Illuminating the Arts-Policy Nexus 

Indian Environment Minister Jairam Ramesh urged Hillary Clinton to back off on climate change mandates when the two met in New Delhi last month. "There is simply no case for the pressure that we, who have amongst the lowest emissions per capita, face to actually reduce emissions," Ramesh brazenly told the secretary of state. Not quite the Bollywood ending Mrs. Clinton was expecting. Certainly not the ending desired by scientists and policymakers as they look ahead to December's Climate Conference in Copenhagen as a last-chance-dance for a meaningful international accord. But Bret Stephens, the former editor of the Jerusalem Post, sees the Clinton-Ramesh exchange as a perfect outcome for an unsuspecting group: the billions of humans living on less than $2 a day. “The poor told the warming alarmists to get lost," he writes in his August 4 Wall Street Journal column, describing Ramesh's shut down of Clinton, whose climate policy, Stephens believes, will threaten India’s access to the free market.

Stabilizing Afghanistan has emerged as one of the Obama administration’s top priorities. The president has expended significant effort to forge a new Afghan strategy, even firing the general in charge of the campaign in search of a fresh approach. Most discussions of the conflict focus on four actors: the insurgents, the Afghan government, the United States, and Pakistan. In fact, however, there is another important player in Afghanistan that receives much less attention: India. India has historic ties with Afghanistan and a long-standing relationship with its current leaders. Indian interests in Afghanistan largely converge with those of the United States and the international community. And India has invested considerable resources in helping to develop Afghanistan in the wake of civil war and Taliban rule. Thus India could potentially play an important future role in helping to stabilize the country. Such a role would not be without risk. Greater Indian involvement in Afghanistan could threaten Pakistan, thereby building support for the Taliban within the Pakistani military and security services. A greater role for Indian in Afghanistan might raise alarm in Islamabad, diverting Pakistani resources away from Afghanistan toward the border with India and increasing the likelihood of outright Indo-Pakistani conflict. Some basic diplomatic and military steps, however, would reduce these dangers and could help India to emerge as an important part of future efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. Indo-Afghan Ties The Indo-Afghan relationship goes back centuries. Long before the advent of British colonial power, the region that is now present-day India had extensive cultural and trade links with Afghanistan. The British launched several expeditionary efforts into the country from India, usually with disastrous consequences. In 1893, a formal border between Afghanistan and India, known as the Durand line, was drawn. British colonial rule in South Asia lasted for another 60 years. When it came to a close in 1947, the nascent state of Pakistan came to abut Afghanistan in the east. In the aftermath of Britain’s departure from the subcontinent, the Afghans repudiated this border, causing considerable tension with now-neighboring Pakistan. New Delhi, for its part, established close ties with Afghanistan’s King Zahir Shah after independence, and maintained these links until the king’s overthrow in 1973. Even after Zahir Shah’s ouster and the emergence of a communist regime, India managed to keep close ties with subsequent Afghan governments. The Soviet Union’s 1979 invasion and occupation of Afghanistan surprised and displeased New Delhi. But the Indians proved unable to cooperate with Pakistan on a solution to the problem. In addition, India was concerned by substantial United States military and economic assistance that began flowing to Pakistan—initially, $3.2 billion from 1981 to 1986. New Delhi also cared little for the Islamist mujahedeen groups that Pakistan was supporting to battle the Soviets. Finally, India did not wish to jeopardize its easy access to advanced Soviet weaponry. India therefore avoided any public censure of the U.S.S.R.’s occupation. Instead it chose to work with successive Soviet puppet regimes in Afghanistan. It also subsequently supported Ahmed Shah Massoud’s Northern Alliance because of its hostility towards the Pakistan-supported mujahedeen groups. India’s ties to Afghanistan were sundered when the Taliban seized power in 1996. The Taliban victory, which owed much to Pakistani support, enabled Islamabad to achieve an important goal: the establishment of a pliant regime in Afghanistan, which would give Pakistan “strategic depth” against India. New Delhi abandoned its embassy and withdrew its diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan. It did not, however, relinquish its ties to the Northern Alliance, and provided Massoud’s forces with a range of military and logistical backing. After September 11, 2001, India quietly supported the American-led effort to dismantle the Taliban regime. New Delhi was also pleased by U.S. efforts to promote the presidential bid of Hamid Karzai, who had lived and studied in India. After the Taliban’s fall, India moved quickly to reestablish its presence in Afghanistan. It re-opened its embassy in Kabul and its consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad, and established two new consulates in Herat and Mazhar-e-Sharif. It also became deeply involved in Afghan development, spending approximately $750 million, and pledging a total of $1.6 billion, to help rebuild the country—making India Afghanistan’s sixth-largest bilateral aid donor. Specific projects include efforts to rebuild the Afghan national airline, Ariana; construct telecommunications, power transmission, and road networks; improve sanitation; build a new Afghan parliament; and include Afghanistan in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). A Possible Backlash? New Delhi believes that its extensive involvement in Afghanistan will help to stabilize the country, thereby reducing the likelihood of a Taliban resurgence, limiting Pakistan’s regional influence, and facilitating Indian ties with the energy-rich states of Central Asia. India’s wish for a stable, Taliban-free Afghanistan, and a demonstrated willingness to invest significant resources in developing the country, align closely with the interests of the United States and the international community. Indeed, a larger role for India could be an important component of the new strategy that the Obama administration is attempting to devise for Afghanistan. A larger Indian presence in Afghanistan poses a significant problem, however; it could threaten Pakistan.

With parliamentary elections behind it, India shouldn’t be back at square one in its quest to settle the bitterly divisive issue of Kashmir, one that has led to three full-scale wars with Pakistan and that nearly brought the two countries to the brink of nuclear combat.

India missed its great opportunity to resolve the burning dispute with Pervez Musharraf before he was overthrown from the Pakistani presidency last year. According to the British and American diplomats I talked to 18 months ago in New Delhi and Islamabad, a deal was tantalizingly close. One British ambassador told me that India had to make very few concessions to strike a final deal and that the main barrier to the agreement was merely “psychological.”

If Musharraf wasn’t prepared to give away the store, the Pakistani compromises came close to it. But despite the seemingly friendly diplomacy of Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, the unwarlike prime minister Manmohan Singh and, in the background, (another peace-loving figure) the chairwoman of the Congress Party Sonia Gandhi, India couldn’t bring itself to go the extra mile.

Observers had different explanations for Indian intransigence: that Musharraff was trying to force the pace; that the Indian army, the intelligence services, and senior bureaucrats in the foreign ministry were resisting an accord; that the leadership had not made an effort to educate the electorate as the Pakistan government had done; that the prime minister was weak and only focused on the economy; that his (successful) attempt to lower the grinding poverty in the rural areas was also a preoccupation; that the time consuming nuclear deal with the U.S was critically important; and that India rather liked the status quo, since stubbornness fitted in with its self-image of being the subcontinent’s super power.

There was also the failure of the Bush administration—it pushed a deal through Congress that lifted the long-standing embargo on selling nuclear materials and reactors to India—that was, in Singh's words, “loved” by his country. America could have used the muscle afforded by the nuclear deal to instead help push India to sign on to Musharraf’s magnanimous offer.