Commentary for World Policy Institute Symposium on Cuba
Drafted for presentation in Mobile, Alabama, June 9, 2005
Not presented due to travel difficulty; faxed to the symposium instead

I suspect that what would be most interesting to you in the brief time I have would be some impressions I have received from the Cuban armed forces during four visits I made to the island in the late 1990s and early 2000s. I undertook these as part of a bilateral effort to develop a measure of military-to-military contact which could be of long term benefit to our respective countries.
I must emphasize at the outset that the US Government has not officially authorized any such activity since we broke relations 45 years ago, but moderates on both sides have long recognized the advantages of "technical" and "academic" connections even in times of great stress. Officially, the embassies on both sides are closed, but the physical facilities and staffs still exist, and both sides do their best to keep abreast of what is going on the opposite country. My participation in the visits was unofficial and unrecognized by the US Government. On the Cuban side, it was probably seen as an opportunity to clarify their security policies and their determination to defend their country from attack from any quarter - - most especially from the United States.
Their principal story is as follows:
> The greatest threat to Cuba is the United States. The US has had designs on Cuban territory without much let-up since administration of Thomas Jefferson.
> Since the departure of the Soviets in the 1990s, Cuba has assumed full responsibility for its own national defense. The key to Cuban defense is a strategy of "a war of all the people." Every man, woman and child has a role to play in event of hostile attack.
> US tactical military doctrine is known to depend heavily upon attacks by aircraft and missiles to subdue its opponents. There fore, all of Cuba's important national control and military facilities will be placed under ground. Every community in Cuba will help prepare subterranean defense installations on a volunteer basis. In the words of General Rosales-del-Toro, former Chief of the General Staff, "Any invader would have to come down from his aircraft and off of his ships and meet us man-to-man in the field." The general emphasized that Cuba could muster more people in an emergency than an aggressor could soldiers. He would punctuate his remarks with a broad, alligator-like grin. I found the gesture a little unnerving, since he kept a real stuffed alligator lying on the floor, across the room, with the same expression on its face.
I found it interesting, in a conversation with one of the brighter general staff officers I had come to know, that he fully expected an attack from the United States in the near future. When I suggested that the United States might not have any such intention, he looked at me askance. His reply: "Don't kid me, General. Just since the last time I saw you, you have invaded Bosnia, you've occupied Albania, you've deployed troops to Macedonia and Kosovo, and you've bombed Serbia into jelly. Now don't tell me that Cuba is not somewhere on your list."
The officer's words came back to me with some force a little later, particularly when we invaded Afghanistan, and more acutely, Iraq for the second time. There is no doubt but that Cuban officers are deeply distrustful of our policies. However much they may admire certain aspects of our country, they are highly fearful of our intentions. They don't want to be the next target of attack. They greatly fear that if they appear weak or unprepared to defend their island, they will be the next victims.
Clearly, this is what lies behind their enthusiasm for hosting American military visitors and educating them on their strategy and capabilities. Unfortunately, such visits have been terminated by the United States, so that slim opportunity for developing some connections, which might prove helpful in time of crisis, or in time of inevitable change of leadership in the future, will no longer be there.
Undoubtedly, some of you harbor suspicions of the utility of such visits. Let me give you some taste of what we were seeing.
Over the period of years, we met with the top members of the general staff, the foreign ministry, and the peoples' congress. We also had extended sessions - running until four o'clock in the morning - with Fidel Castro. As most of you know, he is a human talking machine, and there was seldom a moment of pause. He gave us the flavor of his views on a range of subjects, including battle tactics, drug traffic control, and the conversion of his principal industrial complexes to Western business standards. In the latter area he took great pride in explaining how he had educated his business operators to embrace profit-making practices.
Of course, the military sector was our principal focus. We visited the Cuban school of battle tactics, the war college of advanced studies, the cadet school, and the non-commissioned officers' school. We visited the home station of the armored brigade which took over the equipment the Soviets left behind, and the central complex of an underground facility for tactical operations control and the storage of heavy equipment and supplies for another regiment.
There were artillery pieces, armored vehicles, ammunition dumps, medical supplies, food and water, almost all under protective plastic sheeting and humidity control devices.
We visited the naval base, which the Soviets had used for their submarines (leaving a large number of the batteries behind - perhaps deliberately in case of emergency – the Cubans still maintain the batteries with a trickle of current running through them).
We paid two visits to the Juragua nuclear power plant to see how that was progressing. (As you know, that installation is sort of a up-dated Chernoble, but inconveniently down-wind from Florida and Mobile, Alabama.) We visited the principal hospital in Havana, the Che Gevara boarding school, a military farm, an ammunition factory, and a free trade zone where Cuban workers were manufacturing Swiss-designed electronic devices for the South American market.
Early-on we visited the Cuban Naval Academy, but that was subsequently consolidated with the school of tactics, and the facility converted to a medical school for Latin American students - several thousand of them. They were an enthusiastic bunch. Whatever the quality of the four-year course, I would expect that most graduates would have some nice things to say about "Uncle" Fidel and his generous country when they are back in their villages in the Andes.
Notably, we were politely received at the headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Security and briefed on their operations for coastal and air security. They routinely track suspected drug-laden aircraft hauling their goods across Cuban air space to the Straits of Florida or the Bahama Bank. There they dump their loads for pick-up by high-speed motor launches. Interesting enough, we were allowed to have a Coast Guard officer attached to our Interests' Section with communications to our coastal patrols. At the time of our last visit the Cubans had gone as far as taking him aboard their armed surface patrol craft, but I don't know how that program has developed, given our "hold" on virtually all other cooperative activities. A Cuban sector commander told me that the illicit air traffic was so dense that they had long-since given up trying to force them all down. Considering their shortage of aviation fuel,. the best they could do was to track the aircraft and notify our officer.
Finally, let me give you some idea of what I think of the officers I met. First, I think they are very proud of their country and are dedicated to its defense. Few of them appear given to debating their political system. I suspect that many of them have misgivings, but there is a keen sense that this is a proud era in their history in which the Cuban state is run by Cubans. The had enough of the Spaniards. They had enough of the Americans, with our infamous Platt Amendment and invasions to insure American interests.
They also wonder why we are still in Guantanamo 100 years after we seized it. I have not had an opportunity to talk to them since the 9/11 disaster, but I would expect that they are also wondering a bit about our sincerity when we talk about mistreatment of inmates in Cuban prisons while we maintain the now infamous stink-hole of prisons in Guantanamo.
Like most of us, I think they are looking for a better future when current leaders on both sides move on, and new ones, perhaps with a better understanding of each other come to power. I hope we all live to see that.
Edward B. Atkeson, Major General, USA (Ret.) Senior Fellow, Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the US Army