not be as large for Georgia as generally believed, the conflict has not "dramatically inflated the perceived risks of investment in Georgia relative to other factors." This, he said underlines a common factor of secession, brought up by Jones, that the burden of cost is clearly one-sided unless the secessionist state works to transfer a portion of the cost to the parent state. In sum, Georgia has not only survived but will benefit from oil investment in the Caspian leaving Abkhazia in isolation. Abkhazia for its part has failed to achieve any real international recognition and has yet to "generate comparable economic interest in Russia or the West." Such is one economic cost for Abkhazia. Georgia has benefited from the first wave of Production Sharing Agreements (PSA) between Azerbaijan and foreign oil companies - the first signed was in 1994 between the Azeri Government and the Azerbaijan International Oil Consortium (AIOC) - by sharing part of the export pipeline running from the Caspian to the Black Sea. Georgia stands to receive $.17/barrel/day. While this represents a fraction of the revenues gained by Azerbaijan ($.43/barrel/day) and that paid to other oil producing countries, it is a critical infusion of money for a suffering economy. Georgian budget revenues for 1999, the first year of the pipeline's operation, are estimated to be around $2 billion and are expected to reach $6 billion by the year 2000. In addition, Georgia stands to benefit from spill over investment as foreign companies and agencies seek to invest in the area. Bhatty noted that this has created a sense of optimism among Georgian elites about the prospects of the ailing economy and the ability of the Georgian Government to entice Abkhazia back into union with Georgia. Bhatty asserted that the Abkhaz situation has created a paradoxical situation common to almost all secession movements in this period of intense global economic internationalization. This system has made secession a "viable policy choice for sub-states," but only for those that can continue to maintain and expand access to global markets. The risks of secession are now directly tied to the ability of a sub-state to win the consent of the parent state and therefore gain acceptance into the system of viable states. Bhatty stated: "Failure to do so maximizes the risk faced by possible investors, due to the unresolved status of the seceding territory, which denies investors access to insurance. Unrecognized status also acts to block access to international aid and credits." This is applicable to almost all the cases studied at the conference. He summed up by saying that secession is "the province of risk," both political and economic, and that the economic costs and benefits of a secessionist escapade should be considered with care. Political risk has direct economic consequences. For energy investment in the Caspian Basin, as in other conflict zones of the world, conflict is incorporated into the cost of operations; investors and lenders will charge a higher rate to support the operation. He said, however, that the dynamics are changing. Political considerations related to private investment in regions of conflict may indeed be losing relevancy as the private sector extends its reach into foreign policy, long the territory of states and governments. He cited the struggle between private oil companies in the U.S. and Turkey and the American and Turkish Governments over the location of the Main Export Pipeline for Caspian crude as an example of the growing power of the private sector and purely economic considerations in the making of foreign policy. This will have far-reaching effects on future secessionist movements. In response to questions about the Abkhazia/Georgia conflict, Bhatty stated that one thing that makes this case unique is that it turned extremely violent. He said that one must consider the unfortunate circumstances that led up to the outbreak of violence between the two communities. He said that what was supposed to be a police operation to secure transport routes turned out to be a "series of cat fights between local inhabitants" precipitated from the violent actions of Kitovani's "mob." Lack of judicial control and deterrence contributed to the downward spiral of the conflict. He noted that similar events did not occur in other minority areas of Georgia, such as Ajaria, which have Russian military bases and "uncomfortable" relations with the Georgian Government. He said that one cannot discount the simple fact that both sides "had a really bad day" and a situation resulted that spiraled out of control. Gia Tarkhan-Mouravi, President of the International Center for Geopolitical and Regional Studies in Tbilisi, discussed implications of the Abkhazia/Georgia conflict. He noted that there is a problem with the idea that nations and ethnic groups have to "protect and maintain their identity, cultural tradition, and existence" as "group interests." There is an inherent conflict between the notions of individual and ethnic rights and those differences make "the moral evaluation of any political scenario" difficult. The moral dimension complicates the Abkhaz conflict and makes the two sides' positions even more incompatible. Tarkhan-Mouravi said that the failure to resolve the crisis can be attributed to several factors, including the exploitation of nationalist and ethnic strategies by political elites and the absence of international institutions committed to coordinating a resolution through building "partnerships and flexible strategies." He also noted the importance of the demographic issue. As with Quebec, fears of ethnic domination and cultural extinction lead to a perceived threat, which leads to insecurity among the population and, therefore, instability. The main source of instability comes from Georgian IDPs driven from Abkhazia who place the most pressure on the government in Tbilisi and form the greatest threat to Abkhazians. The solution to their predicament is hinged not only on the fear of ethnic dominance, which is zero-sum in nature, but also on fears of violent retribution once the Georgian majority is repatriated. He said that safety, prosperity, and "participation in governance" are the basic needs of a society. Any solution should address improvements in these areas and establish a step by step process that will slowly build confidence among both populations and reduce the fears through the construction of a "formal democracy" instead of an "ethnic democracy." Implications for Abkhazia: a militarized population and economy, which is a large obstacle to the construction of "development-oriented thinking" lack of international recognition the conflict strengthened the underlying, if not expressed, notion that Georgia is "enemy number one" crime, disorder, devastated economic and transportation infrastructure, poverty, unemployment, lack of investment interest, and overall economic decline
Tarkhan-Mouravi also discussed the role of Russia. He said that Russia perceived a window of opportunity to preserve its military position and its influence in the so-called "Near Abroad" by manipulating and stoking ethnic tensions in the Caucasus. Who better to step in and provide peacekeeping troops and order than the new states' former patron? But, this had implications for Russia as well. He already spoke of pushing Georgia into the arms of the West. The involvement of Russian troops, arms traders, and economic policy advisors has not only polarized many of the combatants even further, but Russia's involvement in post-Soviet strategic maneuvering also distorts Russia's reform process, allowing political elites in Moscow to be hypnotized by "post-imperial nostalgia." Ian Bremmer
The
Political Economics of Secession :
|
Implications
for Georgia:
 |