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The
Political Economics of Secession : BARCELONA REPORT: SECOND PLENARY
SECOND PLENARY
Alain Dubuc, an economist and Editorial Page Editor of La Presse in Montreal Canada, delivered the presentation on the secessionist movement in Quebec. Dubuc stated that global economic changes over the course of the Quebec separatist movement, which began in the 1960's as a socialist anti-colonial movement, had profound effects on the economic issues concerning secession. He said that arguments for and against secession on the "economic side" changed several times over the decades. In the 1970's, following the formation of the Parti Québecois and its rise to power in the province in 1976, the movement matured and began to consider economic issues in relation to separation. The debate during the 1970's centered on whether or not continued union with Canada had detrimental effects on development in Quebec, whether an independent Quebec would be more likely to possess "all the tools it needs to ensure development or not." The debate became not about just identity and ideology, but about the "viability of the Quebec economy" - about whether or not a small country dependent on government subsidies had a realistic chance of surviving in the global economy. The fear that Quebec would not be able to survive and prosper independently was the most likely reason for the defeat of the first referendum on independence in 1980. The 1980's saw rapid economic development and the growth of a new class of French-speaking entrepreneurs. This was one concrete result of nationalistic policy in Quebec. In addition, changes in the dynamics of Canadian trade, with the United States replacing Europe and other Canadian provinces for Quebec's main trading partner, increased the confidence among the Quebec elite that a small country may in fact be able to prosper on its own. Suddenly the debate centered on a cost-benefit analysis for both sides. Pros, such as controlling your own economic and political "tools" and the enthusiasm linked to independence, and cons, such as inheriting an enormous amount of Canada's debt (highest levels in the G7) and disruptions in investment and capital flows, were weighed. The result was a common perception that the costs would be overwhelming and the "overall impact" of secession would be negative on Quebec's development and standard of living. Dubuc said that the effect of citing "economic costs was to dampen the enthusiasm that was created by the sovereigntists." He noted that, as is typical of wealthy democratic states, the Quebecois were not willing to pay the costs for a formal independent state. He said, "...even for something as wonderful as creating your own country, the idea didn't wash." Dubuc highlighted the complexity of the debate over Quebec secession. Economic factors and ideology were used by both sides of the debate to support their positions. However, the issue did not die in the 1980's. In 1995 the second referendum on independence almost won with a 49.6% final vote in favor. Dubuc attributed this to the "shock" factor, the desire for French speaking residents of Quebec to send a clear message to the rest of Canada that, while they were hesitant to leave, they insisted on having greater recognition and autonomy as a "special" unit within the Canadian Federation. The 1995 referendum turned a previously amicable debate into a serious threat to the economic and political cohesion of Canada. As a consequence, emotions on the federalist side rose. Suddenly the prospect of losing 23% of Canada's GNP and the coveted seat at the G7 table became a stark possibility. Also, the existence of a bilingual society is important to most Canadians, if for no other reason than to distinguish Canada from the United States. The second problem Dubuc cited was that following the fallout from the 1995 referendum, it became clear that most of the economic debate associated with Quebec secession was in fact political. The questions raised by Canada were not about currency or debt or ending transfer payments to Quebec, but about how Canada would come to terms with political issues such as sharing the Canadian currency and infrastructures, seeing the Canadian Federation split in two, and the issue of the Anglophone and Native minorities loyal to Canada in Quebec. Dubuc stated that the behavior and decisions of the federalists must be "cast as political assumptions." Several other problems arose with the rapid changes occurring in the global system. Dubuc stated that states continue to lose some sense of relevancy in the interdependent global system. If this is true, then why should there be a need for independent statehood? If states are losing their role as primary international actors, why not remain part of an established state with a reputation, influence, and power? This is true also for the identity of states and nations, as cultures experience increasing homogenization. If Quebec were to split from Canada, it "would be crushed by global policies and would not be able to maintain the kind of difference it wants." He cited Canada's welfare system. If Quebec were to exist as an independent actor in the global market place, it would be unlikely to be able to protect such a generous system. Welfare states in Europe can continue, with modifications and a certain level of reform, because they have the protection of the European economic and social union to protect their otherwise cost-prohibitive systems. In this respect, Dubuc attests, Canada offers some important advantages. In Dubuc's opinion, the possibility of Quebec independence is not good. While sovereigntists periodically command the support of 40-50% of the Quebecois, they have yet to, even in non-election polls, reach the 50+% necessary for secession. It appears that most Quebecois favor greater autonomy within Canada. So, he attributed the continuation of the secessionist issue in Quebec to the creation of the debate by political elites in the 1960's as a choice between outright independence or continued union with Canada. He implied that the elitist construct may have trapped the Parti Québecois in its own game. Lastly, Dubuc touched upon the factors outlined by O'Leary. He said that following twenty years of linguistic freedom, few French-speaking Quebecois fear English-speaking Canada. People older than the baby boomers are the only ones who remember language and employment discrimination against French speakers and therefore, are the staunchest sovereigntists. However, Dubuc said, the reality of minority politics is that minorities are susceptible to paranoia and have a constant fear for their security. He said that, given the fact that the French-speaking population in Canada will continue to shrink in relation to its fellow Anglophone citizens (especially with the high rate of immigration into Canada from the Third World), some sort of formal constitutional guarantee of Quebec's French community is necessary to end the acrimonious and divisive debate once and for all. Jonathan Miller, a freelance journalist formerly with News Corporation in London, discussed the dynamics of devolution in the United Kingdom (UK), with emphasis on Scotland. Miller stated that the creation of regional legislatures in Scotland and Wales (and Northern Ireland if the 1998 Agreement is fulfilled) through Prime Minister Tony Blair's constitutional reform program has brought the identities of the United Kingdom, Great Britain, and even England into question. What was once "one of the most stable bastions of political economy anywhere in the world" is suddenly facing the prospect of dissolution and of becoming a "neo-federal kingdom" - a concept historically anathema to the English. The "glue of culture, tradition, and institutions" that has kept the UK together for centuries is under threat not only from internal devolutionary forces, but also from unifying forces from the EU, namely the advent of the euro. Miller stated that by allowing the Scots to have their parliament, Blair may have created a situation where, rather than being satisfied with greater regional power long promised by the Labour Party, Scotland may seek to use its new power to push for secession from the UK. Blair's policy has "opened fault lines in the most basic political geology of the British Isles." Miller noted that there has been latent resentment to the English absorption of Scotland in 1707, which was reinforced by Thatcher economic policies that used Scotland as a laboratory for economic experiments. He added that the threat of a "red" independent Scotland during the Cold War prevented any consideration of Scottish nationalist demands. The end of the Cold War has eliminated this factor and allowed Westminster to grant Edinburgh limited regional self-determination. Miller stated that where the process proceeds from here is an open question. He said that UK devolution has created an intriguing paradox: the possibility of demands for an English parliament. The political reconfiguration of the UK bargain creates new issues and problems of political structures and of the very identity of the English. Would Westminster, the parliament of Great Britain, become the English parliament? How would London deal with Scottish MPs in both Edinburgh and Westminster, Ulster MPs in both Belfast and Westminster and so on? The Campaign for an English Parliament has been established to fight for the formation of a purely English body to handle domestic and regional issues, leaving foreign and defense policy to a "reduced" Westminster. A related consequence is the issue of fear of inequity among the English in such a federal state. There is a fear among some people that Scotland could come to dominate England through its culture, higher oil revenues, and a greater number of MPs. This is an issue that will continue to arise if devolution proceeds beyond the current arrangement. Miller said the existence of the EU, with a stable currency, security and economic integration, and its regional development aid, will have two major effects on the outcome of this embryonic process. First, it has convinced some Scottish nationalists that it is possible for Scotland to exist and flourish independent of England. This dynamic was touched upon in the question and answer session with regard to Quebec too. Dubuc felt it would be more problematic in the case of Quebec because (1) Scotland is already part of the EU through the UK and (2) an independent Quebec membership in the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) would depend on American acceptance and Canadian acquiescence. The existence of the EU, especially the single currency, may "lubricate" Scottish secession. What, Miller queried, would happen if Scotland decided to join the euro while London continued to cling to the sterling? Secondly, the political and economic developments of the EU have created momentum for the union of the states of Western Europe, which, when added to prospects for even basic devolution, could act as an overwhelming centrifugal force pulling the UK apart. Miller said that confusion and inaction on the part of England will worsen its chances of halting the process and creating an alternative formation that preserves the UK, even in a federal format. Ian Bremmer
The
Political Economics of Secession :
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