Illuminating the Arts-Policy Nexus 

The past two months have seen some interesting developments in Sino-Indian relations. Immediately after India’s official entrance into the group of nuclear states sent shudders through the nonproliferation community worldwide, the latest round of discussions between the Asian giants came and went with little fanfare. Taken together, these developments further confound rather than illuminate understanding of the lurching relationship between the world’s two most populous states. Earlier this month, the U.S. Congress approved a deal that allows American companies (like General Electric and Westinghouse) to sell India atomic fuel and nuclear technology. A month before Congress made the deal official, member states of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) had waived the usual restrictions to entry into the elite club, warmly welcoming India as the newest nation to openly possess nuclear weapons; this despite the fact that India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The move landed with a whimper in the U.S. media, but has made a huge splash in Indian news, where the event was largely celebrated as something of a coming out party—India, no longer the shy debutante. Others took notice too: companies in Canada, France, and Russia are salivating at the opportunity to sell nuclear-related material to India, a country once denied such privileges. Many in the NPT crowd are worried about the implications of this NSG deal. Adam B. Kushner of Newsweek warns that the NSG agreement may spark a nuclear arms race with the likes of Pakistan and Iran. Likewise, Daryl Kimball of the Arms Control Association says the move blows “a huge loophole in the global non-proliferation system that’s going to make it harder to persuade the Irans and the North Koreas—an already difficult task—to abide by their obligations; and it’s going to make it more difficult to strengthen this global non-proliferation effort which is already fraying at the seams.” But both analysts largely overlook the serious implications with regard to China.

It is something of a marvel that the U.S.-India civilian nuclear agreement actually managed to receive the approval, however grudging, of the 45-nation Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in early September. Many ardent proponents of nonproliferation had hoped that a curious combination of countries—ranging from a staunch U.S. ally, Australia, to a potential U.S. challenger, China—for very different reasons, would bury the deal in the NSG. The Australians were concerned about seeming to reward India, which has steadfastly refused to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). China, on the other hand, while couching its arguments in the rhetoric of nonproliferation, simply did not want to let India join the de facto nuclear club. Deft Indian and American diplomacy, combined with a subtle display of American political clout, including a phone call from President Bush to Chinese premier Hu Jintao, saved the day. Despite this setback, the nonproliferation zealots still hope to have their day in Congress. Already some key members of the House, notably Edward Markey of Massachusetts and Howard Berman of California (both Democrats), have made intransigence to the deal well known. As Congress convenes to consider the deal, the nonproliferation brigade will quickly muster every conceivable argument, no matter how specious, to sandbag its progress. What are their principal objections? Most importantly, they argue that it will have perverse consequences for the nonproliferation regime. India, a de facto nuclear weapons state that has remained outside the ambit of the NPT, will be able to maintain its nuclear weapons program and still partake in global nuclear commerce. This, in their view, is tantamount to rewarding a recalcitrant state. Furthermore, they argue that states which had previously joined the NPT may now reconsider their decisions given that India has been granted a pass. They also contend that the deal will energize various deceitful states, ranging from Iran to North Korea, to boost their nuclear weapons programs. In a similar vein, they suggest that Pakistan (also a non-signatory to the NPT) will now insist on equal treatment. Finally, they claim that nuclear power cannot possibly serve as a panacea for India’s expanding energy needs. Each of these arguments, while seemingly attractive, is fundamentally flawed. The question of rewarding India despite its apparent recalcitrance is perhaps the most galling argument.

As India’s parliament debates whether or not to approve the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement today, more than the fate of the deal itself is at stake. The fate of India’s government, a coalition of multiple political parties headed by the Congress Party, and the political future of the country hangs in the balance. One thing is not in doubt: India may well be the most openly corrupt democracy in the world.