U.S. should alter course on Cuban relations
Birmingham News, Sunday, July 10, 2005
WILLIAM D. ROGERS
The National Summit on Cuba held in Mobile last month had a certain poigna
ncy for me. It served to recall how long our two countries have been at each other's
throats, what the Fidel Castro regime has done to Cuba and to its once warm
relations with the Gulf Coast - and how out of date is the U.S. effort to strangle
the Cuban economy.
For many long years I have been embroiled, vexed and obsessed by the dilemma
that is Cuba - from the late 1950s when, as legal counsel to the Puerto Rican
government, I watched the overthrow of Batista, the triumphant arrival of
Castro in the capital and the bloodbath of executions that followed; then in
the State Department managing the Alliance for Progress that Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson had devised to blunt Castro's ambitions in Latin America;
a decade later when, as assistant secretary of state for Latin America, I ran
a year and half of secret negotiations with Castro's government to normalize
relations between our two countries; and for the past two decades as chair of
the Council on Foreign Relations Cuba Task Force and adviser to other policy
groups.
The sum of this experience makes for several grim realizations, and a wake-up
call for all who care about American leadership in this hemisphere.

First, those who see the embargo as a chip in a negotiation leading to
dismantlement of the regime are kidding themselves. There is no package of
inducements we can put together that will lead Castro to change. The Castro
system is bolted on in Cuba as long as he is there.
I have been persuaded of the durability of that system since I participated in
clandestine negotiations with Castro's team as a representative of the U.S.
State Department in the mid-1970s. With Henry Kissinger's endorsement and as
an extension in the Western Hemisphere of his broad strategy of detente with
the Soviet empire, I offered Cuba, then a staunch Soviet satellite,
concessions which I thought - as I later told Castro - were too good to turn
down.
But they were turned down. In my view, Castro had carefully calculated that a
normalized relationship and the American trade and investment that follow
would cost him more in lost justification for the regime than he would have
gained economically. Castro needs the United States as a threat. Having an
enemy serves to sustain his system. The embargo plays into his hands. This
reality has become the conventional wisdom in the Senate and House of
Representatives, where bills to ease the embargo have repeatedly gained
majority support, only to be dashed by leadership at the White House's behest. Second, Washington's policy of trying to isolate Cuba and restrict its
economic development can't and won't work. A multilateral embargo worked to
change South Africa, but our 45-year embargo of Cuba has been a lonely ride.
According to the Economist magazine, Cuba's economy has been growing fairly
steadily in the past decade, having miraculously withstood the massive
depression caused by the Soviet pullout 15 years ago. New domestic oil and
natural gas have energy analysts speculating that Cuba may soon be energy
self-sufficient. And even if these finds cannot be developed as expected,
tighter ties with other strategic friends both regionally and overseas are
helping Cuba.
Although a less hostile attitude here will not likely spark any political
change in Cuba, a fresh U.S. policy is nonetheless very much in order. Castro
might not welcome it in his heart of hearts. But it is in our national
interest to see a greater American presence in Cuba, more not fewer tourists,
more Cuban-Americans visiting relatives, a thickening web of business ties and
of American products to Cuba. This presence now will enhance the possibility
of a peaceful transition then.
Castro's death will open up a host of possible scenarios. A tide of Cubans
might flee the island for our own Gulf Coast. There might be a massive return
of Cuban-Americans. The transition of power could be untidy and contested.
There might be calls for U.S. military intervention. To sit on our hands and
wait until the event to figure out our post-Castro relationship with the
island is asking for trouble.
Lastly, but perhaps most importantly, while our relations with Cuba are
frozen, our ties with the rest of Latin America are altering before our very
eyes. A variety of populisms, each inspired to a greater or lesser degree by
the Cuban example, is hitting key countries such as Venezuela, a country we
depend upon heavily for our domestic oil consumption. The United States is
losing ground and influence in our own hemisphere. Anti-Americanism is on the
rise. Castro is markedly more popular on the Latin American "street" than
George W. Bush. Our hostile relationship with Castro is central. He is seen as
standing tall against American influence. We damage our own interests by
playing Goliath to his David. And to no avail.
My view, after four decades of pondering Cuba? The United States should alter
course. Unilaterally. Expect no concessions from Castro, whom we should view
as a nonactor, popping that larger-than-life balloon we have made of him.
Allow such American trade and investment as American businesses conceive to be
in their commercial interest and worth the risk. Institute full and open
diplomatic relations. Encourage family visits, travel and full intellectual
exchange. Such moves, supported by a majority of members of Congress and
Americans at large, would tip the balance and set the stage for a full
reassessment of American leadership in what we often refer to as our own
backyard.
My apprehension? Washington is no more likely to learn from history than
Havana. William D. Rogers was assistant secretary of state for inter-American
affairs from 1974-1976 and currently is vice chairman of Kissinger Associates
Inc.